CHAPTER ONE

Gender Makes the World Go Round

Where Are the Women?

Perhaps you have never imagined what it would feel like if you were a woman fleeing your home with your young children, escaping a violent conflict between government troops and rebel soldiers, crossing a national border, pitching a tent in a muddy refugee camp, and then being treated by aid staff workers as though you and the children you are supporting were indistinguishable, "womenandchildren."

Maybe, if any of your aunts or grandmothers have told you stories about having worked as domestic servants, you can more easily picture what your daily life would be like if you had left your home country to take a live-in job caring for someone else's little children or their aging parents. You can almost imagine the emotions you would feel if you were to Skype across time zones to your own children every week, but you cannot be sure how you would react when your employer insisted upon taking possession of your passport.

It probably feels like a stretch to see yourself working in a disco outside a foreign military base. It is hard to think about

Figure 1. Egyptian women protesting sexual harassment hold up signs in Arabic and English, Cairo, 2013. Photo: OPantiSH.

how you would try to preserve some modicum of dignity for yourself in the narrow space left between the sexualized expectations of your foreign male soldier-clients and the demands of the local disco owner who takes most of your earnings.

While you might daydream about becoming a senior foreign policy expert in your country's diplomatic corps, you may deliberately shy away from thinking about whether you will be able to sustain a relationship with a partner while you pursue this ambition. You try not to think about whether your partner will be willing to cope with both diplomacy's social demands and the pressures you together will endure living in a proverbial media fishbowl.

If you keep up with the world news, you may be able to put yourself in the shoes of a women's rights activist in Cairo, but

how would you decide whether to paint your protest sign only in Arabic or to add an English translation of your political message just so that CNN and Reuters viewers around the world can see that your revolutionary agenda includes not only toppling the current oppressive regime but also pursuing specifically feminist goals?

As hard as this will be, it will take all of this imagining—and more—if you are going to make reliable sense of international politics. Stretching your imagination, though, will not be enough. Making feminist sense of international politics requires that you exercise genuine curiosity about each of these women's lives—and the lives of women you have yet to think about. And that curiosity will have to fuel energetic detective work, careful digging into the complex experiences and ideas of domestic workers, hotel chambermaids, women's rights activists, women diplomats, women married to diplomats, women who are the mistresses of male elites, women sewing-machine operators, women who have become sex workers, women soldiers, women forced to become refugees, and women working on agribusiness plantations.

That is, making useful sense—feminist sense—of international politics requires us to follow diverse women to places that are usually dismissed by conventional foreign affairs experts as merely "private," "domestic," "local," or "trivial." As we will discover, however, a disco can become an arena for international politics. So can someone else's kitchen or your own closet.

And so can a secretary's desk. Consider, for instance, women who work as secretaries in foreign affairs ministries. They are treated by most political commentators as if they were no more interesting than the standard-issue furniture. But women as secretaries have played interesting roles in international events as significant as the controversial Iran-Contra Affair, which

exposed the clandestine American military intervention in Nicaragua in the 1980s, and as the secret Israel-Palestine peace negotiations in Oslo in the 1990s. Who pays attention to women as clerical workers when, allegedly, it is elite men (and a handful of elite women) who determine the fates of nations? Feminist researchers do. They challenge the conventional presumption that paying attention to women as secretaries tells us nothing about the dynamics of high-level politics. Feminist-informed investigators pay attention to low-status secretarial women because they have learned that paying attention to (listening to, taking seriously the observations of) women in these scarcely noticed jobs can pull back the curtain on the political workings in lofty state affairs. Devoting attention to women who are government secretaries, for instance, exposes the far-reaching political consequences of feminized loyalty, feminized secrecy, feminized record-keeping, feminized routine, masculinized status, and masculinized control.[1]

Thanks to innovative research by feminist-informed scholars, we know to look for secretaries throughout international politics. For instance, we recently have learned that in the 1920s and 1930s, some enterprising women—German, British, Dutch—pursued jobs in the newly launched League of Nations, the international organization founded in the wake of horrific World War I to remake interstate relations. These women were breaking new ground not only by becoming the first international civil servants but also by, as women, pursuing their own careers far from home. Working as secretaries and also as librarians, these women were the ones who ensured that the League of Nations documents would be produced and archived professionally. Because of these staff women's efforts, we now can launch our provocative reassessments of the League as a site not only for preventing war

but also for promoting international social justice. These women did not think of themselves as furniture.[2]

Some women, of course, have not been treated as furniture. Among those women who have become visible in the recent era's international political arena are Hillary Clinton, Mary Robinson, Angela Merkel, Christine Lagarde, Michelle Bachelet, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and Shirin Ebadi.[3] Each of these prominent women has her own gendered stories to tell (or, perhaps, to deliberately not tell). But a feminist-informed investigation makes it clear that there are far more women engaged in international politics than the conventional headlines imply. Millions of women are international actors, and most of them are not Shirin Ebadi or Hillary Clinton.

To make reliable sense of today's (and yesterday's) dynamic international politics calls both for acquiring new skills and for redirecting skills one already possesses. That is, making feminist sense of international politics necessitates gaining skills that feel quite new and redirecting skills that one has exercised before, but which one assumed could shed no light on wars, economic crises, global injustices, and elite negotiations. Investigating the workings of masculinities and femininities as they each shape complex international political life—that is, conducting a gender-curious investigation—will require a lively curiosity, genuine humility, a full tool kit, and candid reflection on potential misuses of those old and new research tools.[4]

Most of all, one has to become interested in the actual lives—and thoughts—of complicatedly diverse women. One need not necessarily admire every woman whose life one finds interesting. Feminist attentiveness to all sorts of women is not derived from hero worship. Some women, of course, will turn out to be insightful, innovative, and even courageous. Upon closer examination,

other women will prove to be complicit, intolerant, or self-serving. The motivation to take all women's lives seriously lies deeper than admiration. Asking "Where are the women?" is motivated by a determination to discover exactly how this world works. One's feminist-informed digging is fueled by a desire to reveal the ideas, relationships, and policies those (usually unequal) gendered workings rely upon.

For example, a British woman decides to cancel her plans for a winter holiday in Egypt. She thinks Egypt is "exotic," the warm weather would be welcome, and cruising down the Nile sounds exciting; but she is nervous about political upheaval in the wake of the overthrow of Egypt's previous regime. So instead she books her winter vacation in Jamaica. In making her tourism plans, she is playing her part in creating the current international political system. She is further deepening Egypt's financial debt while helping a Caribbean government earn badly needed foreign currency. And no matter which country she chooses for her personal pleasure, she is transforming "chambermaid" into a major globalized job category.

Or consider an American elementary school teacher who designs a lesson plan to feature the Native American "princess" Pocahontas. Many of the children will have watched the Disney animated movie. Now, the teacher hopes, she can show children how this seventeenth-century Native American woman saved the Englishman John Smith from execution at Jamestown, Virginia, later converted to Christianity, married an English planter, and helped clear the way for the English colonization of America. (The teacher might also include in her lesson plan the fact that Pocahontas's 1614 marriage to John Rolfe was the first recorded interracial marriage in what was to become the United Sates.) Her young students might come away from their teacher's well-

intentioned lesson having absorbed the myth that local women are easily charmed by their own people's foreign occupiers.

The lives of Hollywood actresses can take on new international import when viewed through a feminist analytical lens. For example, in the 1930s, Hollywood moguls turned the innovative Brazilian singer Carmen Miranda into an American movie star. Then they put Miranda to work bolstering President Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to promote friendlier relations between the United States and Latin America. Soon after, an international banana company made her image into their logo, creating a new, intimate relationship between American housewives and a multinational plantation company. Today, however, Carmen Miranda has become an archetype of a certain over-the-top Latinized femininity. Men and women dress up with fantastic fruit-adorned hats and put their Carmen Miranda look-alike images up on YouTube and their Facebook pages.

Or consider the implications of a gendered encounter between a foreign male soldier and an impoverished, local woman today: an American—or Australian or Canadian or Ugandan—male soldier on an international peacekeeping or humanitarian mission responds to his comrades' homophobic innuendos by finally going along with them to a local brothel in order to prove that he is "one of the boys." Though he may think of himself as simply bolstering his own manly credentials, his attempts to compensate for his insecure masculine identity help shape power relations between his country's military and the society it is supposed to be protecting. He is also reinforcing one of the crucial bulwarks of today's militarized international political relations: heterosexualized masculinity.

The woman tourist and the chambermaid; the schoolteacher and her students; the film star, her studio owners, the banana

company executives, the American housewife, and contemporary YouTube enthusiasts; the male soldier, the brothel owner, and the woman working as a prostitute—all are dancing an intricate international minuet. Those who look closely at the gendered causes and the gendered consequences of that minuet are conducting a feminist investigation of today's international political system.

These "dancers," however, are not in a position to call the tune. Yet even a woman who is victimized is not mindless. It is crucial to this feminist-informed investigation into unequal international relations that we not create a false (and lazy) dichotomy between the allegedly "mindless victim" and the allegedly "empowered actor." Women who are pushed to the far margin of any power system continue to assess and strategize even with the minimal resources they have available; sometimes they move beyond private strategizing to collective organizing. Nonetheless, acknowledging the severely restricted agency exercised by women pushed to the margins is not to deny that some international actors wield a lot more influence and garner far more rewards than do others. Thus, to investigate the gendered workings of international politics we will have to make power visible—power in all its myriad forms. This exploration can be uncomfortable.

WHERE DOES POWER OPERATE?

To do a gender investigation fueled by a *feminist* curiosity requires asking not only about the meanings of masculinity and femininity but also about how those meanings determine where women are and what they think about being there. Conducting a feminist gender analysis requires investigating *power:* what forms

does power take? Who wields it? How are some gendered wieldings of power camouflaged so they do not even look like power?

A feminist gender analysis calls for continuing to ask even more questions about the genderings of power: Who gains what from wielding a particular form of gender-infused power? What do challenges to those wieldings of that form of power look like? When do those challenges succeed? When are they stymied?

Most of us, understandably, would prefer to think that the appeal of a company's marketing logo is cultural, not political. We would like to imagine that going on holiday to Jamaica rather than Egypt is merely a social, even aesthetic, matter, not a political choice. Many women and men would also prefer to think of sexual relationships as existing in the intimate realm of personal desire and attraction, immune to political manipulation. Yet corporate executives choose certain logos over others to appeal to consumers' stereotypes of racialized femininities. Government officials market their women's alleged beauty or their deferential service in order to earn needed tourism revenues. To foster certain bases of "social order," elected legislators craft particular laws to punish certain sexual attractions while rewarding others. Power, taste, attraction, and desire are not mutually exclusive.

If one fails to pay close attention to women—all sorts of women—one will miss who wields power and for what ends. That is one of the core lessons of feminist international investigation.

Power operates across borders. Think about the power dynamics of marriage. Whose marriage to whom is recognized by which governments for which purposes? To answer this multifaceted question, one has to pay attention to power. One has to investigate who has the power to rule that a male citizen can marry a woman or a man of another country and thereby confer

his own citizenship status on his new spouse, whereas a woman who marries a person from another country cannot. Those with access to political power use that power to control marriage because marital relationships between people of the same or opposite sex affect transnational immigrations and access to the privileges of state-bestowed citizenship. Marriage is political. Marriage is international.

The politics of marriage can become even more intensely international as a result of gendered pressures from outside: colonial rule, new international norms of human rights, transnational religious evangelizing, and membership in new interstate unions whose standards have to be met. A family's wedding album rarely shows what power was wielded nationally or internationally and by whom in that ceremony. One has to dig deeper, even when the digging makes one uneasy.

One of the most important intellectual benefits that comes from paying serious attention to where women are in today's international politics—and investigating how they got *there* and what they *think* about being there—is that it exposes *how much more political power is operating than most non-gender-curious commentators would have us believe.*

This assertion—that many commentators underestimate power—may seem odd, since so many gender-*in*curious commentators appear to project an aura of power themselves, as if their having insights into the alleged realities of power bestows on them a mantle of power. Yet it is these same expert commentators who gravely underestimate both the amount and the kinds of power it has taken to create and to perpetuate the international political system we all are living in today. It is not incidental that the majority of the people invited to serve as expert foreign affairs commentators are male. For instance, one study

revealed that, although white men constitute only 31 percent of today's total U.S. population, they made up 62 percent of all the expert guests on the three most influential American evening cable news channels.[5]

The flaw at the core of these mainstream, seemingly "sophisticated" commentaries is how much they take for granted, how much they treat as inevitable, and thus how much about the workings of power they fail to question—that is, how many types of power, and how many wieldings and wielders of power, they miss.

Too often gender incurious commentators attribute women's roles in international affairs to tradition, cultural preferences, and timeless norms, as if each of these existed outside the realms where power is wielded, as if they were beyond the reach of decisions and efforts to enforce those decisions. What sacrifices a woman as a mother should make, what priorities a woman as a wife should embrace, what sexualized approaches in public a woman should consider innocent or flattering, what victim identity a refugee woman should adopt, what boundaries in friendships with other women a woman should police, what dutiful-daughter model a girl should admire—in reality, all of these are shaped by the exercise of power by people who believe that their own local and international interests depend on women and girls internalizing these particular feminized expectations. If women internalize these expectations, they will not see the politics behind them. Political commentators who do not question these internalizations will accept the camouflaged operations of power as if there were no power at work at all. That is dangerous.

Women's collective resistance to any one of these feminized expectations can realign both local and international systems of power. As we will see, even stymied or only partially successful

resistance by women can expose both who wields power to sustain the gendered status quo and what those power-wielders fear they will lose if women's resistance succeeds. This is why every suffrage movement in every country—the United States, Britain, Brazil, Mexico, China, Egypt, Kuwait—has raised such intense political alarm. Today, likewise, every effort by immigrant domestic workers to unionize—and every attempt by women garment and electronics workers to go out on strike, every move by women banana workers to be heard inside a male-led labor union, every campaign by an "out" lesbian to gain elective office, every demand by women married to soldiers and diplomats to pursue their own careers—not only has the potential to upset the gendered norms and roles on which the current global system has come to rely but also exposes where power operates to sustain the gendered status quo, as well as who benefits from that current gendered status quo.

Thus, if one is interested in gaining a reliable sense of national and international politics, one should be curious about all sorts of women's resistance, whether or not that resistance succeeds.

As one learns to look at the world through gender-curious feminist eyes, one learns to ask whether anything that passes for natural, inevitable, inherent, traditional, or biological has been *made*. One asks how all sorts of things have been made—the receding glacier, the low-cost sweatshirt, the heavily weaponized police force, the masculinized peace negotiation, the romantic marriage, the all-male Joint Chiefs of Staff. Asking how something has been made implies that it has been made by someone with a certain kind of power. Suddenly there are clues to trace; there is blame, credit, and responsibility to apportion, not just at the start but at each point along the way.

That is, a feminist, gender-curious approach to international politics offers a lot more topics to investigate because it makes visible the full workings of myriad forms of power.

WHO TAKES SERIOUSLY THE IDEAS OF TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISTS?

Despite the remarkable activist engagement that has generated today's multistranded transnational women's movement, many journalists (and the editors who assign their stories), foreign-policy experts, and policy decision makers remain oddly confident in their dismissal of feminist ideas.

Among the most loosely organized, social-media-energized, recent transnational women's movements have been Girl Rising, Slut Walks, Femen, and Vagina Monologues, with its accompanying V Day. Each tends to be fluid and not to depend on paid staffs or brick-and-mortar headquarters. The activists in each adapt their actions and messages to suit local needs and conditions. The organizations' distinguishing features are Internet savvy, feminist creativity, and convention-defying public performance.[6]

Simultaneously, a host of more explicitly organized transnational feminist groups and networks challenge the conventional workings of international politics today. Here is an admittedly incomplete list:

- Women Living Under Muslim Laws
- International Network of Women in Black
- Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights
- International Women's Health Coalition
- Our Bodies Ourselves Global Network
- Equality Now

Figure 2. Anna Hutsol, cofounder of the topless direct-action feminist group Femen, and her mother in their Ukrainian home village, 2013, prior to physical attacks aimed at Hutsol and other Femen activists. Photo: Dmitry Kostyukov/The New York Times/Redux.

- International Action Network on Small Arms Women's Network
- Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice
- International Domestic Workers Network
- International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission
- Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
- NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security
- Women in Conflict Zones Network

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom was founded a century ago by transnational feminist peace

activists in the midst of World War I.[7] Many groups on this partial list, by contrast, have been created in the years since the 1990s. New transnational networks and coalitions are on the brink of being launched today. Each network has its own gendered international political history.

Their feminist activists do not always agree. Their members debate each other over what is causing what, which goal should be prioritized, which international power-holder should be the focus of protests or lobbying. They debate with each other over which compromises can be swallowed and which cannot. But the activists working in these organized groups also have come to share much in common: each is headed by women leaders; each, simultaneously, fosters autonomy among its grassroots activists; each urges women to take part in not only local but also international politics; each builds alliances with other all-women groups and with mixed men's and women's networks; each depends on donors, interns, and volunteers; each monitors trends and decisions in a particular arena of international politics; each posts data and analyses on its own website, usually in several languages; each uses its own gender-conscious investigations and analyses as a basis for crafting strategic campaigns to challenge both the oppression women experience and the practices that privilege certain men and certain masculinities; each aims its political campaigns not only at governments but also at the media, international agencies, and corporations.[8]

Why do most of us not hear the names of these organizations regularly on the nightly news or on the main Internet news sites? Editors, mainstream experts, and some academic scholars employ several strategies to dismiss the analytical (that is, explanatory) value of these groups' insights and impacts. One common rationale for ignoring the work of these transnational

feminist networks is to dismiss them as representing only a "special interest." By contrast, the international expert is, so he (occasionally she) claims, interested in "the Big Picture." That is, the common assumption is that one-half of the world's population is equivalent to, say, logging companies or soccer clubs; thus, the thinking goes, their actions do not shed light on the world but simply are intended to advance their own limited self-interests.

A second rationale for not taking seriously the ideas and actions of these contemporary globalized women's advocacy groups—ideas and actions that should be thoughtfully weighed, not automatically accepted—is that the arenas of politics that these feminist activists do expose are presumably merely domestic or private, as opposed to, for instance, the allegedly "significant" public arenas of military security or government debt. In other words, the conventional failure to take seriously the thinking behind transnational women's advocacy is itself rooted in unrealistically narrow understandings of "security," "stability," "crisis," and "development." All four concepts are of utmost concern to those worried about the international Big Picture. Each of these four concerns—security, stability, crisis, and development—is routinely imagined to be divorced from (unaffected by) women's unpaid and underpaid labor, women's rights within marriage, the denial of girls' education, women's reproductive health, and sexualized and other forms of male violence against women, as well as the masculinization of militaries, police forces, and political parties. The conventional Big Picture, it would appear, is being painted on a shrunken canvas.

Third, these feminist transnational groups' analyses and actions can be ignored—their reports never cited, their staff members never invited to speak as experts, their leaders or activists never turned to for interviews—on the questionable

grounds that their campaigns are lost causes. Behind this justification is the notion that challenging entrenched masculinized privileges and practices in today's international affairs is hopeless, therefore naive, therefore not worthy of serious attention. Further underpinning this final argument are the stunningly ahistorical assertions that (a) any advancements that women have gained have come not as a result of women's political theorizing and organizing but because women have been given these advancements by enlightened men in power, and (b) we collectively have "always" understood such useful political concepts as "reproductive rights," "sexual harassment," "systematic wartime rape," and "the glass ceiling." This latter assertion overlooks the fact that each of these revelatory concepts was hammered out and offered to the rest of us by particular activists at particular moments in recent political history.

All three of these spoken or unspoken rationales, and the assumptions they rely upon, are themselves integral to how international politics operates today. All three assertions that deny the significance and analytical value of transnational feminist organizing *are* the very stuff of international politics.

The very rarity of professional international political commentators taking seriously either women's experiences of international politics or women's gender analyses of international politics is, therefore, itself a political phenomenon that needs to be taken seriously. What so many non-feminist-informed international commentators *ignore* has been explored by the burgeoning academic field of gender and international relations. That is, paying close attention to—and explaining the causes and consequences of—what is so frequently ignored can be fruitful indeed.[9]

At the same time, we can be more curious about who does not pay attention to women's experiences—of war, marriage,

trade, travel, revolution, and plantation and factory work. Who reaps rewards when women's experiences of these international affairs are treated as if they were inconsequential, mere "human interest" stories? That is, one becomes an international political investigator when one seeks to figure out who is rewarded if they treat women's experiences and women's gender analyses as if either were mere embellishments, almost entertainment, as if neither sheds meaningful light on the causes of the unfolding global events. Rewards are political.

Consider one common journalistic trivializing device: using a photograph or a bit of video footage of women to illustrate a news story—women shown grieving seems especially alluring to editors—but then interviewing only men for the main content of the journalistic account. Most coverage of international affairs is crafted with the presumption that only men—diverse men, rival men—have anything useful to say about what we all are trying to make sense of. Feminists routinely count how many men and how many women are interviewed in any political news story. A ratio of six to one or seven to zero is common.[10]

Since 2000, new social media have been used by many women, especially young women, to break through the masculinity-privileging walls of mainstream, established media. Women have become skilled bloggers, users of Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube, and Facebook. In addition, some feminist journalists have created alternative, independent international outlets, most prominent being the online international news service Women's eNews, which commissions local women journalists to cover stories about women's politics that the bigger media companies ignore.[11]

These recent media innovations are not the first time that women have tried to fashion alternative media in order to make

Figure 3. Mary Phillips, a Scottish suffragette, selling the British suffragist newspaper *The Vote,* 1907. Photo: Museum of London.

visible women's political issues, women's critical analyses, and women's political activism. Suffragists in the early 1900s set up their own printing presses and publishing houses to put out independent broadsides, pamphlets, and newspapers to let their fellow citizens know why women campaigners were demanding voting rights for women on the same terms as for men.

Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, scores of new magazines, publishing houses, archives, and bookstores were established by feminists in India, Mexico, Britain, the United States, Canada, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Australia, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, Pakistan, and Turkey

in order to provide media outlets for literally thousands of women who were writing feminist-informed histories, novels, poetry, memoirs, political theory, health guides, investigatory journalism, and cinema reviews. Other women started women's radio programs and documentary film distribution companies. Many of the women involved in these media politics were aware of women in other countries doing the same; they read and distributed each other's publications, visited each other's bookstores, and traded encouragement and practical advice across national boundaries.[12]

As influential as these past and present local and international feminist media innovations were—and still are—in offering alternative information and perspectives, they did not and still do not have sufficient resources (for instance, for news bureaus in Beijing, Cairo, Nairobi, London, Tokyo, and Rio de Janeiro). Nor can they match the cultural and political influence wielded by large well-capitalized or state-sponsored media companies—textbook publishers, network and cable television companies, national radio stations and newspapers, Internet companies, and major film studios. These large media companies have become deliberately international in their aspirations. They are not monolithic, but together they can determine what is considered "international," what is defined as "political," what is deemed "significant," and who is anointed an "expert."[13]

Thus it is important to investigate, despite their differences, these influential media companies' common dismissal of unorganized and organized women as insignificant and to weigh carefully the risks that such dismissals carry. Each dismissal hobbles us when we try to explain why international politics takes the path it does.

WHAT WE MISS: TWO BRIEF CASE STUDIES

First case: the transatlantic antislavery movement. Despite the emergence of feminist historians, it is easy to portray the transatlantic antislavery movement of the early and mid-1800s as an all-male movement. The slave trade—and the profitable exports of cotton, tobacco, and sugar that the slave trade enabled—was a globalized business. Challenging that trade would drastically alter the international politics of the time. That is accepted. But it is the American male antislavery activists Frederick Douglass, John Brown, and William Lloyd Garrison, and their British ally the abolitionist William Wilberforce, who continue to be publicly celebrated. Thanks only to the work of African American feminist historians have the political contributions of abolitionist Sojourner Truth been recognized.[14] Overlooked by all but feminist historians have been the lesser-known British and American women antislavery activists, women who created mass movements in the early and mid-1800s. Not only did they strategize and campaign (e.g., British antislavery women provided the backbone for the sugar boycott and introduced mass petitioning), but these women activists, black and white, also overcame their lack of voting rights, their exclusion from the halls of governments, and the obstacles to travel and communication (letters from London took more than two weeks to reach Boston's antislavery hub) to create an effective transatlantic alliance, one of the world's first transnational women's movements.[15]

What do we miss if today we persist in portraying this important early international political movement as an all-male affair? First, we grossly underestimate how much racialized gendered power it took for proslavery advocates to sustain the slave trade and systems of slave labor for as long as they did. If those with

vested interests in maintaining slavery had faced only male opponents, without the energy, political innovations, and knowledge of domestic consumption that women abolitionists contributed, they might have been able to sustain the exploitive racist system longer or at lower political cost.

Second, if we continue to ignore the distinct ideas and actions of the British and American women abolitionists, we will underestimate the internal tensions that marked the transatlantic antislavery movement itself: to sustain their movement over decades and in the face of formidable opposition, male and female antislavery activists not only had to reconcile their differing ideas about race, property, freedom, and the meaning of humanity, but they also had to work out among themselves their contentious differences over femininity, masculinity, respectability, and marriage (e.g., was marriage itself, in its then-current form, as some women abolitionists came to believe, just a more polite form of slavery?).[16]

Finally, if we persist in taking seriously only the male antislavery campaigners in the international movement to abolish the slave trade and slave labor, then we are bound to miss one of the most significant consequences of that political movement: the mobilization in the late 1800s and early 1900s of campaigns to end the political systems of male-only suffrage. The suffrage movement, despite its contradictions and shortcomings, became one of the world's most radically democratizing movements. And it was globalized.[17]

Yet investigations of the international gender politics of both abolitionism and women's suffrage campaigning are virtually absent from most university courses purporting to train students in the skills they will need to make reliable sense of democratization, political mobilization, and international politics.

Second case: the international Arms Trade Treaty. It took eight years. Money had to be raised. Gender-disaggregated data had to be collected. Women had to be interviewed. Interviews had to be translated. Consciousnesses had to be raised. Meetings had to be organized. Visas and plane tickets to New York had to be obtained. Different priorities and understandings had to be aired and reconciled. Alliances had to be forged, then tended and reforged.[18] But on April 2, 2013, by a majority vote (154 in favor, 3 against, 23 abstaining), member states of the United Nations General Assembly adopted the world's first-ever international Arms Trade Treaty. For the first time, governments and companies exporting small arms—rifles, pistols, grenade launchers, and the parts and ammunition for these weapons—would be bound by international law to explicitly assess whether those arms would be used in the importing country for purposes that violated international human rights. This was new.

Buried in its thirteen pages of formal diplomatic language was a transnational feminist success: article 7, paragraph 4. It reads, "The exporting State Party, in making this assessment [of the potential 'negative consequences' of permitting the export of small arms], shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children."[19]

Eight years and multinational attentiveness and transnational lobbying by scores of women produced this crucial phrase: *gender-based violence.* And not only that. The hotly contested phrase—*gender-based violence*—was placed here, in this section of the Arms Trade Treaty that made it binding (not simply advisory) on the ATT's government signatories.

Including "gender-based violence" as a criterion for government officials when they assessed the legality of exporting any small arms from their own countries' gun manufacturers was a criterion strenuously resisted by certain influential organizations and by officials from powerful governments.

The alliance that developed the reasoning for "gender-based violence" as an assessment criterion was feminist-led and transnational. At its core were three organizations: the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), especially its international staffs in Geneva and in New York, across the street from the UN; the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Women's Network; and Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict. Together, these three organizations had activist affiliates around the world. While their combined lobbying to persuade governments' UN delegates to support the inclusion of the words *gender-based violence* in the ATT and to "make it binding" is a story yet to be fully told in all its twists and turns, a crucial part of that story was these activists listening to women, asking where women are in today's international politics of guns.

Most of the non-feminist-informed activists who pushed for the Arms Trade Treaty focused their attention on export figures, import figures, patterns of armed conflict, and gun-exporting governments' and their weapons manufacturers' complicity in enabling those damaging armed conflicts. It was their analyses, too, that informed most mainstream news coverage. What the women of IANSA, WILPF, and Global Action did was distinct: they looked deeper into armed conflicts to chart the gendered dynamics of guns, both gun violence's causes and its consequences. IANSA's women activists in Mali, Congo, Brazil, the Philippines, and other countries that had experienced years of

violence played a crucial role. They asked, "Where are the women?" And "Where are the guns?" They interviewed women about where guns were in their own daily lives. They revealed how politicized conflict became gendered conflict. They exposed the causal connections between group armed violence and violence perpetrated inside homes and families. And they demonstrated how those guns when not even fired could infuse relationships between women and men with fear and intimidation. Listening to women's diverse experiences of living with guns in their communities and their homes, they painted a Big Picture: the massive international exports of guns sustained gender-based violence as a pillar of international and national patriarchy.

The Vatican was a crucial player in the UN Arms Trade Treaty negotiations. The Vatican has "observer status" at the UN (as does the Palestinian delegation). This status gives the Vatican's delegates access to crucial discussions among voting state delegations, where its opinions and interpretations often carry significant weight. In each UN treaty negotiation process, the state participants decide whether or not observers will be allowed to cast votes on the final proposed document. In the Arms Trade Treaty process, observers were not allowed to vote. But throughout the multistage negotiations, the Vatican's delegates were omnipresent and influential. Its delegates helped to create what feminists called the "unholy alliance" between the UN delegates of the Vatican, Russia, Syria, and Iran. The Vatican led the resistance to including the phrase *gender-based violence* in the Arms Trade Treaty. Over the years, the Vatican's delegates have treated social constructions of male and female as anathema. Thus no "gender." They pressed, instead, for the more patriarchal phrase *violence against women and children*. Furthermore, the Vatican pushed to have *violence against women and*

children inserted only in the treaty's opening preamble. That is, they were comfortable with including *violence against women and children* in the final treaty as a motivating reason for creating this new interstate agreement, but were opposed to it being made a binding criterion that governments would be obligated to use when they assessed their own gun exports.

The Vatican was not alone. By itself, its role is never decisive. Numbers of governments and lobbying groups were willing to allow the conventional phrase *violence against women and children* to be inserted and to have it listed merely as one reason among many for limiting the international trade in small arms. What they did not accept was the insertion of the more politically salient analytical phrase *gender-based violence,* or for that to become a formal criterion imposed on governments when they assessed the legality of exporting weaponry.

Ideas matter. Words matter. Placement matters. The strategists of WILPF and IANSA's Women's Network and Global Action, women such as Ray Acheson and Maria Butler, went from state delegation to state delegation to explain why neither the phrase *violence against women and children* nor its placement solely in the nonbinding preamble were sufficient—that is, why neither matched the realities of women's lives. Eventually, more than one hundred state delegations publicly backed the inclusion of the term *gender-based violence* and its placement in the section that would make it a binding criterion in each exporting government's assessment process. The UN delegates of Iceland and Lichtenstein, though representing small countries, were especially helpful in supporting WILPF's and IANSA's feminist campaigners.

The wide governmental support that the feminists ultimately gained was the outcome of scores of women activists spending hours explaining, first, that "women and children"

should not be lumped together and treated as mere victims. Second, feminist activists working the corridors of the UN explained to delegates that when violence is described as "gendered" it makes the workings of masculinities and the politics of misogyny visible in the international politics of gun exporting. Third, they explained to scores of delegates that, to be meaningful, the treaty had to legally obligate exporting governments to explicitly determine whether any small arms were likely to be used in the importing country to perpetrate widespread gender-based violence.

The intricately crafted final version of the Arms Trade Treaty was passed by the General Assembly on April 2, 2013 (with the delegates of Syria, Iran, and North Korea casting the three "no" votes). Its passage was the result of many actors, many efforts, many forms of analysis. But if one does not ask, "Where were the women?" one will miss who tried to dilute the ATT and why. If one ignores the thinking and the activism of the WILPF and IANSA women, one also will miss the innovative feminist thinking that causally linked international gun political economies to the political economies of sexualized wartime violence, domestic violence, and the processes of intimidation that severely limit women's economic and political participation. Moreover, one will miss the feminist-informed listening, data collection, analysis, and strategizing that transformed a groundbreaking international agreement between governments into an instrument for furthering women's rights.

The Arms Trade Treaty's gendered politics had taken years to create, but in April 2013 those gendered politics had just begun. To become operational, the ATT would have to be ratified by individual governments. In each country there would be multiple bases for support and for rejection of the treaty. Who in each

country would balk at making "gender-based violence" a binding criterion? Who would argue that its inclusion was one of the positive strengths of the ATT? Charting each of these ratifying debates, country by country, will shine a light on the genderings of the international political economies of rifles, pistols, and grenade launchers. Then there will be still further chapters in the gendered ATT story: in those countries that ratify the ATT (that is, which sign on to its binding obligations), who will officials turn to for expert advice when they have to assess whether the guns they are about to export will be used to inflict widespread gender-based violence? The women of IANSA?[20]

WHERE ARE THE MEN?

Most of the time we scarcely notice that many governments still look like men's clubs, with the occasional woman allowed in the door. We see a photo of members of Russia's cabinet, Wall Street's inner circle, the Chinese Politboro, or Europe's central bankers, and it is easy to miss the fact that all the people in these photographs are men. One of the most useful functions that the British prime minister Margaret Thatcher served during the 1980s was to break through our gender numbness. Thatcher herself was not an advocate for women, but when she stood at a 1987 meeting in Venice alongside France's Mitterand, Japan's Nakasone, the United States' Reagan, and the other heads of government, we suddenly noticed that everyone else was male. Twenty-five years later, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, provided a similar gender-consciousness-raising function when she stood for a photograph with the other heads of government in the Group of Eight, the world's economic powers. One woman in a photo makes it harder for us to ignore that the men are *men.*

Figure 4. Group of Seven summit meeting, including Margaret Thatcher, Venice, 1987. Photo: Daniel Simon/Frank Spooner Pictures, London.

Once we start looking at men as men, we are more likely to become curious about masculinities—what it means to be manly—and about the contests over diverse, unequally ranked sorts of masculinity.

It is widely asserted today that we live in a "dangerous world." It was commonly stated during the four decades of the Cold War, when the threats posed by nuclear weapons were used by both the United States and the Soviet Union to raise the stakes of international rivalries. The notion that we live in a dangerous world gained new saliency after the attacks on New York's towering World Trade Center in September 2001. Since 2001, countless American politicians have based their calls for rolling back citizens' privacy rights, curtailing due process legal protections, giving surveillance agencies free rein, equipping local police

Figure 5. Leaders of the Group of Eight industrialized nations, including Angela Merkel, joined by European Commission and European conflict officials, summit meeting, Northern Ireland, 2013. Photo: Matt Cardy/Getty Images News.

forces with heavier weaponry, casting new immigrants as potential threats, launching weaponized drones, and turning a blind eye toward the antidemocratic actions of U.S. international allies by justifying each move as a contributor to the "war on terror."

Among its many questionable consequences, the absorption of the idea that we live in a dangerous world serves to reinforce the primacy of particular forms of masculinity while subordinating most women and femininity itself. Men living in a dangerous world are commonly imagined to be the natural protectors. Women living in a dangerous world allegedly are those who need protection. Those relegated to the category of the protected are commonly thought to be safe "at home" and, thus, incapable of realistically assessing the dangers "out there."

Notions of masculinity are not identical across generations or across cultural boundaries. That is why one needs to explore the workings and rankings of masculinities in particular places at particular times—and then track them over generations.[21] Comparison may reveal striking similarities but also expose significant differences. A masculinized rivalry is one in which diverse masculinities are unequally ranked and contested: there is a contest over which expression of manliness is deemed most "modern," which most "rational," which the "toughest," which the "softest," which the "weaker." In such rivalries, women are marginalized unless (withstanding ridicule as "unfeminine") they can convincingly cloak themselves in a particular masculinized style of speech and action. Thus a common British assessment of Britain's first and only woman prime minister: "Margaret Thatcher was the toughest man in the room."

While political contests over masculinity marginalize all but a very few women, such contests always put femininity into play. In a patriarchal society—a society whose relationships and inequalities are shaped by the privileging of particular masculinities and by women's subordination to and dependence on men—anything that is feminized can be disparaged. Consequently, rival men are prone to try to tar each other with the allegedly damning brush of femininity. The intent is to rob the opposing man of his purchase on such allegedly manly attributes as strength, courage, and rationality.[22] This masculinized wielding of femininity happens not only on the playground and in local elections but also in international nuclear politics.[23]

Furthermore, this femininity-wielding masculinized contest between men shapes not only the international politics of war and national security but also the international politics of domestic servants, sex workers, wives, women factory workers,

and women plantation workers. This contest determines what is considered mere "women's work" and thus unfit for any manly man. What presumptions about a manly man's access to any woman's sexuality fuels sexual harassment of women on and off the job?

In conventional commentaries, men who wield influence in international politics are analyzed in terms of their national, ethnic, and racial identities; their positions in organizations; their class origins; their paid work; and sometimes their sexual preferences. Rarely, though, are men analyzed as *men,* people who have been taught, since childhood, how to be manly, how not to be a "girl," how to size up the trustworthiness or competence of other men by assessing their manliness. If international commentators do find masculinity interesting, it is typically when they try to make sense of "great men"—Napoleon Bonaparte, Abraham Lincoln, Mao Zedong, Nelson Mandela—not when they seek to understand the actions of male factory owners, male midlevel officials, male banana workers, or male tourists. It is a lack of feminist curiosity that makes comfortably invisible such men's efforts to be seen by other men as masculine in doing their jobs, exercising influence, nurturing alliances, or seeking relief from stress. In so doing, such a lack of feminist curiosity also makes dangerously invisible these men's attempts (sometimes thwarted) to use diverse women in their daily pursuits of precarious masculine status.

BEYOND THE GLOBAL VICTIM

Some men and women active in campaigns to influence their country's foreign policy—on the right, as well as the left—have called on women to become more educated about international

issues, to learn more about "what's going on in the world." Women are told, "You have to take more interest in international affairs because it affects how you live." The gist of the argument is that women need to devote precious time and energy to learning about events outside their own country because, as women, they are the *objects* of those events. For instance, a woman working for a software company in Ireland is told she should learn more about the European Union because what the EU commissioners decide in Brussels is going to help determine her wages and maybe even the hazards she faces on the job. An American woman similarly will be encouraged to learn about the ongoing fighting in Syria because political contests in the Middle East will affect her children's chances of a safe future.

There are two things striking about this conventional line of argument. First, those who are trying to persuade women to "become informed" are not inviting women to reinterpret international politics by drawing on their own experiences as women. If the explanations of how the EU and Middle East politics work do not already include any concepts of femininity, masculinity, or patriarchy, they are unlikely to do so after more women start listening to the recognized gender-incurious international experts. Because these persuaders are not curious about what paying close attention to women's complex experiences could contribute to an understanding of international politics, many women, especially those whose energies are already stretched to the limit, may be understandably wary of spending precious time reading about fighting in Syria or decisions made in Brussels.

When the common women-need-to-learn-more-about-foreign-affairs approach is articulated by gender-incurious activists (women or men), women are usually portrayed as the objects,

even victims, of the international political system. Women should learn about capitalist globalization, or the Middle East's Arab Spring, or the workings of the United Nations, or climate change because each has an impact on them. In this worldview, women are forever being acted *upon*. They are the victims of garment factory disasters; they are the targets of sexual assaults in wartime; they are the trafficked, the low paid, the objectified. Rarely are women seen as the explainers or the reshapers of the world. Rarely are they made visible as *thinkers* and *actors*.

If women are asked to join an international campaign—for peace, for refugees, against war, for religious evangelism, against hunger—but are not allowed to define the problem and its causes, it looks to many locally engaged women like abstract do-gooding with minimal connection to the battles they are waging for a decent life in their households and in their own communities.

A lot of books about international politics leave their readers with a sense that "it's all so complex, decided by people who don't know or care that I exist." The spread of capitalist economics, even in countries whose officials call themselves socialists, can feel as inevitable as the tides (which, we are learning, are actually not inevitable). Governments' capacities to wound people, to destroy environments and dreams, are constantly expanding through their uses of science and bureaucracy. International relationships fostered by these governments and their allies use our labor and our imaginations, but it seems beyond our reach to alter them. These relationships seem to have created a world that can turn tacos and sushi into bland fast foods, destroy rain forests, melt arctic ice, globalize pornography, and socialize men from dozens of cultures into a common new culture of high-risk banking. One closes most books on "international security" or "international political economy" with a sigh.

They purport to explain how it works, but they offer knowledge that makes one feel as though it is more rewarding to concentrate on problems closer to home.

Most important, many of these analyses of international affairs leave one with the impression that "home" has little to do with international politics. When home is imagined to be a feminized place—a place where womanly women and feminine girls should feel most comfortable, and where manly men and real boys should stop in now and then for refueling—then this consequence of many mainstream explanations can send the roots of masculinized international politics down even more deeply.

There is an alternative incentive for delving into international politics. That is, seeing oneself in it, not just being acted upon by it. To do this, however, requires remapping the boundaries of the "international" and the "political": it requires seeing how one's own family dynamics, consumer behaviors, travel choices, relationships with others, and ways of thinking about the world actually help shape that world. We are not just acted upon; we are actors. Though, even recognizing that one is not part of any elite, acknowledging oneself as an international actor can be unnerving. One discovers that one is often complicit in creating the very world that one finds so dismaying.

The world is something that has been—and is being—made every day. And ideas about and practices of both femininity and masculinity, combined with attempts to control women, are central to that world-making. So are challenges to those conventions and resistance to those attempts. It is not always easy to see those attempts and, thus, to resist them. Policy makers may find it more "manly" (even if some of the policy makers themselves now are women) to think of themselves as dealing in guns and

money, rather than in notions of femininity, marriage, and sexuality. So they—and most of their critics as well—try to hide and deny their reliance on women as feminized workers, as respectable and loyal wives, as "civilizing influences," as sex objects, as obedient daughters, as unpaid farmers, as coffee-serving campaigners, and as spending consumers and tourists. If we can expose their dependence on feminizing women, we can show that this world is also dependent on artificial notions of masculinity.

As a result, this seemingly overwhelming world system may begin to look more fragile and open to radical change than we have been led to imagine.

Thus this book is only a beginning. It draws on the theoretical and organizational work of women in Britain in the 1890s, Algeria in the 1950s, the Philippines in the 1980s, Chile in the 1990s, and Egypt in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Most of the conclusions here are tentative. What readers themselves write in the margins of these pages as they test the descriptions and explanations against their own experiences of the internationalized politics of femininity and masculinity will be at least as valuable in creating a different world as what appears here in deceptively solid print.

CHAPTER THREE

Nationalism and Masculinity

The Nationalist Story Is Not Over—and It Is Not a Simple Story

In the depths of the post-banking-crash recession, Catalonians took to the streets in Barcelona. Women and men of all ages, unemployed young people, public workers who still had jobs but who had seen their wages cut, and older people whose pensions were in jeopardy, all joined in the Catalan chanting and singing. All of Spain was suffering from the economic crisis that had begun with the international banking failures of 2008, but the people who came out to march through downtown Barcelona on this sunny May evening organized as Catalans, a proud regional ethnic group within Spain's multiethnic society. Among the demonstrators' most prominent banners were those that blamed what they called "the Troika" for their woes: the European Union's Commission, the European Central Bank, and the German government, headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel, the latter because the Germans had been the most assertive of the EU's member states in insisting that Spain (as well as Ireland, Greece, and Portugal) engage in deep public-spending cuts to rebalance their budgets. The economic crisis was affecting the

lives of all Spaniards, but for many of these marchers it had reignited an intense sense of their own Catalan national identity. The elected officials of Catalonia promised to give their region's citizens a chance to vote in an upcoming referendum on Catalonian independence.

To the north, politicians of the ruling Scottish National Party were pressing London to allow Scottish citizens to vote for Scotland's independence from the United Kingdom. Scottish National Party leaders assured Scots than an independent Scotland would keep its membership in the thirty-five-member European Union, though EU officials in Brussels warned that an independent Scotland would have to apply for EU membership. That uncertainty gave some Scottish proindependence voters pause.

Across the Atlantic, Quebec voters had twice in recent years voted to remain a province within a multiethnic Canada. But the winning margins had been narrow, and it seemed likely that, before long, Quebec nationalists would press for another referendum on Quebec independence.

In Africa, after years of bloody fighting, South Sudan had broken away from Sudan to become one of the world's newest recognized sovereign states.

Back in Europe, Yugoslavia had fragmented into ethnically defined small nation-states as the result of a violent, multisided 1992–95 civil war. Czechoslovakia had broken in two, becoming the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Soviet Union had broken apart in the early 1990s without a war, leaving a still-ethnically diverse but Russian-dominated state of Russia, now with a score of ethnically defined (though not ethnically homogeneous) new states on its borders, among them Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea, plus Ukraine and Belarus on its European borders, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan along its

western Asian frontiers. Moscow was waging a brutal war to keep the ethnically distinct region of Chechnya within the Russian domain.

Cartographers were being kept busy.

Nationalism, which burst onto the international political scene in the mid-1800s, had generated the political power to splinter empires: the Ottoman, the Hapsburg, the Russian, the British, the French, the Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Danish, the Japanese, and the American. The Americans of thirteen northern colonies, and the Latin Americans to their south, were the first to wield nationalist ideas to effectively challenge Spanish, Portuguese, and British imperial rule. World War I, a war so horrible that it was (optimistically) imagined to be "the war to end all wars," seemed to give even more potent validation to nationalist ideas. Meeting at Versailles in 1919, the victors left their own multinational, multiethnic empires intact but carved up the losing Ottoman and Hapsburg imperial domains into what the male elite carvers thought were peoples with the right to "national sovereignty." It took the combination of World War II, popular anticolonial movements, and a succession of violent armed conflicts to compel the remaining imperial rulers to recognize the rights of national sovereignty belonging to most of the peoples they ruled.

But the Serbs, Croatians, Lithuanians, Slovaks, Catalans, Quebequois, and Scots—as well as the Okinawans; Tibetans; Chechens; Uyghurs; the Kurds living in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran; and the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka—have made it clear that the story of nationalism is far from over, and that it remains a complicated story with narratives still hotly contested.

Moreover, in the twenty-first century, nationalist energies have made themselves felt internationally not only in ethnically

based separatist movements but also through the foreign policies of powerful central governments. Russian nationalists have been determined to suppress the ethnic Chechen rebellion and have narrowly defined the "true" Russian nation in order to suppress Russian gays and lesbians. The Chinese political leadership has spoken in the language of nationalism while not only continuing to deepen China's rule of Tibet and to claim Taiwan but also extending China's claim of sovereignty over the oil-rich South China Sea. The Turkish political elite has wielded nationalism while seeking to deny that modern Turkey is a multiethnic state. Japan's nationalists have expressed new confidence and wielded new electoral influence, partly in response to the Chinese government's regional assertiveness. American officials have continued to assert U.S. rule over a host of island societies in the Caribbean and South Pacific, from Puerto Rico to American Samoa and Guam, while also using various forms of nationalist rhetoric to justify conducting wars and drone strikes far from established U.S. borders.[1]

Popular movements have harnessed nationalist sentiments and images to cast a harsh light on the homogenizing effects of globalization. Starbucks opened more outlets worldwide; Hollywood concocted what studio directors thought of as action-packed "global films"; multilateral agreements were hammered out between governments to enable Walmart and other corporate behemoths to chase smaller, local companies out of the marketplace; large fishing companies decimated fish stocks off the shores of Canada and Iceland. Each manifestation of globalized commerce has seemed to threaten not just rival businesses but the very essence of national identity.[2]

All of these stories, past, present, and those hinting the future, are typically told as if gender were irrelevant. What mat-

ters, so these conventional narratives go, is which people think of themselves as Scottish—or Icelandic, Catalan, Chechen, or Okinawan—and what they do with the feelings this nurtures. The storytellers often craft their tales—of humiliation, mobilization, struggle, victory, and defeat—as if nationalism were experienced identically by women and men, and as if women and men played identical roles in defining and critiquing nationalist goals. What follows from these questionable notions is the further assumption—also typically unexamined—that nationalist movements are created and spin out their consequences without taking into account ideas about masculinity and femininity.

It turns out that these three assumptions are an unreliable basis for making sense of the world we are living in.

Women have had distinctly uneasy relationships with nationalism. On the one hand, thousands of women have discovered in nationalist movements a new public persona and an opening for new political participation. Seeing themselves as, and being seen by others as, members of a nation have given these women an identity larger than that defined by domesticated motherhood or marriage. On the other hand, even when they have been energized by nationalism, many women have discovered that, in practice, as women, they often have been treated by male nationalist leaders and intellectuals chiefly as symbols—patriarchally sculpted symbols—of the nation. Women have served as symbols of the nation violated, the nation suffering, the nation reproducing itself, the nation at its purest. Being reduced to a symbol has meant that women have not been treated as genuine participants (with their own ideas, goals, and skills) in the nationalist movements organized to end colonialism, ethnic domination, racism, and globalized capitalist exploitation.[3]

Moreover, because a nation is framed as an "us," it puts a premium on belonging. It has a strong potential to be exclusivist, even xenophobic. Women active in ethnic minority communities, especially in new immigrant communities, are wary of nationalism's exclusivist tendencies. Afro-Caribbean Scots, Algerian Catalonians, Haitian Quebecois, Korean Japanese, Polish Irish, Iraqi Americans, Turkish Germans, Moroccan French, Kurdish Turks—members of each of these communities have cause to worry when nationalism begins to dominate the public conversation. For many feminists today, approaching nationalism with extreme caution is necessary because, they have concluded, building alliances between women's advocates in all of their country's ethnic and racial communities is crucial for a vibrant, sustainable women's movement.

As feminist ideas and feminist organizing have grown more influential internationally in the late twentieth century and the early twenty-first century, more women have spoken out against being turned by nationalist leaders into mere symbols of the nation. They have made more demands for gender equality inside the nationalist movements that have sought their support. Not all of these feminist-inspired demands have been welcomed. As a result, women's political relationships with nationalist movements have been complex and often fraught. Stories of those complexities have often been silenced—in history books, in national holiday celebrations, in national museum exhibitions. After all, a writer, an events organizer, a curator who adds gendered complexity to the story of any nationalist movement might deprive that movement—and the very idea of "the nation"—of some of its luster.

Any commentator, nevertheless, who remains incurious about women's experiences, ideas, and actions, consequently, will draw a picture of nationalism and of any given nationalist

movement that is simplistic. Drawing simplistic portraits of nationalist movements will produce a canvas that makes international politics look simpler than it is.

WOMEN, COLONIALISM, AND ANTICOLONIALISM

Colonialism was good for the postcard business. Colonial administrators, soldiers, settlers, and tourists were looking for ways to send home images of the societies they were ruling, images that were appealing and yet which made it clear that these alien societies needed the allegedly civilizing governance only whites could bestow. The colonial postcard images were frequently eroticized and surprisingly standardized—a Zulu woman from southern Africa and a Maori woman from New Zealand were asked to assume similar poses for the British imperialists' "grapher."

French colonialists, too, mailed home postcard pictures, choosing images of Arab women in their North African colonies. Some were veiled, others were not. Some were obviously posed in a photographer's studio, others apparently caught on film unawares.[4] Many of these postcards convey a sexual message. "Aicha and Zorah" is the caption for a photo of two young Algerian women, unveiled and looking straight at the photographer—and thus at the buyer and eventual recipient of the postcard. The two women are sitting on a window ledge behind an ornate iron grille. Another card, captioned "Moorish woman"—as if representing all Arab women—shows a woman wearing neither a veil nor a robe to cover her breasts. She too is leaning against a window grille, looking through it from the inside, available, though almost beyond reach.



Figure 9. "The Beauty of Kraal, Zululand": a Zulu woman pictured on a colonial postcard from South Africa; photo taken in the early 1900s.

Figure 10. "Kia-Ora: Greetings from Maoriland": a Maori woman pictured on a British colonial postcard from New Zealand, circa 1930.

Malek Alloula was the collector of these French colonial postcards. He was an Algerian nationalist. The ephemera of colonialist culture, these postcards captured for him the imperial concepts of masculine adventure and the "exotic" that were as crucial to French colonial domination as the Foreign Legion. European "Orientalism" nurtured an appreciative fascination with these cultures while justifying European rule in the name of "civilization." The image of the tantalizingly veiled Muslim woman was a cornerstone of this Orientalist ideology and of the imperial structure it supported.[5]

Malek Alloula used these images to explore his own identity as a male nationalist: for a man, to be conquered is to have *his* women turned into fodder for imperialist postcards. Becoming a nationalist requires a man to resist the foreigner's use and abuse of *his* women.

But what of the women themselves? Aicha and Zora must have had their own thoughts about being posed unveiled and behind bars—just as did the Maori and Zulu women who posed for the British photographers. Perhaps they later saw the postcard on sale near a hotel. Maybe they were flattered; maybe they were humiliated. How were they persuaded to sit for the photographer in the first place? Were they paid? Who got the money? Malek Alloula and other male nationalists seem remarkably *in*curious about the abused women's own thoughts—about the meaning they might have assigned to foreign conquest.

Colonized women have served as sex objects for foreign men. Some have married foreign men and thus facilitated alliances between foreign governments and companies and conquered peoples.[6] Others have worked as cooks and nannies for the wives of those foreign men. In simply trying to earn an income, they may have unintentionally bolstered white women's sense of

moral superiority by accepting their religious and social instruction. Simultaneously, many women living under colonial rule have sustained men in their communities when their masculine self-respect has been battered by colonists' contempt and condescension. Women have planted maize, yams, and rice in small plots to support families so that their husbands could be recruited to work miles away in foreign-owned mines or plantations. Women as symbols, women as workers, and women as nurturers have been crucial to the entire colonial undertaking.[7]

Thanks to feminist historians, we now are learning more about the complex ideas and strategies of women who lived under colonial rule. For instance, some Korean urban women living under Japanese rule in the second and third decades of the twentieth century carved out new identities for themselves as modern New Women. They even traveled to Tokyo to study and to work with Japan's first generation of outspoken feminist writers and artists. These Korean women were not pawns of the colonial rulers, but they did reject what some Korean nationalist men imagined were the ideals of Korean traditional feminine purity. Trying to craft a life as an autonomous woman in an era of colonial rule at a time when nationalist sentiments are politically salient can be risky. There may appear to be almost no cultural space in which to stand, speak, or breathe freely. Who these Korean New Women were, what they stood for, how they should be remembered, whether they should be thought of as "loyalists" or "traitors," are still questions hotly debated among today's South Korean feminists and nationalists.[8]

For Korean feminists these gendered historical investigations of nationalism have increasing significance today, as Koreans continue to determine what they think about the presence in their country of large U.S. military bases, as they build up their

own national military, as South Korea's immersion in the global political economy becomes ever deeper, as the prospects of reunification with North Korea wax and wane, and as growing numbers of Koreans who travel abroad as tourists, students, and business executives migrate, creating a large Korean diaspora in the United States.[9]

And what about those women who worked for, or found their own reasons to work with, the Nazi occupiers of France, or the Soviet occupiers of East Germany, or the American occupiers of Iraq? What criteria are being used today, and by whom, to determine whether any of these women should be seen now as French, German, or Iraqi patriots or pariahs? It is the very saliency of women—and ideas about femininity—during years of foreign occupation and in an ongoing nationalist project that continues to make the writing of feminist history so politically fraught, and necessary.

Nationalist movements rarely have taken women's experiences as the starting point for an understanding of how a people becomes colonized or how it throws off the shackles of that material and psychological domination. Rather, nationalism typically has sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope.

"Not only are we prevented from speaking for women but also [not allowed] to think, and even to dream about a different fate. We are deprived of our dreams, because we are made to believe that leading the life we lead is the only way to be a good Algerian."[10] The speaker, Algerian feminist Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas, was describing the conditions under which her postcolonial nationalist government—an independent government she had fought to establish—could rationalize its new legislation to restrict women's social and political participation, despite

women's active part in their country's anticolonial war. She was quick, however, to warn her feminist listeners gathered in Helsinki at an international meeting: "Probably most of the women present at this Symposium take for granted that they belong to a country, a nation, which does not have to prove its existence; it allows for transcending the concept of nation, and criticizing it. It has not been allowed for us[;] … it is not for so many people in still colonized countries, or countries facing imperialism at war.… [Under these conditions it is] much more difficult to come to criticize the nation, and even the State which pretends it represents the Nation."[11]

Marie Aimée Hélie-Lucas went on to cofound Women Living Under Muslim Laws, one of today's most valuable sources of transnational feminist information.[12] Perhaps not surprisingly, Women Living Under Muslim Laws, which now is a broad transnational network of feminists in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Bosnia, Tunisia, Pakistan, and Malaysia, has been sharply critical of any nationalist discourse used to deny women's rights or to limit women's public organizing.

A "nation" is an idea, a powerful idea. At the core of this idea is the image of a collection of people who have come to believe that they have been shaped by a common past and are destined to share a common future. That belief is usually (though not inevitably) nurtured by a common language and a sense of otherness, of being distinct from groups around them. Nationalism is a package of interwoven ideas and values, one of which is a commitment to fostering those beliefs and promoting those policies that permit the nation to stay cohesive and control its own destiny. Colonial rule has provided especially fertile ground for nationalist ideas because it has given an otherwise disparate people such a potent shared experience of foreign domination.

The experience of foreign domination can trump differences among people of diverse classes, varied skin tones, different regional affiliations, and perhaps even different religions and ethnicities.

The nation has the potential for unfurling a big umbrella. In this generous vision, multiethnicity, religious tolerance (sometimes linked to a secular state), and regional diversity are consciously embraced, seen not as threatening the nation but rather as the distinguishing hallmarks of the big-umbrella nation. Tito of Yugoslavia attempted to institutionalize this form of nation; so did Gandhi and the Baathist parties of Iraq and Syria; so too did Pierre Trudeau of Canada and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. Some of these big-umbrella nationalists have pursued democratic politics, while others have slipped into militarized authoritarianism to enforce their vision. Many people, nonetheless, who have embraced nationalism have been suspicious of the big-umbrella vision of the nation. Instead, they have opted for a "purer" nation, a tightly "wrapped umbrella" sort of nation. In this alternative, narrower vision, national strength is believed to flow from social and cultural homogeneity. Which vision—the big umbrella or the wrapped umbrella—of nationalism any woman supports or simply has to cope with in her life will have an effect on her personal and political choices.

In practice, one of the major differences between the open- and shut-umbrella versions of the nation is the official attitude toward intermarriage. Does the nationalist government make it easy or difficult for a woman of the dominant (or ruling) community to marry a man from outside her community? If a woman marries a man of a different religion, race, or linguistic heritage, is she seen as strengthening the nation or betraying it? An example: as the multiethnic, religiously pluralistic Iraq fashioned by

the Baathists (and then ruled by Saddam Hussein, the country's final Baathist leader, using ever more authoritarian methods) violently fell apart in the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the number of multiethnic and multisect marriages dramatically declined, becoming less and less popularly acceptable. For some Iraqis this decline was taken as a sign of how much they had lost as a result of authoritarian rule, the United States–led military invasion, and the emergence of a postwar sectarian regime. As intermarriage was increasingly deprecated, it felt to these Iraqis as if they had lost the big-umbrella nation they had known and valued.[13]

One becomes a nationalist, of either the big-umbrella or wrapped-umbrella variety, when one begins to recognize shared public pasts and futures with people one does not know personally, people beyond one's family and town. But it is not women's past experiences, present realities, and strategies for the future that are made the basis of the dominant understandings of nationalism they are urged to support. Yet, as Algerian feminists have warned, it is risky for a woman to criticize a movement that claims to represent her own nation or a regime that exercises authority in the name of that nation. Living as a nationalist feminist is one of the most difficult political projects in today's world.

GENDERED COLONIALISM

Many women from imperial countries have served their own governments by teaching in state and mission schools. A young white American woman recalled the thrill she felt when she sailed to Manila as one of the first teachers to help establish American rule over the Philippines in 1901. Pattie Paxton was recruited by the U.S. Army. As she sailed out of San Francisco

Bay, American soldiers were still engaged in a campaign to quash Filipino anticolonial insurgents who had fought their former Spanish rulers in the name of nationalism.

Pattie Paxton hardly fits the conventional picture of an imperialist. She had just graduated from college, a rare achievement for a young American woman at the turn of the twentieth century. A classmate had told her of "the interesting flora in the Philippine Islands, of orchids, of pleasant Nipa houses, and the best behaved children he had ever seen" while assuring Pattie that the army would never send teachers to "dangerous spots." Paxton recalled later that she saw herself "playing my small part in this great adventure" and seeing "the world at the expense of Uncle Sam." Her mind was made up when she learned that her college friend Stella was going as well, and that they could make the voyage together. Aboard ship they met other unmarried young women teachers, as well as men just out of the University of California. The women met in one of the staterooms "to read and gossip" and joined the young men to "spend pleasant evenings on deck singing, chiefly college songs."[14]

Few American women raised their voices to protest at the sailing. Susan B. Anthony, despite her leadership of the emergent American suffrage movement, found she had few followers when she protested to President McKinley in 1900 that the annexation of Hawaii and colonial expansion in the Caribbean and the Pacific did little more than extend American-style subjugation of women. Indeed, opposing Anthony's critiques, some suffragists in the United States and Europe even argued that their *service* to their respective empires was proof of their reliability as voters.[15]

After several weeks in Manila and Iloilo, during which they lived like tourists and provided a seemingly innocent change for

the American soldiers, Pattie and Stella were sent to the provincial town of Bacolod, headquarters of the American Sixth Infantry. In Bacolod, prominent Filipino families, who for generations had accommodated Spanish colonizers, were trying to accommodate the country's newest foreign occupiers. Sabina, the landowner with whom Pattie and Stella were lodged, did her best to introduce the two young women to her relatives and friends. Then, at last, the two American women received their first teaching assignments. They were sent to a village in the Negros mountains where Filipino anti-imperialist *insurrectos* were still active. Pattie and Stella did not seem perturbed; this was the adventure they had longed for. They wasted no time in setting about transforming the village's two existing schools, one for boys and one for girls. Each reflected the earlier Spanish colonists' approach to learning: religious texts and recitation in unison. "Upon such a foundation," Paxton recalls, "we were to build American schools, and in that foundation we recognized at least three strong blocks: a disciplined group, an eagerness to learn, a desire to excel. In addition," she remembers gratefully, "we found the teachers keen to learn our language and our methods of teaching."

Paxton spent four years teaching in the Philippines. Some of her most frustrating moments came when she could not persuade local Filipino officials to encourage little girls to attend school. She was plagued, too, by a lack of proper materials. But she made do, taught vocabulary and numbers, learned local songs, and helped her students make handicrafts. And life was not all work. There were picnics and holiday celebrations to attend with the American soldiers.

Pattie Paxton was not overtly racist. She was disgusted by an American colonel's "white man's burden" dinner speech and

by his wife's arrogance. Nonetheless, Paxton and the other young women who came to the Philippines to teach in those heady days of American colonial rule helped to establish the values and institutions that would become the objects of an intense Filipino nationalist controversy eight decades later. Corazon Aquino became president of the Philippines in 1986 on a wave of democratizing nationalism, but she herself was a graduate of an American college. Like many other Filipinos today, she remained torn between nationalist pride and an admiration for American values, the legacy of Pattie, Stella, and other women who saw adventure in working in the service of colonialism.

European and American women taught more than just letters and numbers in their governments' colonies; they also taught notions of respectability. They traveled to colonized societies as settlers, explorers, and missionaries. They served colonial administrations without pay as the wives of soldiers, planters, missionaries, and administrators. European and American women volunteered to work as nurses, governesses, and teachers. The masculinized colonial governments expected women in all these roles to set standards of ladylike behavior. The Victorian code of feminine respectability, it was thought, would set a positive example for the local colonized women. Colonial male administrators also hoped that such a code would maintain the proper distance between the small numbers of white women and the large numbers of local men. Sexual liaisons between colonial men and local women usually were winked at; affairs between colonial women and local men were deemed threats to imperial order.[16]

Ladylike behavior was a mainstay of imperialist civilization. Like sanitation and Christianity, this version of feminine

respectability was meant to convince both the colonizing and the colonized peoples that foreign conquest was right and necessary.[17] Ladylike behavior also was intended to have an uplifting effect on the colonizing men: it would encourage them to act according to those Victorian standards of manliness thought crucial for colonial order. Part of that empire-building masculinity was protection of the respectable lady. She stood for the civilizing mission that, in turn, justified the colonization of benighted peoples.

"Among rude people the women are generally degraded, among civilized people they are exalted," wrote James Mill, one of the most popular promoters of British colonialism in the nineteenth century.[18] British colonial officers blamed the existing ideologies of masculinity in the colonized societies for women's degradation; if men's sense of manliness was such that it did not include reverence toward women, then they could not expect to be allowed to govern their own societies. Thus, for instance, in India, British commentators created the idea of the "effeminate" Bengali male, only to berate him because he wasn't manly enough to recognize his obligation to protect and revere women.[19] British officials passed legislation in India improving women's inheritance rights (1874, 1929, 1937), prohibiting widow-burning (1829), and allowing widow remarriage (1856), all in the name of advancing civilization. At the same time, Victorian values allowed these British officials to enact laws that imposed prison sentences on wives who refused to fulfill their sexual obligations to their husbands and imposed a system of prostitution that provided Indian women to sexually service British soldiers stationed in India. The riddle of two such contradictory sets of colonial policies unravels if one sees British masculinized imperialism not as a crusade to abolish male domination of

Figure 11. Area set aside for European women at the marriage of a maharaja's daughter in colonial India, 1932. Photo: Harold Lepenperg/ Acme Cards, London.

women but as a crusade to establish European masculinized rule over the men in Asian and African societies.[20]

In the early twentieth century, masculinity—its importance to the nation and the threats to its healthy survival—was a topic of a lively, if nervous, political debate in several imperial countries. The Boer War, following in the wake of the Crimean War, shook Britons' confidence that their men were masculine enough to maintain the empire. Robert Baden-Powell founded the Boy Scouts in 1908 to combat venereal disease, intermarriage of the races, and declining birthrates, all of which were believed to endanger the maintenance of Britain's international power. Baden-Powell and other British imperialists saw sportsmanship, combined with respect for the respectable woman, as the bedrock of British imperial success. Although Boy Scout branches



Figure 12. "A white Man and a man." From *Rovering to Success: A Book of Life-Sport for Young Men,* by Robert Baden-Powell; illustration drawn by the author. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1922.

were eventually established throughout the world, Baden-Powell's original intention was to restore manly self-control in white boys: in their hands lay the future of the empire. To make certain that his followers did not mistake his intentions, Baden-Powell contrasted the images of "a white man" and "a man." The latter was pictured in Baden-Powell's guides as short and black, wearing a top hat and a rumpled coat. This was not what a Boy Scout aspired to become. He wanted to emulate the "white man" standing next to this figure: tall, muscular, eyes straight ahead, body at attention.[21]

The "white man" towered over the black man not only because he had learned how to fight tooth decay, walk without slouching, and properly carry his rucksack but also because he had learned the importance of revering women, especially mothers and "the right girl." The surest way for a young man to find the "right girl" was to marry a Girl Guide. All of this required the same kind of skillful maneuvering that a Boy Scout learned to employ when paddling his canoe through the rapids:

> You will, I hope, have gathered from what I have said about this Rock, "Woman," that it has its dangers for the woman as well as for the man. But it has also its very bright side if you only maneuver your canoe aright.
>
> The paddle to use for this job is chivalry.[22]

NATIONALISM AND THE VEIL

During the Arab Spring's popular uprisings of 2011–13 in the Middle East, women came out into public spaces wearing diverse attire to demonstrate against authoritarian rulers and for democratization. Women protestors in Bahrain created a women-only encampment in the middle of the city to demand

that their country's monarchy adopt political reforms. Most of Bahrain's women protestors were attired in long black robes, their heads covered. Their apparently monochromatic traditional attire did not hamper them from developing new political ideas or implementing fresh forms of public activism. In 2011–12, joining male protestors in Cairo's Tahrir Square, by contrast, Egyptian women—demonstrating first against the rule of Hosni Mubarak and then against the post-Mubarak elected government's uses of sexual harassment to dampen women's public political activism—were notable for their diverse attire: some were in headscarves, some had their hair exposed. In 2013, in Taksim Square, the heart of Istanbul's most secular multiethnic urban neighborhood, Turkish women turned out in the thousands, along with Turkish men, to protest the autocratic decision of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan government to uproot trees to make way for a new shopping mall and a faux Ottoman military barracks. Many of the protesting Turkish women were bareheaded, but some were wearing headscarves.

Many of these politically active women across the Middle East were consciously defining new gendered nations, national communities in which secular women and religiously observant women would see each other as mutually respectful allies, where a woman's choice of dressing one way or another would not be used as a criterion for including her or excluding her from the nation.[23]

No practice has been more heatedly debated among nationalists than the veil: should a Muslim woman demonstrate her commitment to the nationalist cause by wearing a veil or headscarf—or by throwing off the veil and letting her hair flow freely? Men and women in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia have lined up on both sides of this con-

Figure 13. Bahrain women at their own demonstration site calling on the monarchy to democratize, Bahrain, 2012. Photo: Reuters.

troversy. Male nationalist elites have wielded the feminized headscarf and veil to achieve their own political ends. At one end of the patriarchal nationalist spectrum, Iran's revolutionary male elite made women's wearing of head-covering, hair-hiding scarves and long chadors integral to their campaign to reform the gendered meaning of the Iranian nation after the fall of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979. The nation's honor was seen as dependent on women's honor, as expressed in women covering their hair, presumably because the sight of it was too tempting for Iranian men.

At the other end of the same patriarchal nationalist spectrum, Turkey's most persistently influential nationalist, Kemal Ataturk, banned both men's popular red fez and women's headscarves in

the 1920s in the name of modernizing and secularizing post-Ottoman Turkey.[24] If Turkey could no longer rule a sprawling empire, it would have to rely on a more homogenous, modernized national community. Banning the headscarf and "giving" women the right to vote were cemented together in the Ataturk version of postimperial modernizing nationalism. His own wife could not wear a headscarf, and, according to Ataturk's dictate, neither could the wives of any of his military officers. Turkish girls who continued (voluntarily or under pressure from their parents) to wear headscarves could not attend state universities, nor could they be hired in the government's civil service or be elected to parliament. It was this gendered form of Turkish nationalism that the early-twenty-first century Islamicist government of Prime Minister Erdogan was challenging by promoting the wearing of the headscarf among Turkish women, allowing—for the first time since the 1920s—those young women wearing headscarves entrance into state universities. When the women protestors converged on Istanbul's Taksim Square in 2013, they were forging political democratizing alliances between bare-headed and head-covered women, they were implicitly rejecting both the Ataturk and the Erdogan masculinist formulas for gendered nationalism.[25]

Earlier, European colonial officials and men and women from the colonizing societies also exercised moral and coercive pressure to tilt the argument one way or the other, usually toward rejecting the veil. The more that colonialists promoted the anti-veil movement in the name of their own Western civilizing mission, the harder it became for Muslim women in colonized (or neocolonized) countries to control the argument. For if colonial male administrators and progressive European women took prominent public stances against women wearing headscarves or

the veil, and if they did so without an authentic alliance with local women, as was usually the case, they ensured that rejection of the veil would be taken as compliance with colonial rule. In Algeria, French administrators saw removing the veil from women as part of France's "civilizing mission." Egyptian feminists in the 1920s and 1930s had more success in controlling the debate, but they too risked being tarred with the antinationalist brush when they stepped out in public unveiled. The privileged status of those antiveil women who came from the local upper classes, as many did, only partly protected them from ridicule.[26] As women mobilized to join the Arab Spring uprising of 2011–2013, they began to take a fresh interest in Egyptian women's debates of the 1920s and 1930s. There were gendered political lessons to be drawn—and applied—so that women would not again experience the sequence of political participation in a nationalist movement followed by a postrevolutionary marginalization.[27]

European women in Egypt during the colonial period usually expressed strong opinions about the headscarf and the veil. They saw both of these as emblematic of Muslim women's suppressive seclusion and linked it to the harem. Many of the European women who wrote about the veil did so not primarily out of genuine curiosity about the lives and thoughts of Egyptian women but because it allowed them to feel sanguine about their own condition as European women: "By thinking of themselves as all powerful and free *vis-à-vis* Egyptian women, Western women could," as Mervat Hatem points out, "avoid confronting their own powerlessness and gender oppression at home."[28] All too often, those European women who traveled to Egypt and stayed on as teachers and governesses, and sometimes as wives of Egyptian men, were notably reluctant to explain why they felt so much freer in the "Orient."

Men in many communities appear to assign ideological weight to the outward attire and sexual purity of women in the community because they see women as (1) the community's—or the nation's—most valuable *possessions,* (2) the principal *vehicles* for transmitting the whole nation's values from one generation to the next, (3) *bearers* of the community's future generations—or, crudely, nationalist wombs, (4) the members of the community most *vulnerable* to defilement and exploitation by oppressive alien rulers, and (5) those most susceptible to *assimilation* and co-option by insidious outsiders. All five of these presumptions have made women's behavior important in the eyes of nationalist men. But these ideas have not necessarily ensured that women themselves would be taken seriously as active creators of the nation's newly assertive politics. Nor have these ideas guaranteed that male privilege would be effectively challenged in the new independent state derived from that nation.[29]

PATRIARCHY INSIDE THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Women in Jaffna, Sri Lanka, formed a study group in the late 1980s in the midst of what they could not know would turn into a twenty-five-year-long civil war. Their goal was to analyze exactly how their oppression as women was causally related to their oppression as Tamils in a Singhalese-dominated Sri Lankan state. Some women had become politically conscious because the Tamil nationalist movement made them aware that their status as Tamils affected their chances of educational and economic opportunities in Sri Lanka. It was only after this initial politicization through nationalism that they became aware that women and men were being made to play quite different

roles in the escalating violence between Tamil guerillas, the government's military, and the occupying Indian army. The changes wrought by ethnic mobilization and spiraling violence prompted these Tamil women to come together in a study group. There was no guarantee, however, that their examination of women's conditions in Tamil and Sri Lankan societies would make them feel more comfortable with the nationalist movement as the movement evolved and became ever more militarized. Their discussions even had the potential of prompting some of the women to see feminists in the Singhalese community as potential allies.[30] That, in turn, could have threatened their status as trusted women within the increasingly besieged Tamil community.

Today, in the aftermath of the government military's devastating defeat of the Tamil guerrillas and its violent retaking of the country's northern region, Sri Lankan Tamil women have become sharply critical of the militarism and misogyny they have witnessed on all sides of the long conflict. Beyond that, new groups of activist Sri Lankan women, such as the Association of War Affected Women, have pressed both the government and international organizations to recognize the importance of women's full participation in the current postwar nation-rebuilding efforts, efforts that will shape women's relationships to men, to politics, and to economics for decades to come. Experience has made many of these feminist activists wary of the militarization that so often accompanies nationalism.[31]

Women in many communities who have tried to assert their sense of national identity have discovered that coming into an emergent nationalist movement *through* the accepted feminine role of bearer of the community's memory and children is empowering. Being praised by men in the nationalist movement

for bearing more children and raising them to become loyal nationalists does not always feel like being patronized or marginalized; it can feel confidence-enhancing. However, a woman who begins to go out of her home in the evening to attend nationalist meetings in the name of securing a better future for her children still may meet strong resistance from her husband. He may accuse her of neglecting her domestic duties, of having a sexual liaison, of making him look a fool in the eyes of other men, who may taunt him for not being able to control his wife. He never imagined that supporting the nationalist movement would entail losing control of his wife. He may even beat her to limit her new nationalist activities.

Such experiences have raised domestic violence to the status of a political issue for women in some nationalist movements. When they first became involved in nationalist activities, they may not have imagined that critiques of foreign rule, foreign bases, foreign investment, or local authoritarian rule would lead to critiques of relations between husbands and wives. In fact, many women became involved *as* good wives and good mothers. Only later did they conclude that they would have to overcome male resistance in their homes and neighborhoods if they were to participate fully in the movement. A Filipino nationalist who was active in resisting her government's alliances with foreign bankers, corporations, and militaries describes taking a new step in nationalist organizing:

> We have a forum, we call it the women's soirée, where we invite women who are involved in the movement and also encourage them to bring their husbands.... One evening our topic was "Feminism and Marriage—Do They Mix?" We went into a discussion of the family and some even questioned the value of the family because of the oppression of females that emanates from the family.

> Then some of the men started airing their grievances, such as that since their wives joined this movement they are no longer attending to the needs of the children.... It was a very healthy exchange, and it was a very different kind of dialog because it was a group dialogs not just between husbands and wives.[32]

Women active in nationalist movements in the Philippines, Ireland, South Africa, Canada, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Mexico, and Nicaragua began to analyze how femininity, masculinity, marriage, "home," and the international system were integrally tied to one another.[33] In doing so they were far ahead of those women in industrialized countries who scarcely glimpsed the political connections. The process that ties these potent ideas together is not just globalized consumer advertising and the arms trade; it is domestic relations between women and men. If women, they argued, are kept in marginalized roles as domestic caregivers—by men who are lovers or by fathers or husbands—then the chances of halting foreign-financed invasion, ending an unfair military-bases treaty, or holding accountable a multinational corporate employer will be slim. In this sense foreign base commanders and capitalist entrepreneurs may depend on domestic violence and the constraints it enforces on women's public activism as much as they do on alliances with men in the local elite.[34]

On the other hand, it can be very difficult for women to raise these sorts of "women's issues" inside a nationalist movement that is under siege, precisely because they are actually issues about men's power. The more imminent and coercive the threat posed by an adversary's power—a foreign force or the local government's police—the more successful men in the community are likely to be in persuading activist women to keep quiet, to swallow their grievances, to suppress their analyses. When

any nationalist movement becomes militarized, either on its leaders' initiative or in reaction to external intimidation, male privilege in the community is likely to become even more entrenched.

When, on top of this silencing, foreign governments become involved to defend an ethnic group from attack by an alien-backed power and thereby legitimize their involvement, local male privilege gains a foreign ally. This is what happened in 1980s Afghanistan. Two decades before the most recent United States–led military actions in Afghanistan, the U.S. government and its allies framed the war in Afghanistan as a classic Cold War narrative: the Soviet Union had invaded a neighboring country, propping up a puppet regime that lacked a popular base; the antiregime insurgents represented the real nation, and their brave resistance deserved the Free World's moral and military support. This story became murky, however, when one looked at the situation from the vantage point of Afghan women. The cause for which the insurgent mujahideen fought was a traditional-rural-clan way of life that is unambiguously patriarchal. One of the policies the Soviet-backed government in Kabul pursued that so alienated male clan leaders was the expansion of economic and educational opportunities for Afghanistan's women. While there is little evidence that the Soviet-backed Kabul regime enjoyed wide public legitimacy, outside observers report that its tenure proved beneficial to those mainly urban women who were able to take advantage of the government's policy. Women conveniently slipped off the policy stage when U.S. officials designed their Cold War response to the civil war in Afghanistan.[35]

Given this experience, it was little wonder that in the twenty-first century, as U.S. military allies withdrew their troops and

Washington set its own troop-withdrawal timetable, Afghan women's advocates, such as those in the Afghan Women's Network, were suspicious. Women's rights, they predicted, again would be reduced to a mere bargaining chip on the negotiation table when men on all sides sat down to sort out among themselves the political future of the country.[36]

Military mobilization, it is true, may make it necessary for men to permit women to acquire new skills and take on new responsibilities. But simultaneously, militarization puts a premium on communal unity in the name of national survival, a priority that can silence women critical of patriarchal practices and attitudes; in so doing, nationalist militarization, even while it calls on women to make contributions, can privilege men.

Militarization during the first intifada of the 1980s has provided young Palestinian men with new opportunities to prove their manhood, often in defiance not only of Israeli men's authority but also of what many perceive as their fathers' outworn authority. On the other hand, "women are bearing the brunt of the *intifadah*," as one Palestinian told a reporter in 1988. The Israeli government's use of soldiers to enforce strict curfews and to arrest an estimated six thousand Palestinian men raised women's household chores to the stature of national imperatives: "They have to watch the money, make all the family chores, bake their own bread, grow vegetables, take care of chickens and goats. These traditional roles are more important now." Najwa Jardali, a Palestinian woman long active in a movement to provide day care and health clinics for women in the occupied territories, warned Western women not to imagine that day care was simply a women's issue. With militarization, it became a national concern: "Most Western feminists wouldn't regard kindergarten as important[,] … but for us it's very important. The

military government doesn't allow us kindergartens in schools, and day care enables women to get involved in other activities." Proof of day care centers' national importance was the Israeli military's efforts to harass the women teachers and close them down.[37]

The popular image of the Palestinian nation until then had been the young male street fighter of the Palestine Liberation Organization. With his checkered scarf, and a rock in hand, defiant and alert, he stood for an entire nation. Palestinian women remained in the shadows. They were reduced to being the protected, or the unprotected. But in 1988 Palestinian women began holding their own marches in the occupied territories to protest against the Israeli government's "Iron Fist" policy. They defied heavily armed soldiers with chants of "We are people, we are women. Never are we subdued. Never do we feel self-pity." The community's leadership committee, the Unified National Command of the Intifada, began addressing women's as well as men's concerns in its bulletins. The nature of Israeli military policy compelled Palestinians to develop a new way of organizing, one reliant less on outside help and more on small neighborhood committees, less susceptible to police and military disruption. In this type of organization, especially with so many men and boys jailed after the more visible stone-throwing confrontations, women began to come into their own as political actors. Women on the neighborhood committees went from house to house recruiting more members and collecting money and food for the besieged, asking people knowledgeable about health care to provide health services, and urging participation in demonstrations.[38] Would such militarizing pressures lead to an enduring reordering of femininity and masculinity within the Palestinian nation?

THE OTHER NOSTALGIA

The common practice of sweeping nationalist debates about masculinized power, and about women's relations with men, under the nation's historical rug has bestowed inordinate power on future nationalist male leaders: they can claim that they are inheritors of an unambiguous legacy of communal solidarity. In reality, they may be inheritors of a patriarchal victory won within the community a generation ago. The history of any nationalist movement is almost always a history filled with gendered debate. If a decade or a century later it looks as though there was no confusion, no argument about women's relations to men in the ruling community and to men in their own ethnic community, that is probably evidence only that the nostalgic patriarchal narrative of the nation's history has won for the time being.

And the impact of winning—or of being defeated—can be tricky to calculate at the time if the nation is fragile and outside threats are formidable. For example, Hue-Tam Ho-Tai, a Vietnamese feminist historian, describes one of those seemingly minor incidents in which the patriarchal side of the nationalist debate inched a step further toward victory.[39] In the 1920s there was a vital women's movement in French-ruled Vietnam. It raised issues of literacy, marriage conditions, and public participation challenging some of the most entrenched ideas of Vietnamese Confucian culture. Male intellectuals within the early nationalist movement also began speaking out against patriarchal values and practices that, they said, deprived the Vietnamese nation of women's talents and energies, both of which were needed to throw off French colonialism.[40] Vietnamese women were encouraged by male and female nationalists to learn to read

and write. The Trung sisters, who had led the Vietnamese against Chinese colonialists in the first century A.D., were heralded as models for contemporary Vietnamese. Women began to join the Indochinese Communist Party and other nationalist groups. In the process, earlier women's groups became overshadowed by mixed nationalist organizations. Fighting for women's rights increasingly came to be seen as part of creating a Vietnamese sense of nationhood vital enough to challenge French colonial rule, a rule that grew harsher as the nationalist movement spread. During the 1930s there seemed to be little tension between advocating women's rights and joining the struggle for national rights: each bolstered the other; both questioned the capacity of Vietnam's traditional Confucian culture to protect the nation from foreign domination.

Then some women activists began to examine relations between men and women inside the nationalist movement. At a Communist Party conference in the 1930s, women delegates were told by nationalist leaders to omit mention of problems between husbands and wives in their public report. Raising such questions on the floor, they were warned, would only generate hostile feelings within the nationalist movement at a time when it was already threatened by arrests by French police. The women excised those sections from their report. Problems were deemed legitimate only if they were seen as obstacles to nationalist unity; a suggested problem was generally dismissed if it made men in the nation anxious.

To make sense of the decline of the French empire, we have to understand how women saw the choices they faced at each precarious step in the creation of an effective Vietnamese nationalist movement. Many Vietnamese women did find strength and meaning through participation in the nationalist

struggles during the next four decades of war.[41] Later women may not have had the same choices. But every time women succumb to the pressure to hold their tongues about problems they are having with men in a nationalist organization, nationalism becomes that much more masculinized. Vietnamese women have been almost invisible in the senior ranks of the unified country's party and government: in 1979, five years after the expulsion of American troops, women constituted a mere 17 percent of the Vietnamese Communist Party's membership; a decade after the nationalist victory, the Politburo of the party, the most powerful decision-making body, was an all-male enclave. Women have even lost some of the influence they acquired in village and collective farm councils during the war.[42]

Women in early-twenty-first-century Vietnam began to challenge this masculinization of public life. It was a moment when Vietnam's international relationships were expanding: Vietnam had become a popular foreign tourist destination, large global corporations such as Nike had contracted Vietnamese factories to produce goods for export, and many Vietnamese were growing nervous about China's territorial expansionism. Furthermore, witnessing a widening gap between rich and poor, more Vietnamese citizens were openly criticizing the arrogance and corruption of their own elite. This also was a time when Vietnamese feminist academics were building wider networks with women's studies researchers in other countries.[43] It did not go unnoticed by Vietnamese feminists that, in 2013, only two of the sixteen members appointed by the male leadership to the Politboro were women. Thus it could prove difficult for Vietnamese women's advocates to push forward if they could not retrace the steps of the nationalist movement back to the points at which women's relations with men were shoved off the nationalist agenda.

Nationalism places a high value on anything indigenous. Thus Sri Lankan feminist scholar Kumari Jayawardena explains that "those who want to continue to keep the women of our countries in a position of subordination find it convenient to dismiss feminism as a foreign ideology."[44] Sometimes this dismissal is combined with a homophobic attack. Feminists pressing their own nationalist movements to rethink the roles of women in politics, to reassess the effects of militant violence on women and men in the community, have been labeled lesbians by critics. In the wartime years of 1992–95, Serbian nationalist supporters of the invasion of Bosnia by Yugoslavia's then-president Slobodan Milosevic similarly taunted Serbia's antimilitarism feminists in Women in Black with homophobic slurs. Calling women lesbians is designed to dismiss the feminists as tainted by alien ideas, as if heterosexuality were the sole indigenous practice in the local community, and to marginalize feminist ideas as stemming from degenerate women.[45]

Nationalist feminists have crafted critiques that raise important questions about the relationships between precolonial and colonial culture. If their nation was free of patriarchy before the imposition of foreign colonial rule, then the task would be relatively simple: by joining with men to roll back foreign domination and restore precolonial values, they could restore equality between women and men inside the community. *If,* however, women discovered that patriarchal values and practices predated colonial rule, and if, subsequently, these values and practices were exploited and exacerbated by colonialists, then regaining control of that society would not liberate women. In Turkey, the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam, women's advocates have become wary of nationalist spokespeople who glorify the precolonial past. They have become uncomfortable when

women warriors and queens are offered as proof that women had genuine influence over land and sexuality in the past. And yet they have to conduct these historical explorations carefully, knowing that outsiders might use their findings to discredit the nationalism they want to transform.[46]

CONCLUSION

Nationalism has provided millions of women with spaces in which to be international actors. To learn that one's own culture is full of intellectual and artistic riches, to learn that outsiders depend on coercion, not innate superiority, when wielding their influence, to recognize bonds of community where before there were only barriers of class, region, and party, to discover that one is valued outside the realms of home and kin—all this has been empowering for thousands of women as well as men. National consciousness has induced many women to feel confident enough to take part in public organizing and public debate for the first time in their lives. Furthermore, nationalism, more than many other ideologies, has a vision that includes women, for no nation can survive unless its culture is transmitted and its children are born and nurtured, two activities that nationalists deem essential.

Nationalism, by definition, is a set of ideas that sharpens distinctions between "us" and "them." It provides, moreover, analytical tools for explaining how inequities have been created between "us" and "them." A woman who becomes politicized through nationalism is more likely to see a man from her community as sharing a common destiny than she is to see women from another community as having a shared future, especially if those women, no matter what their politics, come from a community that has treated her own with derision.

But many of the nationalisms that have rearranged the pattern of world politics over the last two centuries have been patriarchal nationalisms. Their spokespeople—historians, novelists, poets, artists, generals, political organizers—have presumed that all the forces marginalizing or oppressing women have been generated by the dynamics of colonialism, neocolonialism, or capitalist globalization, and hence that the precolonial, preglobalized society was one in which women enjoyed respect and security. Following this nonfeminist analysis, simply restoring the nation's independence will ensure women's liberation. Many nationalists have assumed, too, that the significance of the community's women being raped or vulgarly photographed by foreign men is that the honor of the community's men has been assaulted—although some women survivors of wartime rape, such as those in Bangladesh, have been silenced for years because of the stigma attached even by male nationalists to rape victims.[47] And frequently nationalists have urged women to take active roles in nationalist movements but have confined them to the roles of ego-stroking girlfriend, stoic wife, or nurturing mother.

Repeatedly, male nationalist organizers of diverse cultures have elevated unity of the community to such political primacy that any questioning of relations between women and men inside the movement or the community could be labeled as divisive, even traitorous. Women who have called for more genuine equality between the sexes—in the movement, in the workplace, in the home—have been told that now is not the time, the nation is too fragile, the enemy is too near. Women must be patient, they must wait until the nationalist goals are achieved; *then, and only then,* can relations between women and men be addressed. "Not now, later," is the masculine advice that rings in the ears of many nationalist women.

"Not now, later," is weighted with implications. It is advice predicated on the belief that the most dire problems facing the nascent national community are problems that can be explained and solved without reference to power relations between women and men. That is, the causes and effects of foreign investments and indebtedness can be understood without taking women's experiences seriously; foreign military bases and agribusiness-induced landlessness can be challenged without coming to grips with how each has relied on women's labor and silence; and the subtle allure of cultural globalization can be dissected without reference to masculine pride and desire. Each of these presumptions seems politically shallow.

In addition, the "not now, later," advice implies that what happens during the nationalist campaign will not make it harder in the future to transform the conditions that marginalize women and privilege men. It also rests on the prediction that political institutions born out of a nationalist victory will be at least as open to women's analysis and demands as the institutions created within the nationalist movement. Both of these assumptions are questionable.

The very experiences of a nationalist campaign—whether at the polls in Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia; on the streets of Seoul, Istanbul, Belgrade, Haifa, and Jaffna; or in the hills of Vietnam and Algeria—frequently harden masculine political privilege. That cementing occurs if men are allowed to take most of the policy-making roles in the movement, as well as if they are more likely to be arrested, gain the status of heroes in jail, and learn public skills, all of which will enable them to claim positions of authority after the campaign is won. If women are confined to playing the nationalist wife, nurse, porter, girlfriend, or mother—albeit making crucial contributions to a

successful nationalist campaign—they are unlikely to have either the political skills or the communal prestige presumed to be requisites for exercising community-wide authority at a later time. The notion of what "the nation" was in its finest hour—when it was most unified, most altruistic—will be of a community in which women sacrificed their desires for the sake of the male-led collective. Risky though it may indeed be for a nationalist movement to confront current inequities between its women and men in the midst of its mobilizing era, doing so is more likely to produce lasting change than waiting until the mythical "later."

There is a long history of nationalist women challenging masculine privilege in the midst of popular mobilization. Erasing those women's efforts from the nationalist chronicles makes it harder for contemporary women to claim that their critical attitudes are indigenous and hence legitimate. Thus nationalist feminists today in countries such as Vietnam, Palestine, Turkey, Bangladesh, India, Egypt, Syria, Sri Lanka, and Jamaica have invested energy in recapturing local women's nationalist history. As Honor Ford Smith of the Jamaican feminist theater group Sistren has recalled,

> What we knew was that a spate of tongue-in-cheek newspaper and television reports had projected white feminists in Europe and North America as "women's libbers," hysterical perverts. . . .
>
> We did not know of the struggles of women for education and political rights between 1898 and 1944. We did not know the names of the early black feminists.[48]

Challenges have been hardest to mount when women within a movement have lacked the chance to talk with each other in confidence about their own experiences and how they shape

their priorities. Women in an oppressed or colonized national community are usually not from a single social class, and thus they have not experienced relations with the foreign power or the co-opted ruling elite in the same ways. Nor do all women within a national community have identical sexual experiences with men—or with other women. Women who have not had the space to discuss their differences and anxieties together have been less able to withstand nationalist men's homophobic or xenophobic charges.

Women's efforts to redefine the nation in the midst of a nationalist campaign have been thwarted when potentially supportive women outside the community have failed to understand how important it is to women within the community not to be forced to choose between their nationalist and their feminist aspirations. As stressful as it is to live as a feminist nationalist, to surrender one's national identity may mean absorption into an international women's movement led by middle-class women from affluent societies. This is the caveat issued by Delia Aguilar, a Filipino nationalist feminist: "When feminist solidarity networks are today proposed and extended globally, without a firm sense of identity—national, racial and class—we are likely to yield to feminist models designed by and for white, middle-class women in the industrial West and uncritically adopt these as our own."[49]

Given the scores of nationalist movements that have managed to topple empires, create new states, and unsettle existing states, it is surprising that the international political system has not been more radically altered than it has. But a nationalist movement informed by masculinist memory, imbued with masculinist pride, and holding a patriarchal vision of the new nation-state is likely to produce just one more actor in an

untransformed international arena. A dozen new patriarchal nation-states may make the international bargaining table a bit more crowded, but this will not change the international game being played at that table.

It is worth imagining, therefore, what would happen to international politics if more nationalist movements were informed by women's multilayered experiences of oppression. If more nation-states grew out of feminist nationalists' ideas and experiences, then community identities within the international political system might be tempered by cross-national identities. Resolutions of interstate conflicts would be more sustainable, because the significance of women to those conflicts would be considered directly. They would not be dismissed as too trivial to be the topic of serious state-to-state negotiation.

CHAPTER FOUR

Base Women

Where are the women on and around a military base? How did they get there? Who benefits from their being where they are? And what does each woman think about where she is on or near the base?

Start with a base laundress. She is most likely a civilian hired directly by the base command or indirectly by a private defense contractor. She might be the same nationality as most of the soldiers whose uniforms and sheets she is washing. Or she might be from the local community, but with quite a different nationality. She could even be from a distant country, a place from which the private contractor prefers to recruit its female workers. While working in the base's large laundry, she develops her own thoughts about what the military personnel on this base are doing with their deadly weaponry, but is careful not to express her political thoughts out loud. She may value her job, which is enabling her to support her children or to send money home to her parents. Or she may find the job exploitive but feel as though neither the officers in the base chain of command nor her

profit-preoccupied contractor will listen to her. She knows there are other women on the base—women soldiers, pilots, or sailors; wives of male officers and enlisted men; and women who come onto the base secretly to have paid sex with some of the men. But she does not think of any of these women as her natural allies.[1]

A military base is a complicated microworld dependent on diverse women: (a) women who live on the base, (b) women who work on the base but go home at night, (c) women who live outside the fence but are integral to what goes on inside the fence and to what military men and women do when they leave the base for recreation, and (d) women who may live far from a base but who are in almost daily contact with men on the base via the Internet. Paying attention to all these women makes one smarter about the international politics of military bases.

The United States today has more military bases outside its own borders than any other country.[2] One of the reasons so many people in other countries think the United States qualifies as an "empire" is its global network of military bases.[3] Furthermore, the specification "outside its own borders" overlooks the American military bases on island territories controlled by the United States, territories whose residents do not have their own voting members in Congress and who do not have the right to vote in American presidential elections. These islands are places that other people might call colonies. Get out your atlas or spin your globe to find Guam. The Pacific island of Guam is rapidly becoming one of the most militarized places on the planet, owing to the U.S. military's twenty-first-century buildup there. But the fact that most mainland Americans would be hard-pressed to find Guam on a map and have given scant thought to the women and men living on Guam only underscores the gendered international political reality of most military bases: their

operations rely on particular dynamics between women and men, and yet most of those operations are defined as "off limits" to civilian scrutiny.[4]

The late twentieth century set a high-water mark in the spread of overseas military bases. The Soviet Union had scores of bases in East Germany, in Poland, and throughout its Baltic and western Asian regions. France and Britain maintained bases in their colonies and former colonies. The United States exercised control over many of the Pacific and Caribbean territories it had colonized at the end of the nineteenth century, as well as over those it captured from Japan at the end of World War II, most notably Okinawa. Simultaneously, its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union became the justification for the American military to multiply its bases—with the support of Congress—in Iceland, western Europe, Central America, Turkey, South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan.

Twenty-five years later, in the early twenty-first century, the Soviet Union is no more, and most of its Baltic and eastern European bases have been shut down. However, today the Russian military has agreements with the government of Syria and with some of the former Soviet states to maintain its military bases on their territories: for instance, the large Russian naval base at Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The French government has lost its empire but still maintains military bases in several of its African former colonies, such as Gabon and Senegal, and has opened a new base in Mali. The British empire has shrunk to a mere shadow of its Victorian size, and a cost-conscious British government has continued to close many of its overseas bases. The British military's training base in Belize closed in 2010, while its bases in Germany are due to completely shut down by 2019.[5]

Occasionally, a shrinking empire simply has passed along its old bases to a new global power. Thus, in 2001, the Americans took over—and expanded—Camp Lemonnier, a former French military base in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa.[6] In the next decade, justified by what Washington officials called their "war on terror," the Defense Department created AFRICOM, a new military command structure (headquartered in Italy) for its operations in Africa: in Kenya, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.[7] One of its newest bases is a drone base in Niger.[8] Some of these U.S. bases in Africa are elaborate and large, others are tent cities. Each base depends on a formal agreement with the host country's current government, though some of those governments are politically weak; allowing the U.S. military to operate on their soil can jeopardize an already wobbly government's local legitimacy.

Similarly, the Pentagon took over and expanded a former British imperial base in the Indian Ocean territory of Diego Garcia, compelling its local residents to abandon their homes.[9] In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. military has bases in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Keeping friendly relationships with the autocratic monarchies of these three countries has meant that American officials have expressed only lukewarm support for Arab Spring sentiments and prodemocracy movements in these countries.

Every one of these bases has been and continues to be gendered. There are both women and men in uniform on most of these bases. There are contractors: mostly male contract workers on the small bases, but women contract workers, as well, on the larger bases. Each of the men and women—civilian and military—deployed to each base has relationships that extend beyond that base, intensified by the Internet, which affect how

that man or woman thinks about what he or she is doing there. Even bases deliberately located far from local towns send out sociocultural ripples, shaping local people's gendered understandings of the nation, modernity, security, and citizenship.

That is, the workings and impacts of each base have been shaped by ideas and practices of masculinities and femininities, and by particular relationships (intended and unintended) between diverse women and men. Each base's commander and his (almost always *his*) superiors back home in the capital—Washington, Moscow, London, Paris—have crafted rules meant to bolster certain ideas about valued manliness and proper womanhood and to control scores of daily interactions between women and men.

Any base—no matter whether it is the base of a foreign military or a local military—is militarized not just because it houses soldiers; it is *militarized* insofar as most decisions are judged by a principal criterion: how well does this proposed rule or practice serve that military's priorities—not environmental priorities, not civilian democratic priorities, not racial justice priorities, not national development priorities, and not women's rights priorities. Every militarized ritual, rule, and arrangement has as its primary goal the effective operation of that country's military, including the smooth operation of the facility on which its soldiers, sailors, and pilots are based.

A military base does not need to be thoroughly militarized. Potentially, any base can be held accountable by civilian authorities for meeting other, nonmilitary goals. But that requires those civilians in office—and those in voting booths—to resist the appeals of militarized values, militarized civilian jobs, and militarized money. Many civilians do not. Insofar as civilian officials and civilian voters become militarized, they will

come to see the military base's priorities as serving their own interests.[10]

Consequently, each of the basing policies designed to sustain a militarized base calls for a feminist enquiry. That, in turn, calls for exploring what are each policy's gendered intents and its gendered consequences:

- housing policies
- curfew policies
- civilian hiring policies
- commercial policies
- prostitution policies
- sexually-transmitted-diseases policies
- marriage policies
- sexuality policies
- race policies

That is only a partial list of military policy decisions intended in part to shape masculinities and femininities and to choreograph the interactions between women and men on and around any military base. There are more:

- environmental policies
- policing policies
- judicial policies
- sexual assault policies
- health care policies
- recreation policies
- alcohol policies
- morale policies

- child care policies
- domestic violence policies
- chaplaincy policies
- divorce policies

The combined list is long because managing a military base requires the management of myriad gendered, racialized, ranked, and nationalized relationships. Each of these military policies ensures that different groups of women are where they are supposed to be in the ideal universe of military effectiveness. Yet women on and around any military base cannot be treated as if they are homogeneous. Policies intended to control women have had to be fine-tuned to take account of their diversity, as seen through the eyes of commanders and civilian officials. The categories of women associated with military bases are complex and overlapping: young, single, white, Asian, Black, Latino (in the U.S. military's categorizing), older, married to officers, married to enlisted men, single parents, married parents, paid, unpaid, officers, enlisted, civilian, nursing, uniformed, on-base, off-base, deemed respectable, deemed not respectable. Some base policies have been intended to ensure that dissimilar women are unlikely to make common cause. Those policies frequently have been successful.

Nevertheless, military bases' gendered policies have not been fixed, either geographically or historically. Military officials (uniformed and civilian) have altered their gendered ways of doing things as ideas about each group of women have changed and as ideas about soldiering, about masculinities, and about delicate interstate alliances also have changed. Government officials and commanders have redesigned or simply tweaked their policies, too, as they have tried to adapt when some women have

radically altered their understandings of themselves, their rights, their interests, and their political capacities. Can ex-wives of generals today be dismissively shrugged off as easily as they could be by militaries thirty years ago? Can a base commander continue to assume that women working in discos around his base will never make common cause with the country's middle-class feminist activists?

In this sense, no military base has been stable in its gendered politics, even those whose fenced and walled boundaries seem to have remained stubbornly fixed over decades. To engage in a feminist analysis of any military base anyplace in the world means watching it through a gendered lens over time. Look for the persistent convictions. Look for the new meanings. Look for the confusions.[11]

RACE AND SEX ON THE UNSINKABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible if its ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community's job market, schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children's games, adults' friendships, gossip, and senses of pride and security.

On any given day, therefore, only a handful of the scores of bases scattered around the world are the objects of dispute. Most have draped themselves in the camouflage of normalcy. Real estate agents, town officials, charity volunteers, bartenders, schoolchildren, local police, local journalists, religious clergy, building contractors, business owners, crime syndicates, tour-

ism companies—all accept the base, its soldiers, and, if a large base, their civilian spouses and children as unremarkable givens. They may even see them as valuable, as good for their own well-being. When the Pentagon decided to expand its Camp Lemonnier base in Djibouti, six hundred local civilian workers, mostly men, were hired for jobs in base construction and other expansion services.[12]

Likewise, rumors of a base closing—in Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, or Belize—can be the cause for local nationalist celebration. Yet, simultaneously, the expected closing can send shivers of economic alarm through a civilian community whose members have come to depend for their own economic well-being on base jobs and soldiers' spending. Thus, for instance, in Ecuador in 2008, when a nationalist popular movement and a newly elected nationalist president, Rafael Correa, compelled the U.S. Air Force to close its base at Manta, there were complicated local reactions. Some residents were thrilled, seeing the foreign-base closure as a victory for both demilitarization and Ecuadorian sovereignty; but other Ecuadorians worried about whether the economic gains and the sense of security they had perceived as flowing from the base's 450 personnel, and from the American spending, would be so easily replaced.[13] That is, when any base is being closed, one needs to be curious about who among the local population—by political inclination, by economic class, and by gender—will feel vindicated and who will be anxious.

The normalcy that sustains a military base in a local community rests on finely tuned ideas about masculinity and femininity. If the fit between local and foreign men, and local and foreign women breaks down, the base may lose its protective camouflage of normalcy. It may become the target of nationalist

resentment that could subvert the very structure of an international military alliance. On the other hand, when a base does not seem to provoke controversy is a time when gender politics are at work to keep the waters calm. That is, controversy—set off by a sexual assault, discovery of polluted water, escalating noise—can pull back the camouflage curtain to reveal gendered base dynamics that are usually invisible. However, one does not have to wait until a controversy breaks out to explore those base dynamics.[14] One can conduct a feminist-informed gender analysis of a base when routine reigns. Normalcy is always interesting to a feminist investigator.

"A friendly, unquestioning, geographically convenient but expendable launching point for the projections of U.S. military power" is what many British people believed their country had become in the 1980s.[15] They felt as though their country, once a global power, had become less a sovereign nation than a land-based "aircraft carrier" for Americans' Cold War armed forces. Between 1948, when American forces returned to postwar Britain, and 1986, the U.S. military created some 130 bases and facilities in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. They did this with the British government's—often secret—acquiescence.[16] Some of these installations were mere offices, hardly noticeable to the casual passerby. Others, like those at Greenham Common, Molesworth, Mildenhall, and Holy Loch, were full-fledged communities with elaborate facilities, heavy weaponry, and large workforces.

Most of the larger bases in Britain had their roots in the American installations that had been established during World War II. These were easier to reestablish during the Cold War precisely because they had become a familiar part of British life in the early 1940s. But even during World War II, local accep-

tance could not be taken for granted. Policy makers had to fashion racialized and gendered policies that would make the introduction of thousands of foreign soldiers palatable to local civilians, but do it in a way that would not offend the voters back home. In 1940s Britain this meant ensuring that British and American men could work together as allies, not sexual rivals.

During World War II, a potentially explosive topic of policy debate among British and American officers was how to manage the relations between African American male soldiers and white British women.[17] During the course of the war, 130,000 Black American soldiers were stationed in Britain. Though they represented only a fraction of all the American troops based there, they became the focus of intense controversy—in village pubs, the press, Parliament, and war rooms. When the first soldiers arrived in 1942, the American military was a segregated institution. However, Blacks had become a political force to be reckoned with in America; the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt had entered office indebted to thousands of Black voters in northern cities who had transferred their electoral support from the Republican to the Democratic Party.

British society in 1942 was overwhelmingly (though not totally) white, imbued with a sense of imperial superiority over the Asian and African peoples it still ruled. British armed forces had fought World War I, and were fighting World War II, with regiments mobilized in India, Africa, and the West Indies.[18] When white male British officials during World War I sought to choreograph race and gender to wage that earlier war, they had thought sexually; they had worked hard to manipulate prostitution policies to wage what was then called the Great War.[19] Two decades later, during the early 1940s, both the British and the American, male-led governments were ready with racial

formulas when they sat down to talk about how to ensure that African American men stationed in Britain would relate to white British women in ways that would enhance the joint war effort.

White British women, however, had their own ideas. When they dated Black American soldiers, they made comparisons between African American and white British manhood. British women often found the former to be more polite, better company, and perhaps more "exotic." By 1943, some white British women were giving birth to children fathered by African American GIs. Some were choosing to marry their Black American boyfriends. Certain male members of Winston Churchill's cabinet became alarmed at what they considered a dangerous trend.

Top-level discussions already had begun in 1942. Three possible solutions were suggested in the all-white, all-male Cabinet sessions: (1) stop the U.S. government from sending any Black male soldiers to Britain, (2) if that were impossible, confine African American soldiers to certain coastal bases in Britain, or (3) if all else failed, press the American armed forces to send more African American women soldiers and Red Cross volunteers to Britain so that Black male soldiers would not have to look to white British women for companionship.[20]

None of these proposals proved feasible. The Allies' war effort depended too much on optimum use of human resources to keep over a hundred thousand American troops out of Britain or holed up in coastal towns. Furthermore, the postwar experience following World War I, when many British whites turned against West Indian Black men who had served as maritime workers in the port of Liverpool, suggested that coastal quarantining was no insurance against racial hostility. Finally, the American government refused to send thousands of African American women to Britain. Leaders of the NAACP (National



Figures 14 and 15. African American soldiers and their dates in one of London's "colored" clubs, probably the Bouillabaisse on New Compton Street, 1943. Photos: The Hulton Picture Company.

Association for the Advancement of Colored People) made it clear to the Roosevelt administration that they did not see such a plan as respectful of Black womanhood: Black women were volunteering for the U.S. Army to be soldiers, not sexual companions. Furthermore, some Britons did not think that the plan was wise; white British men might start dating the Black American women. In the end, only eight hundred African American military women were sent to Britain, and those not until 1945; they were members of the historic 6888th Central Postal Directory Battalion.[21]

At the same time that British and American officials were hammering out complicated policies for racialized gendered relationships in wartime Britain, other male officials of the same allies were devising policies that would allow the British government to enlist West Indian Afro-Caribbean and Indian women into the British military without their deployment upsetting the entrenched racial segregation that organized work and social life in Washington, D.C.[22]

Back in Britain, attempts to prevent white British women from dating Black soldiers took the more diffuse forms of official and unofficial warnings directed at local white women. British women who went out with African American men stationed at nearby bases were warned that they were more likely to get VD. Women who dated Black soldiers were branded as "loose" or even traitorous to Britain. Whenever some infraction of disciplinary rules involved an African American soldier, the press was likely to specify his race. British parents who allowed their daughters to date Black GIs were portrayed by local British papers as "irresponsible."

During the early years of the war, there was a widespread suspicion, expressed in British newspapers and by members of

Parliament, that Black American soldiers were more likely than white GIs to be charged for sexual offenses such as rape and to receive harsher sentences if convicted. By 1945, while Blacks (the great majority of them male) constituted only 8 percent of all U.S. troops stationed in Europe, they represented 21 percent of all American servicemen convicted of crimes. When the criminal convictions are broken down by category, the discrepancies are even more startling: Black soldiers were 42 percent of those convicted of sex crimes.[23] Nonetheless, in August 1942, Britain's Parliament passed the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, which gave the American authorities the right to try American soldiers for offenses committed on British soil. It was one step toward permitting the Americans to maintain their kind of racial-sexual system despite the unusual circumstances of wartime.

Many white Americans were afraid that if sexual relations between Black men and white women were allowed in wartime Britain, sexual segregation would be harder to maintain in postwar America. Governmental and press persuasion was hardly overwhelming in its success, however. A Mass Observation survey, a British wartime public opinion poll, conducted in August 1943 revealed that only one in seven of the Britons questioned disapproved of marriages between Blacks and whites; 25 percent told interviewers that they had become more friendly toward Black people partly because of meeting African American soldiers.[24] Yet by the end of the war, and especially after the first babies had been born of white British women and Black soldiers, it took considerable social courage for a young white British woman to go out to a local pub with a Black soldier.

American military commanders were not passive in these racialized gendered wartime debates. General Dwight Eisen-

hower, senior U.S. commander in Europe, tolerated white-Black dating because he believed that the U.S.-British alliance would be harmed if American white officers tried to impose their segregationist "Jim Crow" conventions on the British. Other American male officers, however, thought that clashes between white and African American soldiers in Bristol and Leicester were due to white male soldiers' justifiable resentment of Black troops "using up" the limited pool of local white women. Some American officers were also firmly opposed to "mixed" marriages and used their authority to prohibit men under their command from marrying British women. By the end of World War II, at least sixty thousand British women had filed applications with U.S. officials to emigrate to America as war brides.[25] Very few of those whose prospective husbands were Black were accepted by authorities. There appeared to be a "gentleman's agreement" between British and American middle-level white male officials to forbid marriages between Black GIs and white British women. The Black soldier intent on marriage would be transferred and given a serious talking-to by his superior; the woman was counseled by an American military officer or a British welfare officer.[26]

Whom male soldiers meet and whom they marry while stationed on overseas bases has continued to be an issue in the minds of U.S. military strategists. Their concern derives largely from a distrust of the motives of the local women. American male soldiers seeking to marry Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, Okinawan, Filipino, and German women have been routinely discouraged, if not by commanders, then by military chaplains. Those women who have, nonetheless, married American male soldiers and become U.S. military wives have found that, on top of coping with the pressures and rules that shape the

lives of all military wives, they have to cope with both American white citizens' responses to them and their own U.S.-based diaspora's often less than welcoming responses. In both cases, the responses are based on a common assumption that these women must have met their military husbands while working in a disco or massage parlor near an American overseas base.[27]

Marriage, in other words, has been made integral to international security politics chiefly by those military strategists—uniformed and civilian, American, Canadian, British, Russian, Turkish, Japanese—who have become convinced that only a certain sort of militarized marriage, with a certain sort of wife, can ensure their country's military's smooth operation. Not taking seriously marriage politics—and the power wielded on its behalf—leaves one unable to fully comprehend international politics. Taking seriously the international politics of militarized marriages requires, in turn, a genuine curiosity about the lives and ideas of the diverse women married to male soldiers.

THE MILITARY WIVES "PROBLEM"

By the late 1960s, the American military base at Effingham had become an integral part of the social and economic life of nearby Long Crendon, a modest English village in Essex. The expansion of the base in the 1950s had wrought subtle but fundamental changes in townspeople's lives. The Americans started to hire local men and women and soon became one of the region's principal employers. More American soldiers arrived, bringing with them more wives and children. And with the families came American-style consumption: "air transports began to fly in to Effingham laden with deep-freezers, washing machines, pressure- and microwave cookers, hi-fi equipment, Hoovers, electric

organs and even Persian carpets."[28] Some of the appliances made their way on to the flourishing local secondhand market. Still, the ideological spillover from the American model of family life was contained by the married soldiers' preference for staying on the base, where the U.S. Defense Department provided everything to make them feel as though they had never left home.

This continued to be the model of base construction through the 1990s, as American overseas bases multiplied during the Cold War: the suburb with family houses, grass to mow, men employed as soldiers and civilian women as unpaid housewives.[29] Betty Friedan, the feminist who wrote the devastating critique of American white suburban women's entrapment, would have recognized the Pentagon's gendered community model immediately.[30]

The American military strategists' Cold War and post–Cold War thinking was this: keeping married soldiers happy on a foreign base required keeping soldiers' wives happy or, if not happy, at least silently resigned. For a century both British and American military commanders had been weighing the advantages and disadvantages of allowing their soldiers to marry. It was a sometimes confusing calculus. On the one hand, they calculated, marriage raised the moral tenor of their male troops and cut down on their drunkenness, indebtedness, and venereal disease. On the other militarized hand, marriage might divide a soldier's loyalty, making him slower to mobilize, while burdening the armed forces with responsibilities for maintaining housing, health care, and family harmony. The military marriage debate remains unsettled today not only in the United States but also in other countries whose governments depend on married male soldiers to carry out their national security and foreign policies and on the women their male soldiers have married to conform to the model of the Good Military Wife.[31]

Despite commanders' ambivalence, the rising post–World War II need to accommodate male soldiers' wives and children altered the nature of a military base. No longer could a soldier's wife be as easily marginalized as she had been in earlier centuries, dismissed as merely a low-class "camp follower" living on the edge of military operations, cooking her husband's food, and doing his laundry in return for meager rations. There were too many of them now. And they were "respectable" women. For the British, Canadian, and American armed forces, which today have to recruit—and *keep*—large numbers of expensively trained male volunteers without the aid of compulsory male conscription, civilian wives' dissatisfaction with military life can produce worrisome manpower shortages. A dissatisfied wife will urge her husband not to reenlist. The washing machines and electric organs flown into the U.S. base at Effingham in the 1960s were early evidence of the American army's attempt to satisfy not only male soldiers but also their wives.

By 2010, there were seven hundred thousand civilian American women married to active-duty U.S. male military personnel. Some lived on overseas bases. Many lived on or near U.S. domestic bases. By the early twenty-first century, the U.S. military had become the most married force in the country's history: 58.7 percent of active-duty military personnel were married. The army had the highest proportion of married personnel; the marines the lowest. Of all heterosexual spouses of U.S. active-duty personnel, only 6.3 percent were men; 93.7 percent were women.[32] As the Pentagon tried to adapt to life after the ending (in 2011) of the "Don't ask, don't tell" ban on openly gay and lesbian military personnel, it also had to adapt, base by base, to having more civilian married partners in same sex marriages demand access to the same benefits enjoyed by heterosexual spouses of military personnel.[33]

Many women married to male soldiers have been content with the privileges that have come with living on a military base: low-cost housing, shopping discounts, access to medical care, a sense of shared values, and, for many African American military wives, less overt racism than experienced in society beyond the base. Many women married to American male soldiers also saw themselves as models of self-sacrificing feminized patriotism, enduring regimens, constant moves, virtual single parenting, long spousal separations, and wartime fears for their husbands' safety. Some of the women deployed with their husbands to the larger U.S. overseas bases—for instance, in Britain, Germany, South Korea, and Japan—have also taken on the role of informal American ambassador, trying to represent what they saw to be the best of American values while living abroad. Their efforts have been open to varied interpretations in their host countries, appreciated by some local people but appearing to others to be just an updated feminized version of an older imperialism.[34]

For those women who gained a sense of political purpose, community, security, and comfort from living as military wives on bases, there was a price to be paid: adherence to the military's gendered presumptions about proper femininity, good marriages, and ranked propriety. Central to this package has been the official presumption that a civilian wife would merge her loyalty to her soldier-husband with her uncritical loyalty to his employer, the government: the military's adversary was to be her adversary; her husband's rank would determine her friendships and her children's friendships. Living up to the military's model of the Good Military Wife also meant giving up aspirations for a career of one's own and, especially if one was married to an officer and was invested in his rise through the ranks, doing

hours of unpaid volunteer work. Military wives' unpaid labor has been the glue that has made many a base a working "community." Such feminized, wifely volunteer work takes an even more prominent role when a woman follows her husband to an overseas base, because the opportunities abroad for a military wife to gain paid employment and pursue her own professional career have been particularly slim.[35]

Military base commanders and their civilian superiors—from the early years of the Cold War through the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—have counted on most women to see the satisfactions that come from being an unpaid, loyal military wife as outweighing the frustrations.[36]

It came, therefore, as an unwelcome surprise when, in the 1980s, a group of politically experienced wives and ex-wives of American male military officers began to organize and speak out about what they saw as the unfairness of the Pentagon's gendered political marriage system. They found sympathizers in Congress, especially Representative Patricia Schroeder, a Democrat from Denver. These military wives steered clear of any discussions of the U.S. government's foreign policies; they talked about spousal benefits and divorce rules.

Among the early activists were older women who had fulfilled the model military wife role, many for up to twenty years, doing the unpaid work on countless bases that would be considered a plus when their officer-husbands came up for promotion. These women found that when their husbands filed for divorce in order to marry a usually younger woman, they would lose not only their marriages but also their housing, health benefits, and store discounts. Officials in the Pentagon had ruled that their divorcing husbands did not have to count these base benefits when calculating alimony. Initially, according to Carolyn Becraft, one of the

politically active wives, the divorced women focused their anger on the young women who were marrying their officer-husbands. But as they got together to analyze their situations and to frame their political message, they realized that it was not the new wives who were their problem. It was the Pentagon officials. Those officials, these women concluded, cared more about their male officers' economic security than about civilian military wives' economic security. The result of their lobbying was a congressionally mandated change in the benefits accorded by the Pentagon to military spouses and ex-spouses.[37]

Soon after, in the ongoing gendered political marital history of the U.S. military, women doing volunteer work on American bases around the United States and abroad began to speak out publicly about domestic violence, about male soldier-husbands beating their military wives. Although few of these women called themselves feminists, many were fully aware of the emergent battered women's movement in the United States. They had absorbed the lesson that wife abuse was not something any woman had to be ashamed about or had to silently endure. However, a military base turned out to be a very difficult environment in which to turn violence of this sort into a legitimate issue.[38] First, most base commanders—and their Washington superiors—did not want to hear about it. They had other priorities. They expected military wives to cope. Second, these same officials frequently imagined that male soldiers were just acting out of stress, and stress was what soldiering was all about. Third, airing the realities of domestic violence on a base tarnished the reputation of that base, which would hurt the base commander's chances for his next promotion. Finally, and importantly, allowing domestic violence within their soldiers' homes to become a public issue was likely to raise the always thorny question of the

culture of violence nurtured in the military as a whole. That certainly was not a question that senior officers wanted explored in the wider public arena.

Trying to break the silence shrouding violence against women is always a challenge. Breaking the culture of gendered silence on a military base was harder still. Feminized silence, it became clear, was a pillar of U.S. national security.

Despite the formidable obstacles, women working with military wives succeeded, by the 1990s, in getting congressional armed service committee members, especially women in Congress, to pressure the Defense Department to acknowledge the incidences of domestic violence in male soldiers' households. On the other hand, as activists would discover when, a decade later, they would try to get senior military officials to face up to their complicity in the epidemic of sexual violence perpetrated by male soldiers on their uniformed female comrades, the military's prioritizing of male soldiers' value and their complementary reliance on women's silence remains stubbornly entrenched.

Today, thousands of women married to male soldiers live in the United States on or near one of the Defense Department's many domestic bases. Some of the largest: Camp Pendleton, California; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Lewis-McChord, Washington; Fort Hood, Texas; Naval Air Station, Virginia; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Carson, Colorado. Each of these bases is as gendered as every U.S. base in South Korea, Turkey, Japan, Guam, Djibouti, and Germany. The women who live on or near these domestic bases in the roles of military wives often feel pressured to stay silent about the hardships that have been part of the government waging its extended wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where bases were not created to accommodate spouses and children. Many of these women take part in wives' associations, but

their activities frequently are shaped by the cautionary influence of the women married to the base's senior officers and by the expectations of base commanders, who make it clear that a wives' association's chief job is to help military wives cope; it is not to alter the way the base is run.

Among the American military wives living on or near domestic bases in the current political era who have spoken out publicly, despite these pressures, have been those women whose military husbands have returned from Afghanistan and Iraq severely wounded, physically and mentally. These civilian women have become a vocal presence on many domestic military bases, demanding from base commanders transparency, attention, resources, and candor. In breaking the silence expected of military wives, these women not only have made clearer the actual costs of these two wars but also have exposed the unfairness of camouflaging those costs by shifting them onto the shoulders of soldiers' civilian family members.[39]

During the post-9/11 administration of President George W. Bush, a new concept in American overseas basing was developed, "the lily pad." Lily pad bases would be low-impact bases, overseas bases that still would require formal agreements with local host governments, but would have a smaller social and cultural "footprint."[40] No suburban housing, no lawns, no bowling allies, no golf courses, no discos outside the gates. And no wives.

For many local people living around American bases overseas, the lily pad formula might seem a welcome change. Bases would come with less heavy sociocultural baggage. There would be no questionable entertainment districts appealing to off-duty male soldiers outside the fence of a lily pad. Fewer American armored vehicles would race through a civilian town's busy streets. But the Pentagon's motivations appear to have less to do

with sensitivity to local concerns than with shedding the feminized dimensions of the big Cold War bases. Lily pads simultaneously offer smaller targets for local antibases protests. One consequence of the Pentagon's adoption of the lily pad basing strategy for the thousands of women married to American soldiers is that more of their husbands will be deployed far from home more of the time. Military wives who have experienced virtual single motherhood are due to experience more of it.

One source of political weakness hobbling those military wives seeking to change the sexist policies governing life on military bases has been the division between women as military wives, women as civilian base workers, women as military personnel, and women drawn into prostitution around military bases. The four groups of women, whom male military elites see as distinct, often share the same compartmentalized imagining of themselves. Women soldiers who launched their twenty-first-century campaign to make sexual assaults against women soldiers a national issue could have learned a lot by turning to activist military wives and to women in military prostitution for analysis and strategic advice.

IS A MILITARY BASE SECURE FOR WOMEN SOLDIERS?

Any military base—local or overseas—is a place where certain forms of masculinity are nurtured and rewarded, other forms disparaged or punished. Drill sergeants are often the chief molders and enforcers of the desired militarized masculinity—that is, a mode of acting out one's manhood that makes soldiering, especially combat soldiering, real or fantasized, a principal criterion against which to judge one's behavior and attitudes.

This particular mode often accords primacy to toughness, skilled use of violence, presumption of an enemy, male camaraderie, submerging one's emotions, and discipline (being disciplined and demanding it of others). Beyond drill sergeants, many different actors on a base play their parts in shaping and encouraging certain militarized masculine attitudes and behaviors: chaplains, psychiatrists, commanders, midlevel officers, even wives. Off-base actors also can celebrate certain forms of manliness while ridiculing others: fathers, legislators, media commentators, entertainers.

Nor is the privileged form of militarized masculinity universal. The nurtured and rewarded form of militarized masculinity can vary from country to country, with some country's militarized masculine norm being crafted to serve international peacekeeping, others to fit into humanitarian missions, while still others are intended to enhance combat roles. We know today that we need to investigate these differences, as well as commonalities, between, for instance, the diverse masculinities that are privileged and celebrated in the Irish, Japanese, Nigerian, Chinese, Swedish, British, United States, South Korean, Brazilian, Israeli, Bangladeshi, Fijian, and Canadian militaries. Each of these militarized masculine norms is wielded in particular domestic and foreign operations.[41]

A military woman has a personal stake in charting and making sense of which mode of masculinity is made the favored norm on the base to which she is assigned, whether in Texas or Bahrain. Knowing this could make her life rewarding and secure; not knowing it could put her career and her physical safety at risk.

Military women are virtually always a minority of all the uniformed personnel on any of their country's military bases,

sometimes a very small minority. With many governments adjusting to the end of the Cold War by ending male conscription (what Americans call "the draft"), defense strategists and their legislative allies have had to devise ways to increase the numbers of women recruited into their government forces without jeopardizing the military's valuable image as a place where a man can prove his manliness. In 2013, among the militaries with the highest percentages of women in their ranks are those of Ukraine, Latvia, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. To understand each military—those with high proportions of women and those with the lowest proportions (such as the Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Turkish)—one needs to explore not only how uniformed women experience pride, patriotism, and camaraderie but also how uniformed women experience sexual harassment and sexual assault.

In the United States, women have grown from just 2 percent of the active-duty military—during the U.S. war in Vietnam, in the 1970s—to 14.5 percent by the time of American troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. The branch with the highest percentage of active-duty women (thus the branch most reliant on women to fulfill its mission) is the air force, with 19 percent. The branch with the lowest percentage (and the one most resistant to women's participation) is the marines, with just 6.8 percent.

The gendered politics of any military can play out rather differently for uniformed women belonging to different social classes, ethnic groups, or racial groups. Among women in the current American military, the numbers of African American women have stood out: while African American women were just 12 percent of all the country's women, in 2011, they constituted 17.2 percent of all women who were active-duty military officers and 29.6 percent of all women in the military's active-duty enlisted

ranks. Looking more closely, especially at differences among military branches, one notes that in that same year a stunning 39.1 percent of all women in the active-duty enlisted ranks of the army were African American women. That was more than three times their proportion of all women in the country's civilian population.[42]

By contrast, Hispanic women, who were approximately 15 percent of all women in the U.S. population, appeared more likely to choose a different branch when they volunteered for the U.S. military. Hispanic women's proportion of all active-duty women, which has been steadily rising since 1990 as a result of the Pentagon's deliberate recruiting campaigns, reached its peak in the enlisted ranks of the marines: 19.6 percent. Asian and Pacific Islander American women accounted for only 4 percent of the total U.S. female population in 2011, but they constituted 20 percent of all women in the navy's enlisted ranks.[43]

Owing to three decades of lobbying by American women in the military—especially women officers such as navy pilot Rosemary Mariner, working in collaboration with women members of the House of Representatives and Senate—the Defense Department has gradually, usually begrudgingly, opened more and more types of military jobs to women.[44] American civilian feminists often have been ambivalent about investing their limited resources in challenging sexism inside the military because they have prioritized antiwar campaigns and worried that elevating women soldiers to "first-class citizenship" status would send the roots of already potent militarism even deeper into their country's cultural soil. Nonetheless, since 1990, barrier after barrier to women's military training and deployment has been dismantled; the latest change was the 2013 lifting of the Pentagon's ban on women in combat roles. The U.S. military did

not lead the way. Militaries of the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were out in front of the United States in ending their sexist bans on military women in the jobs that the Pentagon classifies (and, changing its mind, then reclassifies) as "combat." Exactly how the opening of combat roles to women will be implemented in practice in the United States is a story yet to be told. Changing the formal rules of any institution is only the beginning of its gendered transformation and, by itself, is no guarantee that the institutional culture will become significantly less patriarchal.

At the same time that organizational sexist barriers have been lowered, there has been an upsurge in reported sexual assaults by U.S. military men on military women and on military men. Some feminist analysts have wondered aloud whether the increased reporting of violence against women inside the U.S. military has been at least in part a result of the increase in the proportions of women and their inching up the ranks and moving into the military's most masculinized occupations. As in other spheres of many societies, some men have acted out their resentment of women's advancements in arenas that until recently had been securely masculinized, by attacking women as "intruders." Other feminists have warned that the recent upsurge in reporting should be treated quite separately from the actual incidences of sexual assault. They warn that many women soldiers in past eras have endured rape and attempted rape in silence, never thinking it was safe or useful to speak about those assaults for the record. In any area of international politics, paying close attention to silences is a crucial investigatory strategy.

Violence against women, a central issue for women's advocates since the 1970s, was a topic that even feminist peace activists, wary of working for women's military equality, felt unambiguous about

when it occurred inside the military. This was not a question of merely militarized careers or promotions. Thus, by 2013 a national campaign organized by women activists brought together military women, civilian feminists, journalists, documentary filmmakers, and women in Congress to challenge the Defense Department and the entire chain of command.[45] Together, they shone their spotlight on the military academies and on particular military bases (for instance, Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas). They forced the Veteran's Administration, a large federal institution whose officials for generations had collectively thought of their services as being intended only for male veterans, to vastly broaden their self-perception. In the middle of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to respond to the rising number of women veterans they were seeing as patients struggling with the aftereffects of sexual assault, the VA's health professionals scrambled to develop a new medical concept. They decided to call it "military sexual trauma." The VA then created special clinics around the country to provide care specifically for women veterans who were suffering from military sexual trauma, a subset of post–traumatic stress disorder. Military sexual trauma was brought on, according to these medical professionals, by having been raped by a fellow male soldier.[46]

As the politics of American intramilitary sexual violence quickly intensified, the Defense Department was pressed to issue a report on both the incidence of reported sexual assaults and the survey results estimating the incidence of actual assaults. It estimated that reported sexual assaults were just the tip of the iceberg, that during just the fiscal year 2011 (that is, October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011), nineteen thousand military personnel had been sexually assaulted by their American military colleagues. During FY 2012, that number jumped to

twenty-six thousand. The majority of those American military personnel said that they had been assaulted by military men, often their superiors. Men made up 85 percent of the total active-duty personnel during this era. Women, though only 15 percent of the U.S. active-duty forces, were disproportionately assaulted. Women in the military were thus much more likely than men to be targeted by military men for attack. Most of the women and men who were subjected to sexual assaults did not report those assaults. Male victims told reporters that it was women coming forward to speak out about rapes that had given them the courage to overcome their years of secret shame and publicly tell their own stories.[47]

On and off the record, military women told of being sexually assaulted when going to the latrines at night, when sleeping in their own barracks, when meeting with a superior officer in his office. Controversy soon swirled around the very notion, long cherished by American military officers, that the military's hierarchy itself—not civilian criminal justice authorities—is best equipped to investigate, prosecute, try, and punish its own personnel. Yet in practice, the sanctity of the "chain of command" had erected another, less visible wall around any already-fenced-off military base. It was a double fence that many women survivors of military rape felt had jeopardized their safety.

Rebekah Havrilla, a former army sergeant, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2013 that she had been raped by her male superior while she was deployed in Afghanistan in 2007. She did not report him: "I chose not to do a report of any kind because I had no faith in my chain of command." Instead, Sargeant Havrilla had sought counsel from the army chaplain on her base. His response to her: "The rape was God's will." He urged her to go to church.[48]

Two related questions frequently have gone unexplored during the debate over what to do to effectively prevent and prosecute sexual violence inside the American military. First, what, if any, are the causal linkages between, on the one hand, sexual violence perpetrated by men on women inside the military and, on the other, sexual violence perpetrated by U.S. military men against civilian women living around U.S. military bases at home and abroad? Second, how exactly do diverse men inside the military absorb the masculinized idea that women are property to be used by men in ways that allegedly confirm their own manhood and simultaneously preserve the masculinized atmosphere in certain institutional spaces?

The two questions are analytically related: answering either question will help to answer the other. Failure to ask—and try to answer—these two related feminist analytical questions has meant that the politics of masculinity has been swept under the militarized rug. It also has meant that American military women rarely have tried to make common cause with women in other countries who have endured abuse as a consequence of U.S. soldiers being based abroad. Most often, sexual violence inside the military has been treated merely as a domestic issue. In reality, it has been a dynamic of international politics.

PROSTITUTION, WOMEN IN PROSTITUTION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL GENDERED POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Military men's sexualized relations with women—and other men's attempts to control those relations—have been a major thread running through international politics for at least the last

two centuries. These sexualized relations include befriending, dating, marrying, purchasing sex, and coercing sex. The lines separating these five different sorts of relations often are blurred, yet at other times they are drawn in bold ink. What is odd is that this multistranded topic so rarely is explored by mainstream investigators of international politics and only makes headlines when it erupts into "scandal." Topics treated merely as scandals, however, rarely alter conventional understandings of what is "international" and what counts as "politics."

Military bases and women in prostitution have been assumed to go together, to be a "natural" twosome and thus unworthy of political investigation. In fact, it has taken calculated policies to sustain that alleged fit: policies to shape men's sexuality, to ensure battle readiness, to regulate businesses, to structure women's economic opportunities, to influence military wives, to socialize women soldiers, and to design systems of policing, entertainment, and public health. It is striking that these policies have been so successfully made invisible around most bases, especially bases within the United States.[49]

By the late nineteenth century the British government had troops deployed around the globe to sustain its empire.[50] These troops were not as likely to seek sexual liaisons with working-class white women as with colonized women of color—Chinese women in Hong Kong, Indian women in India, Egyptian women in Egypt. British officials had been thwarted in their efforts to control white working-class women's relationships with British military men in Britain. In the 1860s, in the wake of the disastrous Crimean War and at the behest of Britain's generals and admirals, the men in Parliament, in the name of protecting male soldiers and sailors, had passed the Contagious Diseases Acts. These militarized laws, a form of national security policy,

mobilized Britain's civilian local policemen to arrest working-class women in army base towns and naval port towns whom those policemen suspected of being prostitutes. In practice, that was any working-class woman out at night on her own. The suspected women were compelled to undergo vaginal exams with the crudest of instruments. It was the Anti–Contagious Diseases Acts Campaign, led by British feminists of the Ladies National League, that (despite women being denied voting rights) effectively lobbied for twenty years to persuade the all-male Parliament of the unfairness of the Contagious Diseases Acts and to repeal them.[51]

British military officials were determined, however, not to lose control over Britain's colonial women. First, they refashioned marriage policies for soldiers, considering whether to allow British soldiers to marry Indian women: would such marriages harm or enhance military readiness and white settler morale? Some officials believed that if British soldiers were allowed to marry Indian women, they might be less likely to frequent prostitutes and thus, presumably, be less likely to pick up venereal diseases. On the other hand, these men reasoned, such a policy of encouraging interracial marriage might jeopardize British men's sense of their own racial superiority. Second, colonial officials continued to enforce the equivalent of Contagious Diseases Acts outside Britain even after they had been repealed at home in the 1880s. These laws, called the Cantonment Acts, permitted colonial police authorities to conduct compulsory vaginal examinations on civilian women around imperial military bases for the sake of allowing British soldiers overseas to have sexual relations with colonial women without fear of contracting venereal disease.

In 1888, Josephine Butler, founder of Britain's politically effective Ladies National League, launched an international cam-

paign calling for the abolition of the Cantonment Acts. Her new journal, *The Dawn,* criticized British male authorities' double standard: controlling women's allegedly immoral sexual behavior for the sake of protecting male soldiers' allegedly necessary sexual pleasures.[52] Butler's movement was more feminist in its analysis than in its organization. Her chief abolitionist allies appear to have been British men and educated men in the colonized societies. Colonial women—a study in 1891 found that 90 percent of military prostitutes were impoverished local widows—were seen by most prostitution abolitionists as victims, though rarely as organizational allies with their own political ideas and resources.[53]

Anti–Cantonment Acts campaigners were transnational activists, but they saw these policies from an imperial perspective: if such regulations were allowed to persist in India, they would provide lessons for military authorities in other British colonies and even in the colonies of rival imperial powers, such as the Netherlands, who also needed to station soldiers abroad, provide them with sexual access to colonial women, and yet ensure that the soldiers were physically fit enough to carry out their military duties for the empire. A letter written in 1888 to Butler by one of her Dutch campaigning correspondents in Indonesia (then under Dutch colonial rule) charts the international flow of militaries' prostitution strategies:

> One of the official gentlemen quietly remarked that they thought of introducing the Anglo-Indian system of having separate tents inhabited by the licensed women in the camps. At present at a fixed hour in the evening the doors of the Barracks are opened in order to admit a certain number of these poor victims. I can scarcely record all that we have learned. Life in the Barracks is *morally horrible*. . . .

> The fact stated here shows that the bad example set by the English government in India is infecting Java, and no doubt other Colonies of other nations, thus doubling and trebling our motives for urging the Abolition of the hideous Indian Ordinances and Cantonment Acts.[54]

By 1895, Butler and her campaigners had persuaded the British government to repeal the Cantonment Acts. Nevertheless, her informants in the colonies reported that, despite the repeal, forced physical examinations of local women did not stop. *The Dawn* published letters from British military officers who expressed the widespread official view that such practices remained necessary. They were allegedly necessary for individual British soldiers (not for Indian soldiers; they seemed to have a strikingly lower incidence of VD, which puzzled their British commanders) and for the very well-being of the British empire. To this argument Josephine Butler editorially retorted, "We had not realized that the women of a conquered race, in the character of official prostitutes, constituted one of the bulwarks of our great Empire!"[55]

In the twentieth century, governments of France, Japan, British, Russia, the United States, and Canada each attempted to enforce military and civilian practices that would sexually control women for the sake of sustaining their military's legitimacy while ensuring their male soldiers' morale and health.[56] The Japanese imperial army's policy of forcing Korean, Filipino, Taiwanese, Malaysian, and Indonesian women into sexual service in their military's "comfort stations," for the sake of allegedly bolstering male soldiers' morale, is perhaps the most famous forced prostitution system designed to wage World War II.[57]

It was this World War II system that gave rise to the concept of "sexual slavery," a concept developed in the 1990s by Korean fem-

inists. They argued, successfully, that such militarized forced prostitution should be understood as a war crime. The "sexual slavery" concept soon after became crucial to those transnational feminists who worked to shed light on the specific sorts of sexual militarized abuse of women that had become integral to waging the 1990s wars both in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. That is, a woman who is forcibly made a "wife" of a warring soldier to be subjected to his repeated sexual violations is not a wife; she is not a prostitute. She is the victim of sexual slavery. These same feminist political and legal activists continued to campaign, persuading governments that "sexual slavery" should be internationally recognized as a prosecutable and punishable war crime. It was their conceptualizing and persuading that led to "sexual slavery" being explicitly listed among the war crimes prosecutable in The Hague before the newly established International War Crimes Court.

The infamous Japanese imperial "comfort women" system, however, was certainly not the only prostitution system used to wage World War II and to create its immediate postwar political systems of occupation.[58] Yet only now, six decades after the end of what Americans still call "the Good War," are we beginning to understand the full scope of the American officials' efforts to make prostitution, and women in prostitution, work for the war effort and for the establishment of the postwar occupation. Recognizing American officials' World War II prostitution policies should not dilute the condemnation of the Japanese imperial army's "comfort women" system. Rather, it should foster a sharp feminist-informed, cross-national, comparative investigation of the sexual politics designed to wage any war.

American officials' World War II efforts to create racialized military prostitution systems included going to great lengths to

set up brothels for African American male soldiers separate from those designated for white male soldiers—along wartime Hawaii's famed Hotel Street, around the America occupying forces' bases in postwar Germany, in postwar Korea, and in postwar Japan.[59] Similarly, feminist historian Mary Louise Roberts has uncovered evidence that in postinvasion Normandy, France, American male soldiers and their superiors created self-serving stereotypes of an oversexed French nation and, with it, a racially segregated brothel system. Chief among its damaging political consequences: sexualized conditions of insecurity for many postwar French women, women whom the American men were supposedly there to liberate.[60] That is, the American military occupation era of the mid- to late 1940s, officially defined by Washington as a time of liberation and democratization, was in fact a time of energetic American racialized prostitution-policy-making.

The immediate post–World War II era did not mark the end of the U.S. military's prostitution system. Korean, Okinawan, and Filipina feminist researcher-activists have been teaching us about how racialized prostitution was a constant throughout the American military's conduct of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and its globally diffuse post-9/11 "war on terror."[61] One of the most stubbornly entrenched beliefs held by many military male commanders has been that military-tolerated, organized prostitution protects "respectable" women. Takazato Suzuyo and her fellow activists who created the feminist group Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence have spent years documenting American military personnel's violence against civilian women and girls in an attempt to dispel this self-serving military myth.[62]

CLOSING SUBIC: THE SUCCESS OF AN ANTIBASES MOVEMENT

Tues. 5—Rained all day
Wed. 6—Rained part of day. Got pay check.
Thurs. 7—Rained all day.[63]

Thus wrote Jessie Anglum, wife of an American army officer, in her diary. She did not enjoy her stay in the Philippines. The year was 1901. The American army had been sent by President McKinley to quash a defiant Filipino insurgency. Filipino nationalists first fought the islands' Spanish colonizers and then resisted the Americans' plans to impose their own colonizing rule. Anglum played her own small part in putting down the Filipino insurgency. She was one of the first American military wives to take the long voyage to join her husband in the Philippines. Once off the ship, she was put up in a Manila hotel. As the monsoon rains poured steadily outside the shutters, she was bored. Her husband spent most of his days on maneuvers against the insurgents. She went for occasional carriage rides and had tea with the few other American women then in Manila. But she did not want to be in the Philippines. She had sailed to Asia only out of wifely duty. She counted the days until her husband's tour was over. And she was happy when she could repack her trunks and sail back home.

There were no elaborate American bases when Jessie Anglum endured her damp hotel stay. But in the century following her arrival, the U.S. government made up for that deficiency. By the 1980s, the now-independent Philippines hosted a score of U.S. military facilities. Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base, both situated on the main island of Luzon, were the largest and were deemed by Pentagon strategists to be among the most

crucial for American global defense. The two bases served as launching pads for the U.S. war in Vietnam and as a bulwark against Soviet power during the Cold War. Subic and Clark were designed to operate in coordination with U.S. Pacific bases in Hawaii, Guam, South Korea, and Okinawa.

The Pentagon's pan-Pacific vision provided an incentive in the 1990s for women activists in these five Pacific regions to create new political bonds with each other. Meeting at the UN women's conference in Beijing in 1995, they began to trade information, experiences, and strategies. They pieced together a portrait of how civilian women experienced the impacts of the U.S. military bases: prostitution, violence, police harassment, and environmental degradation. In meetings held over the next two decades, these antibases women-activists forged friendships and analyses—of security, of militarization, of insecurity, of peace, of violence, of patriarchy. Among the groups whose members met each other were Gabriela: Alliance of Filipino Women, Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, the Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center, and the transnational feminist network Women for Genuine Security.[64] Their members made one of their principal objectives the educating of American mainland citizens about the impacts their government's bases were having on women who must live with those bases. Given how little attention most mainland Americans pay either to overseas military bases or to Pacific island territories and Asian allies, this was a challenge.

During the years of the Cold War and the Vietnam War, Subic Bay Naval Base was the largest of these Pacific U.S. bases. It dominated the Philippines town of Olongapo. The mayor of Olongapo made the Subic Bay base commander one of his chief reference points when he made town policies. The U.S. Navy base

was home for many of the 15,000 American military personnel and their families stationed in the Philippines. When an aircraft carrier docked, another 18,000 men poured into town. The base relied on civilian Filipino labor to keep it running. Workers were paid at lower rates than workers on American bases in South Korea or Japan, but for many Filipino men and women these base jobs provided a livelihood. By 1985, the U.S. military had become the second-largest employer in the Philippines, hiring over 40,000 Filipinos: 20,581 full-time workers, 14,249 contract workers, 5,064 domestic workers, and 1,746 concessionaries.[65]

The social problem generated by the U.S. bases that attracted most Filipino feminists' and nationalists' attention was prostitution. Many Filipinos became convinced that U.S. military bases were responsible for creating or exacerbating conditions that promoted prostitution. Prostitution, violence against women, militarism (American and Filipino varieties), and the compromising of Philippines national sovereignty all seemed woven together. The arrival of AIDS in the Philippines in 1987 escalated nationalists' sense that the American-Philippines bases government-to-government agreement—called the Status of Forces Agreement (often colloquially referred to by its acronym, SOFA)—jeopardized, rather than strengthened, Filipinos' national security.

During the 1980s, especially as the Filipino prodemocracy movement gathered nationwide momentum, local Filipino women activists, including activist Catholic nuns, documented the living conditions of women around the large U.S. bases and provided spaces where women in prostitution could seek nonjudgmental support. The activist researchers estimated that 6,000 to 9,000 women worked in the bases-dependent entertainment businesses, a number that could jump to 20,000 when an American aircraft carrier came into port and thousands of male

sailors were granted leave. They recorded that most women in the sexualized clubs and massage parlors came to Olongapo from poor rural regions of the Philippines. They reported on the "ladies drinks" system used by bar owners to press women employees to persuade off-duty military men to buy more alcohol while purchasing expensive fruit drinks for the women. They explained the "bar fine" system, by which male customers paid the bar owner money for permission to take a woman outside the club to have sex.

These activist researchers also paid attention to the children born of American military fathers and Filipino civilian mothers. Of the approximately 30,000 children who were born of Filipino mothers and American fathers each year during the 1970s and 1980s, these activist researchers found, some 10,000 were thought to have become street children, many of them working as prostitutes servicing American male pedophiles. Unlike children born of American fathers and Vietnamese mothers during the U.S. war in Vietnam—when prostitution was rampant—the U.S. Congress did not grant these Filipino-American children visas to immigrate to the United States under its special post–Vietnam War "family reintegration" plan.[66]

The Filipino researchers also documented the American base commanders' policy that required Filipino public health clinics to set up VD and AIDS examinations for women in the surrounding entertainment businesses. Women who did not go through the exams, or who did not pass the exams, were denied their entertainment-worker licenses. American military men did not have to undergo such exams to get their off-base passes and mix with local Filipino women. The official presumption was that Filipino women infected American military men, never the other way round.[67]



Figure 16. Filipino women working as entertainers around the U.S. Navy's Subic Bay base line up for compulsory VD and HIV/AIDS examinations, 1988. While the base was in operation, all such entertainers were required to undergo these examinations twice a month. Photo: Sandra Sturdevant.

A complex Filipino antibases movement succeeded in persuading the Philippines Senate to vote against renewing the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. In 1992, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base were closed.

Twenty years later, however, Filipino feminists in groups such as Gabriela were reporting that militarized prostitution was on

the rise again, as was American military men's abuse of local women. Even without its sprawling Subic Bay and Clark permanent bases, the U.S. Defense Department, in coordination with officials in Manila, was building up the American military presence in the Philippines. The justification no longer was the Soviet threat and the Cold War. Now the justification was expansionist China and the "global war on terror." Subic Bay was being refitted by a private American defense contractor to handle the visits of more American navy ships. More American soldiers were being deployed to the Philippines on what were termed "training" assignments. New Washington-Manila military agreements called these deployments "temporary rotations." This formula meant that both sides in the government-to-government agreement could avoid admitting that the Pentagon was establishing new bases in the Philippines, an admission that would stir up local controversy.[68]

Prostitution has never been timeless. It is not the static "oldest profession." Women in prostitution, women working against the prostitution industry, men profiting from prostitution, men patronizing women in prostitution, and men who make military policies to mold prostitution to suit their militaries' needs—each of these five groups of actors lives in history. Each of them, no matter how seemingly powerless some of them are, help to reshape the local and international politics of prostitution and, thus, the ideas about and practices of masculinity as they underpin military bases.

Consequently, today one must stay alert to changes. One must become curious, for instance, about the women from both the Philippines and the former Soviet Union who voluntarily or unwillingly leave their countries to become the majority of women servicing American military men in and around the U.S.

bases in South Korea, Guam, and Okinawa.[69] One also has to monitor how local feminists interact with nationalists in any movement to limit or close a foreign base: are the women in prostitution turned by nonfeminist nationalists into mere symbols of "national humiliation," or are these women invited to be active partners in any antibases campaign? Are feminists pressed to sublimate their demands for the good of what nonfeminist nationalists think of as the nation?

Similarly, one must delve into the sexual politics that are integral to those American overseas bases in which military men are prohibited from "fraternizing"—that is, from having social relations with local civilian women. Nonfraternization is the Pentagon's rule for many soldiers and sailors based on American bases, in, for instance, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Bahrain, and Niger. Where are the women, the civilian women, the uniformed women?

CONCLUSION

The closings of the Subic Bay and Clark bases in the Philippines have not been the only occasions when a local popular movement has persuaded a national government to end its basing agreement with the United States. Antibases movements have succeeded in Manta, Ecuador, and in Vieques, Puerto Rico.[70] The gendered politics inside each of these successful antibases movements has been distinct. In each of them, women as activists have been crucial to the mobilization and to the meanings adopted in opposition to the U.S. base. But not every antibases movement has made feminist understandings of sexism central to its strategies and its goals. In each of these movements, as well as those in South Korea and Okinawa—the latter two have not

succeeded in persuading their governments to end their Status of Forces Agreement treaties with the United States—feminist local antibases activists have had to work constantly to ensure that nationalist ideas do not trump feminist ideas. Exploring these dynamics within any country's antibases debate helps to clarify the complex workings of gendered ideas shaping the international politics of military alliances.

Perhaps the antibases popular movement in which feminist ideas—about masculinized politics and about alternative measures of security—have become most central has been the Greenham Common women's peace camp in southern England during the last years of the Cold War.[71] From 1981 to 1989, a British women's peace encampment grew at Greenham Common, outside the fence protecting the U.S. Air Force base. The women who decided to camp outside the base at Greenham sparked a national debate among Britons over both the unequal alliance between the United States and Britain and the meaning of security—and security for whom—in the nuclear age. Still today, one can meet British women for whom "Greenham" was the turning point in their political lives. They will describe in detail camping in the cold winter mud, singing when arraigned in court, debating with each other for hours the meanings of peace and patriarchy—and family, motherhood, and sexuality. They will retell the story of propping up ladders to climb over the base fence on New Year's night in 1983 to dance atop the Americans' nuclear missile silo and getting out without being caught.

The women who camped at Greenham also will recall the pain of hearing police and some local people call them "dykes" and "whores." Then they will tell of the excitement when thousands of women from all over Britain and Ireland came to Greenham to form a nine-mile human chain around the entire

Figure 17. Women peace campaigners dance on a cruise missile silo inside the U.S. Air Force base at Greenham Common, England, 1983. Photo: Raissa Page/Format.

perimeter of the American base. An Irish woman who traveled from Dublin to join the Greenham chain remembered: "We joined hands and began to sing … to say: we will meet your violence with a loving embrace, for it is the surest way to defuse it. How strong I felt when I joined my voice to the waves of voices shouting 'Freedom' and when the echoes from so far away drifted across the base."[72]

Journalist Beatrix Campbell interviewed one British woman who thought of herself as a member of the Conservative Party, the party of Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister who was a chief backer of the U.S. base and its nuclear-headed missiles. But when this woman began thinking about the Greenham women's peace camp, she recalled that she had developed another sort of political understanding. She had cut her hair short to make it clear to her husband and sons that she identified with the Greenham women:

> "Before Greenham I didn't realize that the Americans had got their missiles here. Then I realized. What cheek! It was the fuss the Greenham Common women made that made me realize.... The men in this house [her husband and two sons] think they're butch, queers." Did she? She thought for a moment. "No." Would it have bothered her if they were butch or if they were lesbians? She thought again. "No." Women irritated her men anyway, she said, not without affection. "They never stop talking about Land Rovers and bikes, and they've not finished their dinner before they're asking for their tea."[73]

It was due largely to the Greenham Common peace camp women's activism, not just to the ending of the Cold War, that the British government decided that, when the Americans left Greenham, the land should not be given to the British military. Instead, it should revert to the local people to again become common agricultural land.[74]

Running any military base—a local military's base or a foreign military's base; a base within the country's borders or a base operated time zones away; a NATO, African Union, or United Nations peacekeeping base; a private military company's base—is a complicated operation.[75] Moreover, many institutions that are not usually labeled "military bases" can be fruitfully studied for their similarly intense interactions of place, femininity, masculinity, and militarized purpose: for instance, the World War II encampment at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where women and men, whites and African Americans, worked and lived in racialized and gendered intimate secrecy to create the essential elements of the first atomic bomb.[76]

Every military base depends for its operation on women occupying a range of social locations, performing quite different roles. To make visible that gendered base system, one must

take seriously the lives and ideas of the military base laundress, the military wife, the woman in prostitution in a disco just outside the gates, a woman who is paid to sneak on base to have sex with a male soldier, the military enlisted woman and woman officer, and the woman who has become a public critic of the base. They are not natural allies. Many of these women may disagree with the others' assessments; they may not trust each other. But they all have interesting base stories to tell. Moreover, the separations between them are among the things that sustains that base.

To analyze any base as if it were simply the sum of its budget, its equipment, its land, its chain of command, its legal basis, and its mission is to seriously underestimate all the power that is used to manage it, all the ideas that are devised to underpin it, and all the policies that are implemented to keep it running smoothly. "Smoothly" is a measure of success in the eyes of the commanders and their uniformed and civilian superiors, as well as in the eyes of any local civilians—mayors, police officers, business operators, employees—who see that base as good for their own security and well-being. "Smoothly" does not automatically translate into gender equality or women's empowerment. "Smoothly" usually serves to perpetuate patriarchal international relations.

Hundreds of military bases run smoothly. Their operations are greased by daily humdrum. They do not make headlines. The unheadlined bases are as worthy of feminist-informed gendered analysis as the bases that become suddenly visible because of a scandal. International politics are composed of more than just crises and scandals. International politics can be humdrum, with power flowing unnoted and uncontested. Humdrum is political. Humdrum is gendered.

CHAPTER SIX

Going Bananas!

Where Are Women in the International Politics of Bananas?

Banana wars. Hurricanes and monsoons. Modernity. Capitalist expansion. Repressive regimes. Pesticide pollution. Workers organizing. Nationalism. Hollywood. Bananas are big, globalized business.

India produces the most bananas in the world today, but it is Ecuador that has become the world's number one banana exporter. Ranking two, three, and four are Costa Rica, Colombia, and the Philippines.

All three of the largest producing/marketing corporations in the global banana industry—Dole, Chiquita, and Del Monte—are American.[1] These top three control two-thirds of the world's banana market. Number four in the global banana rankings is Fyffes, a global food corporation based in Ireland. Among the fastest-growing global banana companies is Noboa, owned by the Ecuadoran magnate Alvero Noboa, which uses the sticker name "Bonita." Though less well known, fast-growing Noboa is today among the large plantation companies and has been sharply accused of labor abuses.[2] Together, these five companies

wield influence in Washington, in the capitals of Central and Latin America, and in Geneva, headquarters of the World Trade Organization.

Among the countries whose residents consume bananas, the United States is by far the world's top banana importer. In second place are the countries of the European Union. While the banana plantation companies are perhaps more familiar to international observers than are the retail food giants, the globalizing supermarket chains have become increasingly influential players in the worldwide food industry. Bananas are the most profitable products for supermarkets to sell: for every dollar's worth of bananas sold, thirty-four cents goes to the markets, and only five cents goes to the producers (banana company managers and workers combined). As supermarkets and wholesale food chains have merged and opened outlets in more and more countries, their executives have been able to pressure the banana suppliers to keep banana prices low, allegedly for the benefit of food consumers. In 2013, the world's five largest food retailers/wholesale supermarkets were as follows:

1. Walmart (United States–owned)
2. Tesco (U.K.-owned)
3. Carrefour (French-owned)
4. Costco (United States–owned)
5. Kroger (United States–owned)[3]

Whether standing in the fresh produce section of a grocery store, deciding whether one should buy conventional or organic bananas; or slicing a banana on top of one's morning cereal; or baking banana bread for a benefit sale, one is playing one's part in the politics of the global banana. Those banana politics are

gendered. Women play different roles than men in producing bananas, with different consequences. Ideas about masculinity and femininity have been wielded in the global production and marketing of bananas. Paying serious attention to women makes one a more realistic analyst of the international politics of bananas—and of tea, coffee, broccoli, and mangos.

CARMEN MIRANDA, HOLLYWOOD, AND FRUIT

Today, most people have forgotten Carmen Miranda. Or if they know her, it is because of her over-the-top imitators who now appear at drag parties or on YouTube. Carmen Miranda has become the cartoonish version of the Latin American star.

However, in her prime, Carmen Miranda broke international cultural barriers. In the 1940s, when she appeared on the American movie screen, the tempo quickened. Dressed in her deliberately outrageous costumes, her head topped by hats featuring bananas and other tropical fruits, Carmen Miranda sang and danced her way to Hollywood stardom. She was rarely cast as the romantic lead. Instead, directors made the most of her feisty comic performances. She added wit and energy to any film. But Carmen Miranda also played a part in a serious political drama: the realignment of American power in the Western Hemisphere. Her 1940s movies helped make Latin America safe for American banana companies at a time when U.S. imperialism was coming under wider regional criticism.

Between 1880 and 1930 the United States colonized or invaded Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Each was strategically valuable for its plantation crops. The British, French, and Dutch had their

plantation colonies producing rubber, tea, coffee, palm oil, coconuts, tobacco, sisal, cotton, jute, rice, and of course the monarch of plantation crops, sugar. Bananas, sugar, coffee, pineapples—each had become an international commodity that some Americans were willing to kill for. But by the time Franklin Roosevelt entered office in 1933, sending in the marines was beginning to lose its political value; it was alienating too many potential regional allies. New, less direct means had to be found to guarantee the United States' control of Latin America. Popular culture would be harnessed for foreign policy ends.

Carmen Miranda was born in Lisbon in 1909 but emigrated as a child with her parents to Brazil, where her father established a wholesale fruit business. Despite her parents' hopes that their convent-educated daughter would grow up to be a respectable young woman, she secretly auditioned for and won a regular spot on a Rio de Janeiro radio station. She became a hit and soon was an attraction on the local nightclub circuit. By 1939, Carmen Miranda had recorded over three hundred singles, appeared in four Brazilian films, and was identified by her compatriots as a national institution. At this point in her career, Broadway theatrical producer Lee Shubert saw Carmen Miranda perform and offered her a contract to move north. When she stepped off the boat in New York on May 4, 1939, Shubert had the press corps already primed to greet his new "Brazilian bombshell." With her outrageous headgear and limited but flamboyant (and often deliberately flawed) English (she also spoke French and Spanish, as well as Portuguese), she was on her way to being turned into the 1940s American stereotype of the Latin American woman. In response to reporters' questions, Miranda replied, "Money, money, money . . . hot dog. I say yes, no, and I say money, money, money and I say turkey sandwich and I say grape juice."[4]

Carmen Miranda was a European Brazilian. But she took her musical inspiration from Brazil's African heritage. Her fruit-laden hats were inspired by those worn by Afro-Brazilian market women in Bahia, the northeastern state of Brazil. She not only sang songs derived from Afro-Brazilian culture but also chose Black Brazilian men as her band members. Miranda's new American producers wanted her to leave her Black band musicians behind in Brazil. But she insisted that they come with her to the United States. That is, Miranda was willing to play the silly Latin American woman on stage and screen, but she had serious ideas of her own.[5]

When Carmen Miranda arrived in New York in the summer of 1939, the world's fair was attracting throngs to the Sunken Meadow fairgrounds just outside the city. Nonetheless, Miranda still managed to make Shubert's show, *Streets of Paris,* a commercial success. *Life* magazine's reviewer noted, "Partly because their unusual melody and heavy accented rhythms are unlike anything ever heard in a Manhattan revue before, partly because there is not a clue to their meaning except the gay rolling of Carmen Miranda's insinuating eyes, these songs, and Miranda herself, are the outstanding hit of the show."[6]

In 1940, Hollywood studio directors were getting on board the Latin America bandwagon. Men like Darryl Zanuck, head of Twentieth Century Fox, had long cultivated friendships with politicians in Washington. It was one way to overcome the barriers of anti-Semitism confronting many of the film industry's moguls. Thus when President Franklin Roosevelt launched his Latin American "Good Neighbor Policy," the men who ran Hollywood were willing to help the government's campaign to replace a militaristic, imperial approach to United States–Latin America diplomacy with a more "cooperative" strategy. Roosevelt and his

Figure 21. Carmen Miranda in an undated Hollywood publicity photograph.

advisers were convinced that gunboat diplomacy was arousing too much opposition among precisely those Latin American governments that American businessmen would have to cultivate if the United States were to pull itself out of the Depression. Tourism and investment were promoted in glossy brochures. Pan American Airways flew holiday-makers to Havana and Managua. Construction of the Pan-American Highway was begun. Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza, on his way to creating a repressive regime, was invited to New York's world's fair in 1939 to celebrate regional democracy and progress. Latin American movie stars replaced the marines as the guarantors of regional harmony.[7]

Darryl Zanuck enticed Carmen Miranda away from Broadway to be his studio's contribution to the Good Neighbor Policy. She appeared in the 1940 film *Down Argentine Way,* starring Betty Grable and Don Ameche. Singing "South American Way," Miranda made the song a hit. She popularized platform shoes. Her film career soared during World War II, when Washington officials believed that it was diplomatically vital to keep Latin American regimes friendly to the United States and out of the enemies' Axis alliance. Propaganda and censorship agencies urged the entertainment industry to promote Latin actors and popularize Latin music.[8]

Perhaps Miranda's most lavish film was Busby Berkeley's *The Gang's All Here* (1943), whose set was adorned with giant bananas and strawberries. She mastered English but was careful to maintain in her performances a heavily accented pronunciation, which suggested feminine naïveté. This naïveté, combined with the studios' insistence that she not be cast in the roles of romantic leads, meant that the cinematic Miranda presented a very specific and narrow portrayal of Latin American femininity. For many Americans, she became a guide to Latin culture. While Hollywood's

Latin American male actors stereotypically played loyal but none-too-bright sidekicks, like Donald Duck's parrot pal, José Carioca, Miranda personified a culture full of zest and charm, unclouded by intense emotion or political ambivalence. Like the bananas she wore on her head, Miranda was exotic yet mildly amusing.[9]

"Carmen Miranda is the chief export of Brazil. Next comes coffee." So recalls Uruguayan historian Eduardo Galeano.[10] Many Brazilians were proud of Miranda's Hollywood success yet ambivalent about her not-quite-respectable femininity. When she died suddenly of a heart attack in 1955, her body and effects were shipped back to Rio de Janeiro, where throngs turned out to pay public tribute to her. Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek declared a national day of mourning. Today, Carmen Miranda is memorialized in Rio with a museum devoted to her life and cultural contributions.

"I'm Chiquita Banana and I've Come to Say"

The banana has a history, a gendered history. Bananas have their origins in India and were carried westward by traders. By the fifteenth century they had become a basic food for Africans living along the coast of what is now Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Portuguese traders transplanted bananas to the Canary Islands. When Portuguese and Spanish slave-traders began raiding the coast for Africans to serve as forced labor on colonial estates, they chose bananas as the food to ship with them; it was local and cheap. These were red bananas, a variety still popular in the West Indies and Africa.[11]

The yellow banana so familiar today to consumers in Europe, Japan, the Persian Gulf, and North America—the Cavendish—

is one of sixty-seven varieties of banana. The Cavendish is the industrialized banana, designed for global trade and maximized profit. It was not developed as a distinct variety until the nineteenth century. The Cavendish was imagined to be food fit not for slaves but for the palates of the wealthy. The first record of bunches of bananas being brought to New York from Havana is from 1804. But it was when the yellow banana was served as an exotic delicacy in the homes of affluent Bostonians in 1875 that it took off as an international commodity. In 1876 the banana was featured at the United States Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia. The yellow banana symbolized America's new global reach.[12] The banana was becoming a sign of modernity, specifically of modern prosperity.

Notions of masculinity and femininity have been used to shape the international political economy of the banana. Banana plantations were developed in Central America, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Philippines as a result of alliances between men of different but complementary interests: businessmen and male officials of the importing countries, on the one hand, and male large-landowners and government officials of the exporting countries, on the other. To clear the land and harvest the bananas, these male banana industrializers decided they needed a male workforce, one sustained at a distance by women as prostitutes, mothers, and wives.

However, company executives' manly pride was invested not so much in their extensive plantations as in the sophisticated equipment and technology they developed to transport the fragile tropical fruit to far-away markets: railroads, wire services, and fleets of refrigerator ships. Company officials still take special satisfaction in describing their giant cold-storage ships circling the globe, directed by a sophisticated international

communications network, all to ensure that the bananas leaving Costa Rica or the Philippines by the green tonnage will arrive in New York or Liverpool or Doha undamaged and unspoiled, ready for the ripening factory.[13]

The companies envisaged their customers to be women: mothers and housewives concerned about their families' nutrition and looking for a reliable product. The most successful way of bonding housewives' loyalty to a particular company was to create a fantasized market woman.

The United Fruit Company—it later changed its name to United Brands, then to Chiquita Brands Corporation—became the largest commercial grower and marketer of bananas in the first half of 1900s. It made its own contribution to the American government's Good Neighbor Policy. In 1943, the company opened a Middle American Information Bureau to encourage "mutual knowledge and mutual understanding." The bureau wrote and distributed materials emphasizing the value that Central American products such as hardwoods, coffee, spices, and fruits contributed to the U.S. war effort. It targeted schoolchildren and housewives: those who ate bananas and those who bought them. *Nicaragua in Story and Pictures* was a company-designed school text celebrating the progress brought to Nicaragua by foreign-financed railroads and imported tractors. "Fifty Questions on Middle America for North American Women" and "Middle America and a Woman's World" explained to the North American housewife, United Fruit's chief customer, how the war in Asia was affecting her family budget: the Japanese invasion of British-ruled Malaya, it explained, made imported foods from Nicaragua and Costa Rica all the more important to her own wartime security.[14]

United Fruit's biggest contribution to American culture during these decades, however, was "Chiquita Banana." In 1944,

when Carmen Miranda was packing movie houses and American troops were landing on Asian and European beaches, United Fruit's advertising executives created a half-banana, half-woman cartoon character. Chiquita Banana would soon rival Donald Duck. Dressed as a Miranda-esque market woman, this feminized banana sang her calypso song from coast to coast. Chiquita Banana helped to establish a twentieth-century art form, the singing commercial. Across the country, Chiquita could be heard on radio stations singing the praises of the banana 376 times daily.

Americans who are now in their sixties still can give a rendition of her memorable song:

> I'm Chiquita Banana
> And I've come to say
> Bananas have to ripen
> In a certain way.
> When they are fleck'd with brown
> And have a golden hue
> Bananas taste the best
> And are the best for you.
> You can put them in a salad
> You can put them in a pie-aye
> Any way you want to eat them
> It's impossible to beat them.
> But bananas like the climate
> Of the very, very tropical equator.
> So you should never put bananas
> In the refrigerator. No no no no![15]

United Fruit sales strategists set out in the 1940s to do the seemingly impossible—to create among American housewives a

Figure 22. The United Brands Company's recording for children of the "Chiquita Banana" song. Original music by Len Mackensie, 1945; updated commercial lyrics, 1975, copyright Maxwell-Wirges, 1945.

brand-name loyalty for a generic fruit. They wanted women to think "Chiquita" when they went to the grocery store to buy bananas. Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and Carmen Miranda's Hollywood success had set the stage; animated cartoons and the commercial jingle did the rest. Between the woman consumer and the fruit, there now was only a corporation with the friendly face of a bouncy Latin American market woman. Seventy-five years later the United Fruit Company has

become Chiquita Brands. Today the company brings American consumers not only bananas but also melons, mangos, and papayas. An updated cartoon version of Chiquita still appears on its blue-and-yellow fruit stickers and on its corporate web page.[16] She is no longer a half-woman, half-banana character. She has become a full woman, slender and appealing.

Today, virtually every affluent country imports bananas from mainly poor, largely agrarian countries. Each consumer society gets its bananas from a large agribusiness corporation that either has its own large plantations or controls the marketing system through which small growers sell their fruit. Since United Fruit's advertising coup in 1944, its competitors have followed suit, designing stickers for their own bananas. In Europe, North America, the Middle East, or Japan, a shopper can look for the sticker with a corporate logo and, usually, the country of origin. In London and Dublin, one can look for Fyffes. In Detroit or Toronto, a shopper would be more likely to find Dole-, Chiquita-, Del Monte–, or Bonita-stickered bananas. In Tokyo, Sumitomo's bananas will be more visible.

Bananas, however, are not grown or exported evenly throughout the world's tropical regions. Latin America, where American food corporations are dominant, accounts for a stunning 82 percent of the world's total banana exports. By contrast, African countries together export only 4 percent of the world's total, while the Caribbean's banana exports amount to a mere 0.3 percent of all the world's exported bananas.[17]

Within regions, particular countries have become banana powerhouses. For instance, Ecuador, the world's largest, single, banana-exporting country, produces 43 percent of all the Latin American exported bananas, while Costa Rica, Colombia, and Guatemala, also major players in the global banana trade,

produce 15 percent, 15 percent, and 13 percent, respectively, of the total Latin American exports. In the Caribbean, it is the small Windward Islands—Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines—that are the region's principal banana exporters. Among African countries, the former French colonies of Cameroon, Senegal, and Côte d'Ivoire have become that region's main banana exporters. In Asia, the Philippines has been that region's principal banana exporter for decades, attracting agribusiness investment from large Japanese and American corporations.[18]

One more twist: a country's banana exports might appear puny on the world stage yet still be crucial for its own government's balance of payments and its own farmers', agricultural workers', and local market vendors' economic well-being. Thus, while the West African country Côte d'Ivoire is a minor banana player, the local banana business supports twelve thousand of the country's rural and city workers, including women fruit sellers in Abidjan's main market. Market women such as Isabelle Lou Kouhelou, moreover, think internationally about their bananas. They worry about World Trade Organization rulings that have opened up global markets even further to the big American corporations selling Latin American bananas. Isabelle Lou Kouhelou also calculates that she could sell more local Côte d'Ivoire bananas in neighboring African countries if only her own government's officials would invest more in road and rail development.[19]

WOMEN IN BANANA REPUBLICS

A great deal has been written about countries derisively labeled "banana republics." The term was coined in 1935 to describe

countries whose land and soul were in the clutches of a foreign company supported by the repressive politics of their own governments.[20] That is, a country becomes a banana republic as a result of a particular blending of exploitive foreign capital, local corruption, and authoritarian rule. The national sovereignty of a banana republic becomes so thoroughly compromised that it becomes the butt of jokes, not the object of respect. It has a government, but that government is staffed by people who line their own pockets by doing the bidding of the overseas corporation and its political allies. Because it is impossible for such compromised rulers to win the support of their own citizens, many of whom are exploited on the corporation's plantations, the government depends on guns and jails, not ballots and national pride.

The quintessential banana republics were those Central American countries that came to be dominated by the United Fruit Company's monoculture, the U.S. Marines, and their handpicked dictators. Their regimes have been backed by American presidents, mocked by Woody Allen, and overthrown by nationalist guerrillas. From the 1930s to the 1980s, banana republics were in their prime.

These corrupted political systems, and the international relationships that underpinned them, have been discussed as if women scarcely existed. Conventional commentators have portrayed the principal actors on all sides as men, and as if their being male were insignificant. This has left unexamined the ways in which their shared, though rival, masculinity allowed agribusiness entrepreneurs to form alliances with men in their own diplomatic corps, and with men in Nicaraguan, Guatemalan, or Honduran society. Enjoying Cuban cigars together after dinner while wives and mistresses powder their noses has been

the stuff of smug cartoons but not of gendered political curiosity. Similarly, a banana republic's militarized ethos has been taken for granted without an investigation of how militarism feeds on masculinist values to sustain it. Most marines, diplomats, corporate managers, and military dictators may have been male, but they, like corrupted and corrupting men in contemporary societies, have needed the feminine "other" to maintain their self-assurance.

One of the conditions that pushed women off the banana-republic stage has been the presumed masculinization of the banana plantation. Global banana-company executives imagined that most of the jobs on their large plantations could be done only by men. Banana plantations were carved out of wooded acres. Clearing the brush required workers who could use a machete and live in rude barracks, and who, once the plantation's trees were bearing fruit, could chop down the heavy bunches of bananas and carry them to central loading areas and, from there, to the docks to be loaded by the ton onto refrigerator ships. This was "men's work."

Not all plantation work, in reality, has been masculinized. Generally, crops that call for the use of machetes—tools that can also be used as weapons—are produced with large inputs of male labor: bananas, sugar, palm oil. On the other hand, producers of crops that require a lot of weeding, tapping, and picking hire large numbers of women, who sometimes constitute a majority of the plantation workers: tea, coffee, rubber. That is, while tea, coffee, bananas, and rubber today are globalized, and are grown for export mainly on large foreign-owned or state-owned plantations, their gendered international politics are not identical.

Nor is the gendered labor formula on any single plantation fixed. Plantation managers who once relied heavily on male

workers may decide to bring in more women if the men become too costly; or if their union becomes too threatening; or if the international market for the crop declines, necessitating cost-cutting measures such as hiring more part-time workers; or if new technology allows some physically demanding tasks to be done by workers with less strength. Today both sugar and rubber are being produced by plantation companies using more women workers than they did fifty years ago.[21] What has remained constant, however, is the presumption of international corporations that their position in the world market depends on manipulations of masculinity and femininity. Gender is injected into every Brooke Bond or Lipton tea leaf, every Unilever or Lonrho palm-oil nut, every bucket of Dunlop or Michelin latex, every stalk of Tate and Lyle sugarcane, and every bunch of Dole or Chiquita bananas.

Like all plantation managers, banana company executives considered race as well as gender when employing what they thought would be the most skilled, low-cost, and compliant workforce. Thus although the majority of banana workers were men, race was used to divide them. On United Brands' plantations in 1980s Costa Rica and Panama, for instance, managers recruited Amerindian men from the Guaymi and Kuna communities, as well as West Indian Black men and Hispanicized Ladino men (of mixed Amerindian and Spanish backgrounds). They placed them in different, unequally paid jobs, Ladino men at the top (below white male managers), Amerindian men at the bottom. Amerindian men were assigned menial jobs such as chopping grass and overgrown bush, thus ensuring that Ladino men's negative stereotypes of Amerindians—cholos, unskilled, uncultured natives—would be perpetuated. The stereotypes were valuable to the company because they forestalled potential

alliances between Ladino, Black, and Amerindian men over common grievances. For instance, scholar Philippe Bourgois recorded these revealing explanations offered by men working on one Central American banana plantation:[22]

> MANAGER: It's easier to work with *cholos*. They're not as smart and don't speak good Spanish. They can't argue back at you even when they're right. . . . Hell, you can make a *cholo* do anything.
>
> LADINO FOREMAN: My workers are [not] *cholos*. . . . It's different here. Sure I can grab them [Ladino and Black male workers] and make them work faster; but the consequences will catch up with me tomorrow. We're not *cholos* here . . . you understand?
>
> GUAYMI WORKER: They used to have up to 200 of us crammed into shacks eating boiled bananas out of empty kerosene cans.[23]

To say, therefore, that a banana plantation is masculinized is not to say that masculinity, even when combined with social class, is sufficient to forge political unity. On the other hand, the presumption that a banana plantation is a man's world does indeed affect the politics of any movement attempting to improve workers' conditions or to transform the power relationships that constitute a "banana republic."

In the 1920s, when Honduras was the hemisphere's largest banana exporter and United Fruit dominated the global banana industry, Central American banana workers began to organize and to conduct strikes to which even the U.S. government and local elites had to pay attention. The banana workers' demands reached beyond working conditions to political structures—from low pay and dangerous pesticides to political coercion and national sovereignty. These workers' protests took on strong nationalist overtones: the locally complicit regimes were as much the target of their anger as were the foreign plantation companies. But so long as banana plantation work was imagined

to be men's work, and so long as the banana workers' unions were organized as if they were men's organizations, the wider nationalist cause would also be masculinized. A banana republic might fall, but patriarchy would remain in place.

For this reason, the emergence of women as activists in the two-pronged protests of the 1980s against exploitive foreign agribusinesses and corrupt local elites—in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and, in a less violent form, Costa Rica—had special importance. Their activism made it clear that women had a stake in the local and international banana politics, while, at the same time, their involvement in the antiregime movements altered the meaning of *nation* and the nationalist movement's agenda.[24]

WOMEN GROW FOOD AND WASH BANANAS

The banana plantation has never been as exclusively male as popular imagery suggests. It has taken women's paid and unpaid labor to bring the golden fruit to the world's breakfast tables. Currently, an estimated 8 percent of all employees on banana plantations are women. Although they are a small percentage of all banana workers, in Latin America alone this adds up to an estimated five hundred thousand women banana workers. That 8 percent, however, is a new, lower proportion of plantation workers than just twenty years ago. It marks plantation company executives' successful efforts in reducing the numbers of women workers. Women, these banana executives have decided, are, despite their low wages, "high cost" workers.[25]

A banana plantation is closest to being an all-male enclave at its beginning, when the principal task is bulldozing and clearing the land for planting. But even at this stage women are

depended upon by the companies—and their male employees—to play their roles. As in the male-dominated mining towns from Chile to South Africa to Indonesia, companies can recruit men to live away from home only if someone back home takes care of their families and maintains their land. The "feminization of agriculture"—that is, leaving small-scale farming to women—has always been part and parcel of the masculinization of mining and banana plantations.[26] The male laborers have to make private arrangements with wives, mothers, or sisters that will assure them of a place to return to when their contracts expire, when they get fed up with supervisors' contemptuous treatment, or when they are laid off because world prices have plummeted. Behind every male-dominated banana plantation, consequently, stand scores of women—as wives, daughters, and mothers—performing unpaid household and farm labor.

In the twenty-first century, the feminization of farming is slowly being recognized as a major stumbling block to entire societies' sustainable development. The problem is not that women are incompetent farmers. The United National Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food issued a report in 2013 pointing to the real cause for women-run small farms' low productivity—sexism: "Discrimination denies small-scale female farmers the same access men have to fertilizer, seeds, credit, membership in cooperatives and unions, and technical assistance."[27]

The UN report charged all levels of society with perpetuating the sorts of sexist attitudes and sexist policies that hold back women farmers' productivity: burdening women with all the family's child care and household maintenance; stereotyping women as unworthy of agricultural extension officers' attention; and excluding women from agricultural-policy-making inside

the family and inside the national government.[28] At a basic level, women farmers are denied legal title to the land they farm. For instance, only 3 percent of all agricultural land in Bangladesh is owned by women; only 8 percent of all agricultural land in Egypt is owned by women. In Brazil the figure is 11 percent, in Nicaragua 16 percent, in France 15 percent, in Norway and the United States, a measly 9 percent.[29]

Banana company executives, union spokesmen, and export-driven government officials all have preferred not to take account of the farming responsibilities of the wives and mothers of their male workers outside the plantation. But unpaid women's farming is in fact part of what makes a banana plantation viable, since, without it, those companies would not be able to hire all the male workers that banana production requires.

Once the banana trees have been planted and have started to bear fruit, more women become residents and workers on the plantation itself. In the 1960s, corporate strategists introduced on-site packinghouses to maximize the advantages of their new containerized shipping process. They gendered the packinghouses by hiring women as their principal workers. The sheds where bananas were washed and packed became the banana plantation's most feminized work site.

Just as one can follow a pair of blue jeans from factory floor to retail shop, so one can follow a bunch of bananas along its global supply chain from plantation to supermarket. One can do the same sort of step-by-step global tracking along the supply chain with other now-globalized foods and plants as well: broccoli, tea, chocolate, tomatoes, mangos, flowers. At each step ideas about women and ideas about men are put to work. Typically, those gendered ideas are devised and enforced by both company and government policy-makers.[30]

Figure 23. Women workers wash bananas at cleaning troughs in Costa Rica, 2006. Photo: Terrance Klassen/Acclaim Images.

Out among the long rows of banana plants, on the company docks, aboard the company's refrigerated ships, and on the trucks at the port of destination, men do what company managers think of as "men's work." Inside the banana packinghouses, however, one finds women cutting bunches of still-green fruit from their thick stems, an operation that has to be done carefully (one might say skillfully) so that the bananas are not damaged. The women then wash the pesticides off the bananas in troughs of water that become pesticide-saturated. Women select the rejects, which can amount to up to half the bananas picked in the fields. Companies often dump rejected bananas in nearby streams, causing pollution, which kills local fish. Women weigh the bananas, attach the company's telltale sticker to each banana, and pack them for shipping. These packinghouse women are paid piece-rates, often with no overtime pay. Foremen expect

them to work at high speed to meet supermarkets' demand. Their employment is precarious, since between harvests the women have little paid work.[31]

Tess was one Filipino woman who worked for TADECO, a subsidiary of United Brands/Chiquita Brands, Philippines. She was employed on a plantation on the country's southern island, Mindanao. A twenty-year war has been fought on Mindanao between government troops and indigenous Muslim groups protesting against the leasing of large tracts of land either to multinational pineapple and banana companies or to wealthy Filipino landowners, who then worked out lucrative contracts with those corporations. Tess herself is a Christian Filipina. She, like thousands of other women and men, migrated—with the government's encouragement—to Mindanao from other islands in search of work when the bottom fell out of the country's once-dominant sugar industry. She worked with other young women in the plantation's packing plant, preparing bananas to be shipped to Japan by Japanese and American import companies. She was paid approximately one dollar a day. With an additional living allowance, Tess could make about forty-five dollars a month; she sent a third of this to her family in the Visayas, her home region.

Tess used a chemical solution to wash the company's bananas. There was a large, reddish splotch on her leg where some of the chemical had spilled accidentally. At the end of a day spent standing for hours at a time, Tess went home to a bunkhouse she shared with a hundred other women, twenty-four to a room, who slept in eight sets of three-tiered bunks.[32]

Many women working in banana plantation packinghouses are heads of households and take exploitive jobs in order to support their children; other women see their employment as part

of being dutiful daughters, sending a portion of their meager earnings back to parents, who may be losing their own farmland as acquisitive agribusinesses expand.[33] Neither women nor men working on any plantation—producing bananas, tea, rubber, sugar, pineapples, palm oil, or coffee for export—are simply "workers." These banana workers are also wives, husbands, daughters, sons, mothers, and fathers. Each role has its own politics. That distinctive role, that set of societal expectations, can shape how they think about their banana work. "Dutiful daughter," "responsible mother," and "loyal wife" are ideas on which the international banana industry depends.

BROTHELS AND BANANAS

Feminists have learned always to ask about prostitution. It is not that one knows what one will uncover, only that whatever one finds is likely to be revealing of the larger gender political system at work.

Bananas have long been the objects of sexual jokes and allusions. There were corporate complaints when an AIDS-prevention education campaign used a banana to demonstrate how a man should put on a condom. But the banana industry—not the banana itself—is far more seriously sexualized. Sexual harassment helps to control women working in the plantation packinghouses; prostitution has been permitted by male managers in order to control the largely male plantation workforce.

Historically, plantations have been self-contained worlds. Workers, managers, family members, and the crops they cultivate live together side by side, their interactions regulated by strict spatial hierarchies. Plantations can look like military bases. Male managers and their wives live in comfortable houses

with gardens and kitchens maintained by local employees; these residents often have access to their own clubs with well-stocked bars and refreshing swimming pools. Foremen and their families have their own more modest housing compounds and certain privileges. Workers live in spartan, sex-segregated accommodations that often lack minimal sanitary facilities. Some plantations are better equipped than others. Head offices like to talk about the clinics and schools they provide. They rarely talk about the isolation or the paralyzing debts accumulated by employees at the company store. Some companies have had to provide basic necessities for workers in order to obtain land rights and tax concessions from local governments.

Caribbean critics of their countries' past dependency on neoliberal capitalist monoculture have coined the term *plantation economy:* foreign agribusiness giants have so dominated entire societies that those societies are reduced to the status of dependency and their cultures suffused with paternalism.[34] Prostitution historically has been woven into that gendered plantation dependency and paternalism.

When investigating life on Dutch-owned sisal, tea, rubber, and palm-oil plantations in early-twentieth-century colonial Indonesia, feminist historian Ann Laura Stoler asked about sexual politics.[35] She found that prostitution was integral to the way Dutch male managers recruited and controlled male workers from several different Indonesian ethnic groups. There were many more men than women on these estates. Women were hired at half the rates paid to men, not enough to meet daily necessities. Most were single Javanese women hired on contract and living far away from home. To make ends meet, many of these women provided sexual services to Chinese male workers living in the plantation barracks. Some young women were

pushed into prostitution by sexual harassment by the foremen in their packing plants. White male plantation supervisors enjoyed the privilege of selecting their sexual partners from the most recent female arrivals.

Prostitution became the norm on many plantations by design, not simply by chance. Company records reveal that male managers debated the advantages and disadvantages of prostitution for their company. The debates have a familiar ring: they echo debates among male military officers about the pros and cons of facilitating prostitution around their bases. In the early twentieth century, some Dutch colonial commentators were alarmed at the high incidence of venereal disease among male plantation workers and blamed the prostitutes. Other Dutch critics noted that white male supervisors were assaulted by male Javanese workers who believed their daughters were being lured into prostitution. But the prevailing management view was that it would be too difficult to recruit male workers for plantation work if they were not provided with female sexual services. Furthermore, in the eyes of many plantation managers, prostitution was a lesser evil than homosexual relations between male workers deprived of female companionship. Finally, devoting a sizeable portion of their wages to prostitution left many male workers further in debt, making it harder for them to abandon estate work when their contracts expired.

Almost a century later, brothels had become commonplace around United Brands/Chiquita plantations in Central America. This time it is American male managers, not Dutch male managers, who are engaging in a sexual calculus. Brothels are situated just outside the banana plantation gates. While the men on these banana plantations are Amerindian, Black, and Ladino, the women working in the brothels are overwhelmingly Ladino. Information is limited, but most women servicing banana workers seem to have

done other sorts of work before becoming prostitutes. Many of the women are the sole supporters of their children. Racism and sexism have been woven together in Central America's banana-plantation brothels, as is so often the case in prostitution politics. Ladino women in prostitution told one researcher that they preferred Amerindian male customers because, they said, those men were too shy to fully undress and got their intercourse over with quickly. This was not necessarily meant as a compliment to Amerindian masculinity and may have served to reinforce negative stereotypes among Ladino and Black male workers.[36]

WOMEN GROWERS AND THE "BANANA WARS"

The 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century was a time of "banana wars." These international conflicts were waged without guns, but they were heated. A lot was at stake because so much depends on the banana. The rivals were global banana companies. The international dispute was over this question: could the European Union continue to impose hefty import tariffs on bananas shipped to Europe from Latin America for the sake of protecting the import of bananas grown in West Africa and the Caribbean?

Several narratives were being played out in these intense international banana wars. The Caribbean bananas were chiefly from the tiny Windward Islands Saint Vincent and Saint Lucia, while the West African bananas were from Senegal, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire; bananas from both regions were grown by small farmers. By contrast, most of the Latin American bananas, on which the European Union commissioners wanted to impose stiff tariffs, were grown on large plantations.

The contest seemed to pit small growers against plantation behemoths: a fruity David versus a fruity Goliath. As in any mythic tale, however, complexity lies just below the surface. Dole, then the world's largest banana company, had bought the French firm Compagnie Fruiti in 2009 to deliberately gain control of its West African smallholder-grown bananas and thus take advantage of the EU's tariff regime.[37]

A further layer of meaning and interest shaped this global trade contest: the Windward and West African growers—and the local governments that benefited from favored access to the European banana market—were former British and French colonial subjects, to which trade officials in London and Paris continued to feel some paternalistic postcolonial obligation. The Latin American banana plantations, on the other hand, were owned by major U.S.-based corporations—Dole, Chiquita, and Del Monte. Even though their bananas were Latin American, the corporations were seen by Washington officials as their own important domestic political allies.

A final layer in this war: in the current global political economy, the arena for this heavyweight banana contest was the World Trade Organization. The WTO was created by governments to negotiate settlements between competing trade-dependent governments in order to keep today's neoliberal global economic gears turning smoothly, in particular to stave off escalating trade wars.

It took twenty years to resolve the banana war. In the end, the Latin American corporations and their Washington allies won. The Geneva-based WTO officials concluded that the EU's tariffs and their rationale were protectionist. Protectionism is counter to the new global economic order. The head of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, declared the resolution a "truly his-

toric moment." The small growers in the Caribbean and West Africa were given several years to adjust to the newly unfettered global competition for European market share, but adjust they would have to.[38] This suggests why Isabelle Lou Kouhelou, the market seller in Côte d'Ivoire, had her eye on both the WTO and her own potential neighboring markets. Market women's calculations were close to the heart of the forced "adjustment."

Beyond the market women—the local banana vendors who inspired Carmen Miranda and the creators of Chiquita Banana—are other women whose livelihoods have been tied up in the EU system of tariffs and in the Washington/Dole/Del Monte/Chiquita frontal challenge to that postcolonial system. These are the women in the Windwards and West Africa who are themselves small growers of bananas. If one holds a Fyffes Windward Island banana and a Dole Ecuador banana, one is holding two quite differently gendered bananas.

The women and men who are smallholders sell their bananas to a locally influential growers cooperative, which in turn sells them to an international banana marketing company such as Fyffes. While the small banana farmers have had more autonomy than plantation workers have, their economic fortunes have been tied to those of the growers cooperatives and to the global marketers. In recent years, even some of the major plantation companies have been finding smallholder systems attractive: by shedding their own large plantations and, instead, buying bananas from smallholders and small plantation suppliers, they can rid themselves, presumably, of the social responsibilities of hiring workers directly. In this sense, the banana companies are following in the footsteps of the global garment companies, which have tried to fine-tune contracted outsourcing.

Thus one should resist romanticizing banana smallholdings. They too are gendered. While male smallholders are likely to be married, giving them a second adult to help with farm and family work, many of the women banana farmers are single mothers. Furthermore, women farmers are less likely than male farmers to have property titles to the land they farm. For instance, on the Windward Island of Saint Lucia, the source of many Caribbean exported bananas, a mere 25 percent of all agricultural landowners are women; 75 percent are men.[39]

In addition, both the influential local grower cooperatives and the global marketing companies to which they sell their bananas are male-dominated. One telling indicator of women farmers' marginalization in the local banana politics appears on the Windward Islands Farmers Association's own website. Among the association's "major objectives," its leaders list "mainstreaming of gender-related issues in all WINFA programs." The implication is that gender mainstreaming is still out there on the association's horizon, far from achieved. To underline that yet-to-be-achieved rolling back of the farmers association's masculinized internal culture, the group later states among "WINFA's efforts": "Women are encouraged to participate actively in assemblies and exchanges."[40]

Paying attention to women in the recent "banana wars" throws light on how these intense economic conflicts were fueled by rival masculinities at every level of the globalized trade, fueled in ways that served to further marginalize women.

THE *BANANERAS:* WOMEN BANANA WORKERS ORGANIZE

Banana workers have been organizing for decades. Because banana plantations have been a site for cooperation between

powerful global corporations and local elites, banana workers' unions have spearheaded nationalist movements that have simultaneously challenged foreign exploitation and their own governments' political repression.

For most of those turbulent decades, local and overseas observers did not seem to notice or care that those unions were themselves male dominated. What mattered to sympathetic labor observers was class and capital. It took a handful of women packinghouse workers to compel them, belatedly, to pay attention to women and to the politics of gender inside banana workers' unions.

They called themselves *bananeras*. These were women who worked long hours for low pay in the damp, pesticide-infused plantation packinghouses. They did not wield machetes. They were not photogenic. They did not fit the usual profile of national heroes.[41]

The first women banana workers to wonder aloud why men monopolized the leadership of their labor unions were Honduran women. Their story started in 1985. The location: La Lima, an old United Fruit (later Chiquita) plantation town. They were union members. They belonged to SITRATERCO, the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company, named after the banana company's transportation subsidiary. SITRATERCO had been born out of a mass workers strike in 1954, in the depths of the Cold War, when workers' organizing was considered subversive. The 1950s were also a time in the gendered history of banana plantations when women's role in production was confined to that of unpaid wives of male workers. The introduction of the plantation packinghouse was still a decade away. The union ultimately won the right to negotiate with corporate management and, out of those negotiations, had secured contracts

giving banana workers a modicum of employment stability that other workers on plantations hostile to unions lacked. Thirty years later, in the mid-1980s, military coups had toppled successive governments in Latin America, and women had joined anti-regime guerrilla movements in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. In the same years, energy in the Latin American feminist movement had mounted. It was a transnational movement, out of which came analyses of and activism against militarism, nationalism, capitalism, racism, poverty, and patriarchy.[42] These were heady years. But on the plantations and inside their unions, it was hard to get women's leadership potential recognized and women workers' specific issues taken seriously.

"The men thought we were crazy." That was what women union activists said of the initial response by their male coworkers and union comrades when, in 1986, Gladys Valle and Maria Teresa Aguilar introduced a motion at the SITRATERCO meeting calling for the creation of a Women's Committee, with its own status and its own officers. The men "were laughing at us." The motion was defeated.[43]

The men's opposition and ridicule energized the women. They began meeting to talk about their experiences in the packinghouses. But soon they realized that they could not confine their issues simply to what they experienced on the job. Their responsibilities at home—as single mothers or with their male partners—were so tightly woven into their paid-work lives. Rashes caused by pesticides that seeped under their gloves, and working what Latin American feminists had named the "double day"—paid work and unpaid work—were impossible to separate. They were part of the same politics of women's lived experiences that were not being taken seriously by their male comrades.

Over the next two years, the Honduran plantation women began to seek out individual men in the union, choosing those men who seemed most approachable, who at least did not openly ridicule their ideas. At the same time, when the union leadership called strikes on the plantations, women made certain that their male coworkers saw their support and realized how crucial their support was to any union campaign to win better working conditions for everyone. In 1988, the women again introduced their resolution. This time it passed. Only 8 women could vote. But they had gained the support of 120 male voters. The union's Comite Femenil was launched.

As the *bananeras* continued meeting, trading ideas and experiences, they decided to hold training workshops. The workshop was a feminist skill-building technique that middle-class Latin American feminists had developed. A workshop brought together a dozen or more women, sometimes just for a few hours, sometimes for two days, to share fun, comradeship, and education. The women organizers realized that a principal obstacle to getting more women into union leadership roles was that women were not given the chance to develop their leadership skills. That leadership was a skill, and not just something men naturally took on, was itself part of these women's new gendered political understanding. But attending a workshop—just like taking part in a peace camp—meant taking time away from family. Someone else would have to mind the children and prepare a meal. Thus workshop attendance itself raised questions about the gendered division of labor inside the family and about male partners' distrust of "their" women when the latter were away from home.

During the 1990s, banana labor unions were buffeted from many sides. The large banana companies reduced plantation

Figure 24. On a plantation owned by Tres Hermanas, a key supplier to Chiquita, women banana workers protest the plantation owner's violations of workers' rights, including unpaid overtime and suppression of their union, SITRAINBA. Honduras, 2013. Photo: COSIBAH, March 8, 2013.

workforces; hurricane Mitch devastated Central American banana plants; and governments continued to repress labor activists. In Ecuador, the new Noboa banana company banned unions altogether. These were years of violence, unemployment, ill health, stress, and overwork. Nonetheless, through sharing their experiences, women formed friendships with women working on different plantations, some owned by Dole, others by United Fruit/United Brands/Chiquita, and still others by Del Monte. Information, strategies, and encouragement were circulated among women plantation workers across national borders, especially among women in Honduras, Costa Rica,

Guatemala, and Colombia. More women ran for low-level union offices and won. Women workers became more confident, offering these women officers a realistic sense of their "double day" lives. Knowledge was accumulated. Women started comparing the workings of machismo inside their plantations, their unions, and their homes.

By 2002, women had been elected to senior posts in the banana unions. Women on stage at annual union meetings were no longer an oddity. But the *bananeras* were still organizing workshops in order to empower the newest generation of women banana workers. The older, pioneering *bananeras* were aware that the banana companies now were deliberately avoiding hiring older women—women over thirty years old—and instead targeting younger women, some as young as seventeen.[44] One such workshop took place in Guatemala, led by older, experienced activist women, who had traveled to the session in a pickup truck across the border from Honduras. This time the topic was domestic violence. Bananas and domestic violence. Making this connection was the product of years of thinking and sharing. The workshop started as it usually did, with each young woman in the group saying what she hoped to get out of the gathering:

"I want to learn, and then show others."

"I want to learn how to defend myself from whoever tries to oppress me, whether it's my husband, my union, or my boss."[45]

Women and men employed in the global banana sector have created alliances not only across national borders and gender divisions but also between geographic regions. They have sought to bring Filipino and Latin American plantation workers together with men and women operating smallholder banana farms. To tackle issues of the global banana industry, they contended, those

on the bottom rung of the industry had to globalize their own relationships. Simultaneously, with the support of new transnational groups promoting fair trade and sustainable agriculture movements in affluent countries, such as Banana Link and the Fair Food Network, workers' advocates pressured the big banana production and marketing companies to join the new World Banana Forum.[46] The forum is a gathering at which the full range of economic and social justice issues can be discussed among all the world's major banana players. The first World Banana Forum met in 2009.[47] Without women's activism, this would have been precisely the sort of international economic forum at which masculinized influence would have been normalized.

A leading proponent of the new World Banana Forum was COLSIBA, the Coordinating Body of Latin American Banana and Agro-Industrial Workers, a federation of labor unions. One of COLSIBA's members is the Honduran banana workers union to which the early *bananeras* belonged. When the World Banana Forum gathered in Guayaquil, Ecuador, in 2012, COLSIBA was represented by Iris Munguia, the first woman to be elected the federation's senior coordinator. Back in 1985, as a packinghouse worker, Munguia had been one of the original young women plantation workers who had proposed that her male-dominated union create a Women's Committee. In 2012, Munguia helped to launch the first-ever global meeting of women banana workers and women banana smallholders. Women from all over the banana-growing world came together on the eve of the World Banana Forum's official gathering to share information and strategize about the harsh labor conditions, market pressures, and double days that intertwined to shape their lives.[48]

At the World Banana Forum's meeting that followed, Iris Munguia bargained directly with Chiquita. Amid discussions of

fair trade, organic agriculture, sustainability, and union organizing, Munguia brought up sexual harassment. Pushed by her, Chiquita's corporate executives agreed for the first time to take seriously the sexual harassment of women workers by male supervisors on their plantations. As Munguia explained, "This can be an example for other companies, such as Dole and Del Monte."[49] Women's ideas, too, about what constitutes a workers' issue now determined what made it onto the international economic agenda.

CONCLUSION

For the traveler sated with sugarcoated muffins and bags of chips, the bowl of fresh bananas comes as a welcome sight. In airports and train stations, the bananas usually shine like a nutritious beacon near the cash register. They are not coated with anything but their own bright yellow skins. Finally, amid all the fake food, something natural.

Those skins are a reassuring yellow, however, because their plants were sprayed with pesticides. The weary traveler can peel the banana without fear because women workers have spent hours in a damp plantation shed washing off that pesticide.

Any product that has traveled miles to be consumed far from where it was grown or assembled is the product of multilayered manipulations of ideas about manliness and femininity. Men chop, women wash. Men load ships, women take care of the children. Men lead, women loyally follow. Making sense of the past, current, and future international politics of any product calls for exercising one's feminist curiosity, for squinting one's eyes skeptically at anything that is reassuringly labeled "natural."

Students at Connecticut College, a small liberal arts college in New England, decided to learn more about what they were eating in the campus cafeteria. They chose to focus on the banana. It appeared in their dining hall in a seemingly complete form, unlike most of the foods, which came to them wholly or partially processed. They were soon hot on the trail of the globalized banana corporations. They used the findings from their months of research to persuade their campus administrators and dining hall concessionaires to switch from the corporate banana to a fair-trade-certified banana, imported into the United States by an import company that bought its bananas from Colombian smallholders who had survived years of guerrilla warfare.[50]

However, even a fair-trade-certified banana company should be investigated for its gender politics: who are pictured on the company's website as "the farmers"? Do as many women as men hold legal title to the local banana-farm land? This is just the start. Feminist-informed gender investigators will dig into the local community's decision-making processes, into the recruitment of the export company's executive personnel, into the control of money inside each smallholder's household. Did the women in these Colombian smallholder banana-growing families take part in the 2012 international meeting of women banana workers and farmers? Making the switch in the campus dining hall should be done with one's gender-focused eyes wide open.

The globalized banana is not static. Even if it still looks like the fruit that Carmen Miranda and Chiquita Banana made famous, its politics are constantly in motion. And that political motion is shaped in large part by how corporate male executives forge bonds with local male political elites. Simultaneously, those ongoing political operations are shaped by how banana-company decision-makers imagine the utility of feminized

labor. That political motion is also determined by whether male workers see the value of women's unpaid work or they resist women coworkers' efforts to gain a foothold inside local and international banana labor unions.

Each of the players in today's globalized banana business deserves to be analyzed with gender-sharp tools. We will not know the full gendered story of the banana until we have gender analyses of Chiquita, Dole, Del Monte, Fyffes, and Noboa, until we have gender analyses of Walmart, Tesco, Costco, and Carrefour, until we have gender analyses of COLSIBA and the World Banana Forum, until we have gender analyses of Banana Link and the Fair Food Network, and, of course, until we have a gender analysis of the WTO.

Slipping on a banana peel may not be merely a vaudeville comic act. It may be slipping into the naive political assumption that the banana is natural.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

The Personal Is International

The International Is Personal

Theresa Dantes escaped her abusive employer in Qatar and returned home to Manila. At this point, one can imagine what Theresa might have done next. Perhaps she joined a Filipina domestic workers' group that persuaded her country's government to ratify the International Labor Organization's Convention 189 on domestic workers' rights—though she and her fellow domestic workers do not trust their government to enforce all of the convention's commitments. Officials will have to be monitored and pressured by domestic workers to ensure that Filipinas going abroad to clean other people's homes are treated as full-fledged workers, fairly, and with respect.

Imagining the future, we might picture Theresa deciding to invite women from around the world who have experienced international politics firsthand to come to Manila for a workshop. Through Facebook, Skype, and occasional meetings at women's forums and UN gatherings, these women have begun to realize that their political campaigns overlap because their internationalized experiences as women overlap. Theresa thinks

that holding a three-day workshop might provide the most valuable setting for a genuine exchange of ideas. She may have heard from other Filipinas working on Dole's banana plantation in the Philippines that workshops provide spaces where women can get to know each other informally, speak openly, compare experiences, and build their own collective understandings of the gendered, inequitable world and of their capacity to change that world.

The first to arrive is Iris Munguia, who flies in from Honduras. Iris has become prominent in the international politics of bananas, but she remains connected to the *bananeras,* the women who worked long hours beside her in the banana plantation's damp, pesticide-filled cleaning sheds. Landing in Manila soon after her, on a flight from Dhaka, is Chobi Mahmud. This is her first trip outside Bangladesh. In the wake of the deadly garment factory fires and building collapse, international nongovernmental organizations have been talking directly to the surviving women, like Chobi. They have paid Chobi's airfare to Manila so she could share her experiences with women from other countries. For Lucky Chhetri, it takes several plane changes to travel from Katmandu to Manila. But she and her entrepreneurial sisters are used to making things happen. If one can learn to scale the Himalayas, one can get to the Philippines.

Fortunately, Ray Acheson was still in New York when Theresa's unexpected invitation arrived. She was across the street from UN headquarters, strategizing with other feminists—from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the International Action Network on Small Arms Women's Network—about how to make sure that the historic gender-violence provision in the new international Arms Trade Treaty would be implemented. They already were hearing rumors of a

concerted backlash. Ray had gotten to know several Filipinas active in UN Women, but she never thought she would meet them in their home country. Much closer is Takazato Suzuyo. Flights between Naha and Manila are frequent because so many Filipinas come to Okinawa to work in entertainment businesses around the American military bases there. Some of the Filipinas have told Takazato that they had trained in Manila to be singers, assured that they would be hired as legitimate entertainers when they came to Okinawa. Instead, they told her, upon arrival they had been forced by their bosses to provide sexual services to American military men.[1] Theresa had heard through her new friends in the domestic workers' group that women who were immigrants, as she had been in Qatar, now did their cleaning and child care work without having to live in their employers' homes. These women's experiences of international domestic work seemed to have been quite different from hers. So she invited Rosa to take part. Rosa perhaps had become active in the growing California domestic workers' movement, but she surprised Theresa by suggesting that one of Rosa's middle-class employers, Laurie, come too. Rosa explained that, while she and Laurie lived different political lives, this white American woman also might have experiences of living the "double day" to contribute. Rosa and Laurie arrive together on a flight from San Diego.

There were myriad nationalist movements from which Theresa might have chosen a woman participant. She decided to invite from Marie-Aimée Hélie-Lucas. Although she grew up in Algeria and, as a young woman, fought in the Algerian nationalist movement against French colonialists, Marie-Aimée had felt that she had to go into exile in order to pursue her feminist goals. Her fellow members in Women Living Under Muslim Laws urged her to accept Theresa's invitation.

Before she sent out her workshop invitations, Theresa had talked to local domestic-worker activists about whether to invite a woman married to a diplomat. It seemed as though such a woman's experiences would be too distant from those of a banana worker and the mountain guide. But one of Theresa's new activist friends had cleaned the house of a diplomat and his family stationed in Manila and said the wife seemed frustrated at not being able to pursue her own career as a biologist and was dissatisfied with the constant rounds of social events she was expected to attend. So in the end, Theresa invited Yoko, the wife of the Japanese embassy's first political officer. She asked that only her first name be used so as not to make any waves for her husband, who was on the verge of being promoted to ambassador. Yoko had been posted in Manila for two years and already had raised diplomatic eyebrows when she had invited a group of local Filipina feminists to her home for tea and conversation.

One might imagine that Theresa was a bit nervous when everyone finally was gathered, but she could see that some of the other women were, too, and that put her at ease. She welcomed her nine guests, Iris, Chobi, Lucky, Ray, Takazato, Rosa, Laurie, Marie-Aimée, and Yoko. It did not take much prompting for most of the women to start talking. They began by asking each other about their families. That is always the place to start. Were they raising children on their own? Were they caring for elderly parents? They passed around photos and their smartphones, showing pictures of their children, friends, and extended family members to each other. Then the conversation became more political. Was there a male partner or father who had been reluctant to "allow" them to come to Manila? Who was caring for the children and doing the housework while they were away? Could they afford to lose five days of pay, even low pay?

As they become more relaxed, they start trading stories, especially stories about what people had said upon hearing that the women were invited to take part in a feminist workshop. Many of their male friends, and even some of their female coworkers, were puzzled; some of the men actually laughed. The least understanding called feminists rude, sexist names. But sharing their stories helped take the sting out of these recent memories. It also led the women to talk candidly about how sexism works, how ridicule can be silencing, and how hard it is sometimes for a woman to find her voice when the topic is deemed to be "politics" or "international policy."

One might imagine these ten women talking knowingly about things that affected their sense of genuine security—for instance, governments' immigration policies, the lack of publicly funded child care, the subtleties of racism, stereotypes that place some women on pedestals and others in the gutter, militarism's nurturing of fear and distorted notions of security, corporations' escalating production demands, and unaccountable labor contractors. Together, these women have a wealth of information about global brands, remittances, international debt, nationalist agendas, military bases, development slogans, human trafficking, and environmental hazards, all garnered from their everyday experiences. Yet these topics are not the ones they start with. They start with their most personal relationships, but not because they are naive, parochial, or apolitical. They start there because they know that the one who does the unpaid housework and the feminized caring is integral to the production of blue jeans and bananas, to the promotion of tourism, to the mobilization of nationalist movements, and to the operation of militaries and diplomacy. They know, too, that the way power operates within families is crucial to how power operates in

their communities, in their social movements, in their political parties, in their governments, and within international agencies and alliances.

One of the simplest and most disturbing feminist insights crafted in recent decades is that "the personal is political." It is a profound theoretical statement that can be transferred to a T-shirt or bumper sticker. Asserting that "the personal is political" is disturbing, intentionally disturbing, because it means that relationships we once imagined were (and many of our friends and colleagues still prefer to think are) private or merely social are in fact infused with power. Furthermore, those allegedly private, personal relationships are infused with power that is unequal and backed up by public authority.

But the assertion that "the personal is political" is like a palindrome, one of those phrases that can be read backward as well as forward. Read as "the political is personal," the assertion suggests that politics is not shaped merely by what happens in legislative debates, voting booths, political party strategy sessions, court rooms, or war rooms. While men who dominate public life in so many countries have told women to stay in the proverbial kitchen (not travel to workshops in Manila, not organize, not theorize), those same men have used their myriad forms of public power to construct private relationships in ways that have bolstered their own masculinized political control. Without these deliberate gendered maneuvers, men's hold over political life might be far less secure.

Without these gendered maneuvers, moreover, most men's seeming "expertise" in politics would look less impressive. A 2013 cross-national survey of citizens' political knowledge found that in virtually every one of the ten countries studied, "women know less about politics than men regardless of how advanced a

country is in terms of gender equality."[2] The authors of the study speculated that this gender gap in political information might be due to the fact that few women play prominent roles in news journalism and elite political life, which discourages many women viewers and readers from seeing how current news accounts are relevant to themselves. While this possible explanation for the country-by-country political information gaps appears feasible, a British feminist journalist analyzing the same ten-country study offered an additional explanation: perhaps the researchers' definitions and measures of what counts as "politics" were too narrow.[3] Perhaps what many women do pay attention to, and do store information about, is encompassed by a broader, some might say more realistic, map of politics—for instance, the availability of affordable child care, the condition of public parks, the accessibility of public transport, the readiness of police to treat a woman with respect when she brings a rape charge, the government's willingness to use sexualized pictures of local women to lure foreign tourists, and the impunity with which employers abuse women on the job. That is, perhaps if the map of what is counted as political were redrawn by feminist-informed cartographers, the gap between women's and men's political knowledge would shrink dramatically.

Explaining why any country has the kind of politics it does should motivate us to be curious about how public life is constructed out of struggles to define masculinity and femininity. Accepting that the "political is personal" prompts one to investigate the politics of marriage, the cheapening of women's labor, ideologies of masculinity, sexually transmitted diseases, and homophobia—not as marginal issues but as matters central to the state. Doing this kind of research becomes just as serious as studying military weaponry or taxation policy. In fact, insofar as

the political *is* personal, the latter categories cannot be fully understood without taking into account the former.

To make sense of international politics, we have to read power backward and forward. Power relations between countries and their governments involve more than troop maneuvers and diplomatic emails. Read forward, "the personal is international" insofar as ideas about what it means to be a "respectable" woman or an "honorable" man have been shaped by colonizing policies, international trade strategies, and military doctrines. Today it has almost become a cliché to say that the world is shrinking, that state boundaries are porous: think of KFC opening in Shanghai, sushi eaten in Santiago, Cézannes hanging on walls in Doha, a Korean pop star drawing crowds in New York, and Russian weaponry propping up a Syrian autocrat. We frequently persist, nonetheless, in discussing personal power relationships as if they were contained by sovereign states. We frequently consider violence against women without investigating how the global trade in Internet pornography operates, or how companies offering sex tours and mail-order brides conduct their business across national borders. Similarly, we try to explain how women learn to be "feminine" without unraveling the legacies left by colonial officials who used Victorian ideals of feminine domesticity to sustain their empires; or we try to trace what shapes children's ideas about femininity and masculinity without looking at governments' foreign investment policies that encourage the global advertising campaigns of such giants as McCann Erickson, BBDO, or Saatchi and Saatchi.

Becoming aware that personal relationships have been internationalized, however, may make one only feel guilty for not having paid enough attention to international affairs. "You should know more about the IMF," "Don't switch channels when

experts start talking about climate change," "Find out where Guam is." While useful, this new international attentiveness by itself is not sufficient. It leaves untouched our conventional presumptions about just what "international politics" is and where it takes place. Coming to realize that the "personal is international" expands the politically attentive audience, but it fails to transform our understandings of what is happening on the multiple stages of international politics.

The implications of a feminist understanding of international politics are thrown into sharper relief when one reads "the personal is international" the other way around: *the international is personal*. This calls for a radical new imagining of what it takes for governments to ally with each other, to compete with and wage war against each other.

"The international is personal" implies that governments depend on certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs. Governments need more than tax revenues and spy agencies; they also need wives who are willing to provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need not only military hardware but also a steady supply of women's sexual services, as well as military wives' gratitude, to convince their male soldiers that they are manly. To operate in the international arena, governments seek other governments' recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood.

Thus the international politics of debt, investment, colonization, decolonization, national security, diplomacy, trade, and military occupation are far more complicated than most conventional

experts would have us believe. This may appear paradoxical. Many people, and especially women, are taught that international politics are too complex, too remote, and too tough for the so-called feminine mind to comprehend. If a Hillary Clinton, Angela Merkel, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Michelle Bachelet, or Christine Lagarde enters, it is presumably because she has learned to "think like a man."

Conventional analyses stop short of investigating an entire area of international relations, an area that feminist-informed researchers in the still-expanding field of gender and international relations are pioneers in exploring: how states depend on particular artificial constructions of the domestic and private spheres to achieve their political goals. If we take seriously the politics of domestic servants, of women living on or near a military base, or of women who sew Gap and Zara apparel, we discover that international politics are more complicated than nonfeminist analysts imagine.

This is worth saying again: explanations of international politics that are devoid of feminist questioning are too-simple explanations. Such nonfeminist explanations shy away from complexity. They underestimate power.

A feminist investigatory approach exposes a remarkable assortment of the kinds of power it takes to make the complex international political system work the way it currently does. Admittedly, conventional analysts of interstate relations do talk a lot about power. In fact, they put power at the center of their commentaries. These are the sorts of commentaries that are presumed to be most naturally comprehended by manly men; women, especially those women presumed to be conventionally feminine, allegedly do not have an innate taste for either wielding or understanding power. However, feminist-informed explo-

rations of agribusiness plantation prostitution, foreign service corps sexism, and repeated attempts to tame outspoken nationalist women all reveal that, in reality, it takes much *more* power to construct and perpetuate international political relations than we have been led to believe. One result of feminists' insight is that they do not erect false barriers between the fields of "security studies" and "international political economy." Feminists realize that the actual workings of gendered politics routinely blur these artificial fields of investigation.

This is why the ten politically savvy women who might come together for Theresa's imagined Manila workshop start with their domestic lives. It has taken power to deprive women of land titles and pressure them to leave home to work as domestic workers abroad or to stay on banana plantations. It has taken power to keep women marginalized in their countries' diplomatic corps and out of the upper reaches of central banks and finance ministries. It has taken power to exclude women from labor bargaining. It has taken power to keep questions of inequity between local men and women off the agendas of many nationalist movements in industrialized as well as developing societies. It has taken power to keep diverse women in their separate places for the sake of the smooth running of any military base. It has taken power to ensure that UN treaties do not recognize the rights of sexual minorities. It has taken power to ensure that the UN treaties that do take account of violence against women are not implemented. It has taken power to construct popular cultures—through films, advertising, school curricula, television, books, music, fashion, the Internet—that reinforce, rather than subvert, globally gendered hierarchies.

"The international is personal," combined with a sustained feminist curiosity about women's lives and the workings of

masculinities, provides a guide to making sense of the WTO, the ILO, the IMF, the Group of Eight, the Group of Twenty, the World Bank, the EU Commission, the Vatican, the Qatar emirate, the Chinese Politboro, the UN Security Council, the International Crimes Court, the African Union, and the Arab League. "The international is personal" is a starting point for making sense of Gap, Apple, Disney, Foxconn, Chiquita Banana, Deutsche Bank, and H&M, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, CARE, OXFAM, and Human Rights Watch. To make realistic sense of international politics, we need thorough, feminist-informed gender analyses of each of these organizations—and more.

One can do a feminist-informed gender analysis of anything. And each will make us smarter about how this world works, or fails to work.

Taking seriously the assertion that "the international is personal" means that women—in all their diversity—must be made visible, analytically visible, in our investigations of every one of these organizations, and in the relationships between these organizations. If it is true that cooperative as well as hostile relations between governments, corporations, and international organizations rely on constructions of women as symbols, women as providers of emotional support, women as both unpaid and low-paid workers, women as voters, and women as token participants, then it does not make sense to continue analyzing international politics as if women were a mere afterthought. It does not make sense to collect ungendered data on refugees, private security personnel, earthquake victims, militia members, corporate executives, factory owners, journalists, or peace negotiators. It does not make sense to treat women as if they made eye-catching photo images but do not need to be interviewed.

International policy-making circles may at times look like men's clubs, but international politics as a whole has required women to behave in certain ways. When enough women have refused to behave in those prescribed ways, relations between governments and between governments and corporations have had to change.

That is, women are not just the objects of power, not merely passive puppets or unthinking victims. As we have seen, women of different classes and different ethnic groups have made their own calculations in order to cope with or benefit from the current struggles between states. These calculations result in whole countries becoming related to one another, often in hierarchical terms. In search of adventure, the physical and intellectual excitement typically reserved for men, some affluent women have helped turn other women into exotic landscapes. In pursuit of meaningful paid careers, some women have settled in their governments' colonies or hired women from former colonies. Out of a desire to appear fashionable and bolster their sometimes shaky self-confidence, many women have become the prime consumers of products made by women working for low wages in dangerous factories. And in an effort to measure the progress they have made toward emancipation in their own societies, some women have helped legitimize international global pyramids of "civilization" and "modernity."

Therefore, when asking "Where are the women?"—and following up with "How did they get there?" "Who benefits from their being there?" and "What do they themselves think about being there?"—one should be prepared for complex answers.

Acting out of a new awareness that women, especially in poorer countries, need to be made visible—and audible—on the international stage, one can risk painting over the important dif-

ferences between women. The widening economic class differences between Chinese, for instance, are alarming even Beijing's male political elite. Those gaping inequalities are sharpening the differences between rural and urban women, between women married to politically connected businessmen and women working on the assembly lines in those men's factories. Noting inequalities among women is not just a comparative statement—for instance, noting that urban girls are more likely to reach secondary school than rural girls, or that affluent women are more likely to have access to the Internet than working-class women do. It is a comparative statement with relational consequences. Women's diverse experiences of social class—as well as of race and ethnicity—can translate into often surprising differences in understandings of femininity, in marital economics, in relationships with particular men, and in encounters with the state. In the United States, China, India, Turkey, South Africa, Vietnam, Mexico, Brazil, Malaysia, Iraq, and Egypt, these widening material and political inequalities between affluent women, middle-class women, urban poor women, and rural poor women, especially when exacerbated by racism and ethnocentrism, present daunting challenges for any women who are working to create and sustain a vibrant national or transnational women's movement.

Creating transnational women's banana workers' groups, launching the International Domestic Workers' Network, building a transnational alliance to lobby for a gender-conscious arms-trade treaty, organizing a transnational network of women living near overseas American military bases, creating unions for women garment workers, sustaining a transnational network of feminists living under patriarchal religious laws, building a UN-focused alliance that can take on the "unholy alliance"—

not one of these efforts has been easy. And every day there are those who act to defend their local or global stake in having diverse women lose trust in each other, withdraw support from each other. One might make a list of those patriarchal stakeholders, those people who have come to rely on women's fragmentation. Not all the people on the list will be corporate moguls and political autocrats.

Male officials who make foreign policy might prefer to think of themselves as dealing with high finance or military strategy, but in reality they have self-consciously designed immigration, tourism, labor, foreign service, cultural, and military-base policies in order to divide and control women. They rarely admit it, but they have acted as though their government's or organization's place in world affairs has hinged on how women behaved.

Uncovering these efforts has exposed men *as men.* International politics have relied not only on the manipulation of femininity's multiple meanings but also on the manipulation of ideas about masculinities. Ideas about adventure, modernity, civilization, progress, expertise, rationality, stability, growth, risk, trust, and security have been legitimized by certain kinds of masculinized values, systems, and behavior. That is one of the reasons that each of these ideas has become so potent.

Frequently, male government officials and company executives seek to control women in order to optimize their influence over other men: men as husbands, voters, migrant workers, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence operatives, plantation and factory managers, editors, and bankers. Thus, understanding the international workings of masculinity is important to making feminist sense of international politics. Men's sense of their own manhood has derived from their perceptions both of other men's masculinity and of the femininities of women of different races

and social classes. Thus a caveat: one cannot make adequate sense of the international politics of masculinity by avoiding paying close attention to women and femininity. Ideas about masculinities—the full array of masculinities—have been crafted out of ideas about, myths about, and uncertainties about femininities and about actual women. To conduct a reliable investigation of masculinity, one must take women seriously.

Climate change, capitalist globalization, the new arms race, and widening gaps between rich and poor—it is tempting to plunge into the discussion of any of these contemporary issues without bothering to ask, "Where are the women?" In fact, the more urgent the issue—"New York will soon be under water!" "China's military build up is going to set off a world war!"—the more reasonable it seems to *not* ask "Where are the women?" In patriarchal hands, "urgency" is the enemy of feminist investigation.

The previous chapters suggest, however, that these urgent issues demand a gendered analysis precisely because they are urgent, because they call for the fullest, most realistic understandings. As feminist environmental researchers and activists already are revealing, the causes of climate change, for example, and not just its effects, can be realistically tracked only if one exposes the workings of ideas about manliness and femininity and the relations between women and men, each fostered by the deliberate uses of political power. So too can the causes of the new arms race, exploitive globalization, and the widening gaps between rich and poor.

Theresa, Chobi, Takazato, Iris, and the other workshop participants are now, we can imagine, deep into their discussions. The deeper they dig, the more candid they become with each other. They have tried to create an atmosphere of trust, one that encourages each woman to be honest about her worries and puz-

zles. Together, they are on a journey to understand how banana plantations work, how garment subcontractors perceive women seamstresses, whose security a military base protects, and why women and men who employ domestic workers do not see them as real workers.

Every time the conversation slips into abstractions, one of the women pulls it back to women's complex everyday realities. This is what making feminist sense of international politics sounds like.